THE EVENING OF THE LAST SUPPER

HUBERT M. POSTON

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THE EVENING OF THE LAST SUPPER

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THE EVENING
OF THE
LAST SUPPER

A New Comparison
of the Records

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
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Chapter I.

First Principles.

I. *RÉSUMÉ.*

A BEATEN track of discussion, rapidly traversed, may presently lead us out into country unexplored.

According to the first Three Gospels (Matt. xxvi. 17 ff., Mark xiv. 12 ff., Luke xxii. 7 ff.—see the Reference Sheet at the end of the volume), Jesus ate the passover with his disciples before his trial and death. But according to the Fourth, the Jews were expecting to eat the passover afterwards. At the time of the trial, "they went not into the Prætorium, that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the passover" (John xviii. 28). And in the hour of the condemnation, we have reached, with John, only "the Preparation of the passover" (xix. 14). Out of this different placing of the passover, earlier in some accounts, later in another, arises one of the outstanding problems of New Testament enquiry.

The explanation offered from Tübingen years ago was that the Last Supper was indeed the passover-meal, as in the Synoptic Gospels, but that the writer of the Fourth Gospel, wishing to make the time of the passover-sacrifice seem to coincide with the time of the crucifixion, represented the passover-meal as coming later than it did:

his theological purpose thus bringing him into conflict with the standard accounts.

This is now largely replaced by the opposite critical view that John is right; and on this showing it has been held that the Synoptic Gospels have identified the Last Supper and the passover by a confusion.

On the other hand, a succession of scholars have adopted the historical rather than critical solution, that the supper eaten by Jesus with his disciples was not, indeed, the regular Jewish passover, but was *his* passover with them.

Now we shall apply to the records a method of investigation which has not, I believe, been tried upon them before. And though the statement of results has naturally to be made with the commonwealth of scholarship in view, I am glad to find by experiment that it is not beyond the range of the more general reader who really wishes to follow it. When the investigation is being laid bit by bit before a scholarly mind which has not yet the whole body of results before it the first effect is usually one of modified scepticism. But one grows accustomed to watching the first scepticism fade; and I do not know of a single instance yet of a scholarly critic carefully and persistently studying the facts as now presented, and not finding himself obliged in the end to admit the presence of a new problem.

The results of the investigation are: (i) to disclose a very peculiar formation in the writings, which appears to be due to the high vital tension under which they were produced; (ii) to make it evident that Jesus did appoint a passover to be eaten before

the disciples had been expecting it, and therefore before the passover eaten in the annual course by the Jews; and (iii) to suggest the presence of an authority behind the change which renders its interest for to-day not merely historical, but more profound and abiding.[1]

II. READINESS—AND *READINESS*.

We shall start from a point of coincidence, the full force of which will not be evident until it is seen in its larger setting.

The story which we are to read in the Three Gospels is one of making ready. In Mark and Matthew it opens with a question put by the disciples to Jesus: "Where will you have us . . . make ready *so that you may eat* the passover? (Mark xiv. 12), or "*for you to eat* the passover?" (Matt. xxvi. 17). Now it is admitted that that question would not of itself imply that the passover was to be eaten the same night: strictly, its terms do not require anything but a making ready *with a view* to the passover.[2] Luke's account, on the other hand, opens with a command of Jesus to the disciples: "Go and *make ready the passover* for us, that we may eat," (Luke xxii. 8). And there, undeniably, nothing less than the making ready of the meal itself is implied—a completed making

[1] I think it will become manifest that comparison of any outward feature of the meal with a pre-festival *kiddûsh* will not suffice to interpret the evidences of its comprehensive intention.

[2] The much-discussed dating which precedes the question in Mark will be fully considered later.

ready. The difference in the openings is that in Mark and Matthew the disciples do not plainly speak of more than making ready *for* a meal; in Luke, Jesus enjoins the making ready *of* the meal.[1] And if we could forthwith press this point, we could straightway, of course, reconcile the situation in the Three Gospels with the glimpse of the Jewish calendar in John. At the outset, we should say, the disciples were expecting to make more or less remote preparation for that same passover which the Jews ate after Jesus had died; and it was the requirement of Jesus himself, we should then argue—quite unforeseen by the disciples when they put the question—which forced them into the immediate making ready of the passover-meal—as Luke has it, "that we may eat!"

But then the two senses of readiness at the opening are in different accounts—what looks like the preliminary sense is in Mark and Matthew, what is certainly the complete sense is in Luke. If only the two senses, preliminary and complete, had appeared distinctly together, and plainly contrasted, in Mark, what a harmonist argument we could have made out of them—if, indeed, the position were not too plain for argument.

[1] One of my observant readers draws my attention to the way in which Shakespeare toys with an analogous distinction, just at the point where preliminary making ready *for*, would be passing over into final making ready *of*, the meal:

> *Lorenzo.* Go in, sirrah: bid them prepare for dinner.
> *Launcelot.* That is done, sir; they have all stomachs.
> *Lor.* Goodly Lord, what a wit-snapper are you! Then bid them prepare dinner.
> *Laun.* That is done too, sir; only "cover" is the word.
> *The Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Scene v (Lorenzo 3 ff.).

Well, two senses of readiness, preliminary and complete, do appear together in Mark (xiv. 15). And they appear so surprisingly together, that on looking to see what translators into English, French, German, Italian, and I know not what, have made of them, you will find that these scholars could not permit anything so unusual to appear in their renderings. They have obliterated the strange antithesis—"arranged ready, and there make ready"—by providing more ordinary variations of their own[1]: less likely, no doubt, to give one literary pause, but entirely disguising the existing repercussion of the Greek.

Now if you will consider the passage not as if you were handling so much literary material of which you are required to give a conventional and mechanical explanation, but as rousing yourself to some sense of possible living conversational values still discernible in the memoirs, you may find the expression both interesting and apparently revealing—as if a mind of very unusual quickness were behind it. It may be just as well to remember the fully respected tradition that Mark derived material from Peter, who was on the spot (Luke xxii. 8). There is certainly something here which can draw one into trying all one knows to catch that exact shade of sensibility which would naturally have shaped the utterance.

You will observe that in the first part of the expression there are two emphasising elements,

[1] "*Prepared*, make ready" (A.V.); "all ready, *prepare*" (Moffatt); "préparée, *apprêtez-nous*"; "bereitet, *richtet* (zu)"; "presta, *preparateci*." (The R.V., with its pruning-hook on inconsistency, correctly repeats the two "readys".)

neither of them necessary for making bare sense: "he (*himself*) will show you a large upper room, arranged *ready*." (Αὐτὸς, *he himself*, is emphatic in Mark's writing; and "ready" is here, of course, after "arranged," purely an emphasising adjunct.) Now why should there be this double emphasis? I can perceive but one assignable reason which fits both points at once. Suppose, as we shall find grounds for supposing, that the disciples, underneath the form of their "Where will you have us go off and make ready, so that you may eat the passover?" were really anxiously imagining that no place at all had been chosen, perilously late as it was, and no preparation at all yet made, though it might have been expected days ago. Then the remark that when they came to the appointed place the host *himself* would show them a room arranged *ready*, (instead of their having themselves to begin the making ready which they so eagerly proposed), would be as pointed a mild answer as misgiving allied to distrust could expect for its satisfaction.

The word "ready," then, would be the disciples' own word—used in its preliminary sense as they used it—and returned upon them. Luke omits it—omitting, as we shall particularly notice later, this whole side of the subject: he has no anxiously intervening disciples at the beginning of *his* story.

But if we proceed with Mark we may find ourselves forced very closely into touch with Luke.

In Mark, Jesus, having used the disciples' pressing word, immediately uses it again, in an altered sense, still more obviously taking up their question.

They asked, "*Where* shall we make ready?" He points and says, "*There* make ready." Where? Paradoxically, in the very place which he has just told them they will find *ready*. I should say that anyone who dismissed such play with the language of making ready in such a story of making ready, might be a little lacking faith in the vitality—and the vivacity—of his material.

Suppose the speaker meant that when they went to make ready where he sent them, they would find themselves doing it under conditions totally different from what they were demanding—suppose his persistence in the use of one word meant that they would find themselves constrained by the already inclined plane of preparation to add readiness to readiness, step to step, instead of pausing on a completion of the first readiness of the room. In the step by step language—"a room arranged ready—and there make ready"—would not word thus at once following word be fitted to the meaning more closely than we now fit gloves to hands? Would it not appear very satisfactory that Peter should have remembered, and Mark have recorded for us, a repetition the very simplicity of which so breathes inevitableness?

And in its position in Mark precisely at the end of the directions to the messengers, the passage looks like the Greek rendering of the incisive words which Peter would hear just before he actually started—the Master's summary of the situation, in *both* its aspects, in a few syllables—overlaying the disciples' thought of the preliminary readiness they were to make, by telling them in one touch of the

word that they would find it there before them, and in another and necessarily more advanced touch of the same word appointing for them a making ready which in these circumstances could not be any other than complete.

If it does not appear, when we have reached the end of the sentence, that for active purposes one sense of readiness has been superseded and replaced by another—if something like this is not the force of the two immediately conjoined senses of readiness—what force would you give them? And by what right should we say that in a story in which the presence of two significant senses of readiness has been suspected on quite other grounds by so many competent readers, the certainly unusual and inevitably contrasting conjunction of two senses of readiness at this concluding point in Mark is a thing to be disguised and put out of court at once as without significance?

Perhaps I should explain that I am here only raising a preliminary point which seems to me to have some cogency of its own, and which I thought might pretty easily be understood at once. I am not yet laying the main foundations of my conclusions. And owing to a besetting inability to write a large number of sentences at the same moment, and to make them simultaneously intelligible even to the most impatiently foreseeing reader who may be following a new argument of which unfortunately only the first parts can come first, I must perhaps be content, in what immediately follows, to blush for a while under the reproach of a croak at dawn—"precarious!" Anything that is at all delicate is

apt for that very reason to be at first precarious, but may point the way to what is ultimately not precarious.

I think it can be made to appear that if Jesus spoke thus he must surely have said something else which Mark in his undelaying tale has not included. If the Master was in effect telling his disciples to make ready the passover at a time when they expected only to be making ready the room, or doing other such preliminary preparation, then he was hastening the making ready of the passover for his little company in advance of the usual time—which usual time would thereupon appear to agree with the later time of the Jews' passover in John. But he could hardly convey the commission for so serious a new step in a quick sparkle of contrast just at the end of the directions; though that sparkle would most perfectly reflect the whole situation if a plain commission for a hastened step *had already been given.* Luke implies that a plain commission to make ready the passover had been given at the outset—this would be represented in his definite opening, "Go your way and make ready the passover for us, that we may eat"—and Luke also shows it reflected at the end in the repeated "there make ready," parallel to Mark (Luke xxii. 12). We may find ourselves called upon quite as much to account for the omission of this opening command from Mark as to account for its presence in Luke; and we may find neither accounting impossible.

The appearance of the two senses of readiness, one immediately over against the other, in this place in Mark, would, so far as it goes, support

the two senses of readiness elsewhere in the narratives. And if the authenticity of the presence of these senses at the *openings* should be otherwise fully confirmed, the outline of the story would be clearly before us; though the way in which the narratives have been written might raise a problem of a very far-reaching kind.

Perhaps the reader may like to consider his own answer to the two following questions before he goes further: First, can we give any full meaning to the noticeably unusual phrasing at the close of the directions in Mark, without understanding that the messengers are being led definitely past and beyond the thought of preliminary readiness to the thought of absolute making ready? And second: what is the object of distinctly marking the first and second of the senses thus together if the time of making ready is not being changed?

Already it may begin to seem that if we would explain the form of the words in Mark at all, the first part of the closing expression—"arranged ready"—must be understood in a way which would make it a very natural answer to the question of the disciples in the opening of Mark and Matthew (and an answer which puts it aside); while the second—"and there make ready for us"—must be repeating a command to make ready the passover itself, as in the opening of Luke.

This is a slight beginning in the handling of the history; but I shall for the moment leave it where it is, and make another slight beginning, this time from the critical side of the subject.

III. A FIRST GLIMPSE OF THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM.

We shall have to face the problem of the *distribution of material* among the narratives.

The facts immediately to be given are a first few which can easily be distinguished on the surface of the pages. The unskilled reader, who merely *reads over* what I say about them, may think them complicated and perplexing; but if the same reader, instead of trusting me to know my own business, will let nothing pass without testing my observations by the Reference Sheet, to see for himself whether I am right or wrong, he will find the facts so plain that a child might check them. Their significance is another matter.

So far as I know attention has not previously been directed to any of the following groups of facts except the last, which has been noted in a connection to which I shall refer later.[1]

Look first at the external shaping of the narratives. Mark's narrative consists mainly of two masses (distinguished by double brackets in the Reference Sheet), containing respectively the opening question of the disciples, and the detailed directions of Jesus to his messengers. Matthew, it will be noted, has Mark's first mass with slight difference. Matthew's second mass, whether it be derived from Mark or not, does not look so much as if it were a comparatively simple copy. Matthew takes over Mark's first mass as he does not take his second.

[1] Pp. 16, 17.

Luke, on the other hand, takes over Mark's second as he does not take his first. I tabulate this for comparison with similar groups of obvious fact, shutting all but the closely Marcan material for the moment out of account :

MATTHEW.	MARK.	LUKE.
Overture of the Disciples	Overture of the Disciples	(.....)
(.....)	Details of Directions	*Details of Directions*

Look next, within the story, at the handling of the history. Mark has two groups of *personnel* in touch with the Central Figure—first, *the general body of the disciples*, and then *the two messengers* whom Jesus appoints. In Matthew we see the general body of the disciples, but never distinguish the two messengers—he has Mark's first feature, but not his second. In Luke we distinguish the two messengers, but never see the general body of the disciples—he has Mark's second feature, but not his first.

This is division in the same form:

MATTHEW.	MARK.	LUKE.
The Disciples	The Disciples	
	The Two	*The Two*

Is this a new and distinct fact of arrangement, or simply a consequence of Matthew and Luke taking over different masses?

Observe how Luke, dealing only with the messengers—though he does not eliminate the touching use of the words "my disciples" from the utterance of Jesus himself (xxii. 11)—otherwise

keeps his own narrative framework entirely clear of that word, "disciples." Mark twice calls the messengers "disciples"—thus using the name of the general body of which they formed a part (xiv. 13, 16). Luke drops this—in the first instance by directly calling the messengers Peter and John, and in the second by simply omitting the word "disciples." In the first instance he is not taking over a Marcan mass, and in the second he is. But if he pointedly (and we shall find significantly) eliminates the name of "the disciples" from his narrative, both when he is taking over a mass and when he is not, the effect cannot be due to his taking over one particular mass of Mark's narrative. It is a separate fact.

Matthew, on the other hand, uses Mark's word "disciples" wherever Mark uses it, *except* at the beginning of xxvi. 18, where the messengers are being addressed by Jesus. Now if he had spoken of "the disciples" *simply* here, it might have seemed that Jesus was speaking to the general body, whom alone Matthew has previously mentioned; if he had drawn a definite distinction between the general body and those disciples addressed, it would no longer be true that the messengers were not separately distinguished in his narrative. What he does at this point is to omit all reference to sending "disciples," and he thus avoids either distinguishing the messengers as disciples from the general body, or confusing them with it. He even omits the pronoun of Mark xiv. 13 and Luke xxii. 10—"he said *to them*." Had he included so much as that, he might have seemed to be making Jesus speak

to the general body. He avoids at once explicit distinction and any confusion.

In xxvi. 19, "did" naturally takes a substantive subject, because there was no object to "said" in xxvi. 18. "Disciples" here is not dependent for significance on "disciples" in xxvi. 17, as a pronoun in xxvi. 18 would have been.

Now such perfect exactness on both sides—Luke keeping clear of the very fringes of the first feature, and Matthew keeping clear of the second, yet without confusing it—is what might happen if there were some hitherto unnoticed and unexplained *discriminative* action. It would be a very curious accident if there were none. As following the form of the arrangement of the masses, it would be especially curious.

Observe next how the story begins in exactly the same form (Matt. xxvi. 17, Mark xiv. 12, Luke xxii. 7):

MATTHEW.	MARK.	LUKE.
first . . .	first	
	day . . .	*day* . . .

This may seem not only small but insignificant. Yet the fact is there at the beginning, and the division is uniform with the rest. It will be found in the end that the phrasing shifts exactly with the standpoints of the narratives.

From this immediate introduction to the story, look back to what will appear as its remoter introduction—the first reference to the passover-season during which the event took place (Matt. xxvi. 2,

Mark xiv. 1, Luke xxii. 1). Mark has the double title for the season, "the passover and the unleavens." Matthew again has the first, "the passover," but not the second. Luke, on the other hand, puts the second first, in full setting as "the feast of the unleavens." It is important for the development of the story that he here does not omit the first; but he introduces it in the form of a citation, "*known as* passover." (The use of a capital for "passover," with none for "unleavens," whether in Greek editions or English versions, has a rather question-begging effect on relative prominence.) The distribution of the grammatically direct titles for the feast-time which is the occasion of our story is the same as that of the masses, the *personnel*, and the initial dating:

MATTHEW.	MARK.	LUKE.
passover	passover	
	unleavens	(feast of the) *unleavens*

IV. A PROBLEM SEEN IN GERM.

Here are a very few first facts, all prominent either through their function in the narrative, or by position. Their appearing two and two in Mark, and in first file in Matthew, in second file in Luke, is evident in sheer physical presence to the eye. Whether this division, in view of the different *kinds* of facts involved—mass, feature, details—would be likely to arise without any discriminative cause for it, may perhaps be better determined when the facts of distribution have multiplied themselves upon our view. It is at any rate useless to attempt

to account for it by Matthew's and Luke's casual elimination of "duplicate expressions" of Mark's. Canon Streeter observes: "Mark is very fond of 'duplicate expressions,' such as 'Evening coming on, when the sun set' (i. 32). In these cases one or other of the later Evangelists usually abbreviates by leaving out one member of the pair; and not infrequently it happens that Matthew retains one and Luke the other. Thus in the above example, Matthew writes 'evening coming on,' Luke 'the sun having set.'"[1] But in the passage before us it will be observed that Mark's second mass is not a duplicate of his first, nor are the two messengers in any intelligible sense a duplication of the general body of the disciples. Yet the division applies equally to these with the other elements—first to Matthew, second to Luke. The only expression which could be considered provocatively "duplicate" is the twofold title of the season—"the passover and the unleavens"; and here Luke does not eliminate the duplicate.

Mr. Robinson Smith, in his *Solution of the Synoptic Problem*, repeats the verbal examples of division which he had published in the *Hibbert Journal* (April, 1912) before I had made my own observations without being aware of his. It should be clear, however, from the examples which we are collecting that the problem of division is not merely verbal, but also narrative; not so simple, but more complex. Mr. Robinson Smith draws inferences from his instances, without, to my mind, explaining ours. While he thinks the examples show that Matthew had "'first choice,' as it were,"[2] and attributes

[1] *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins*, pp. 163–4.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

the complement on the other side to Luke being "all for variety,"[1] he does not help us to understand why "*first choice*," which is surely, if anything, the most open choice, should have led to any such complex and determinate *choice of firsts*, and avoidance of seconds, as we detect in this narrative; nor why the play of a taste for variety should have expressed itself in a corresponding regularity. The problem as measured by Mr. Smith does not seem to be quite our problem.

Of the examples which we have noticed, or shall have to notice, he has only "the passover and the unleavens," cited (in the article, not the volume), with a *preceding* "after two days," as an illustration of the "first choice" falling to Matthew, the second to Luke, who "retains only the third part" of Mark's total phrase. In his reference to Mark xiv. 12 he does not make clear the division of "the first day."

Suppose that observation, as it proceeds, should show the first few examples to be the advance-guard of a host of closely packed and definitely ordered distributions of material which would make the word "chance" the mockery of itself. What would the position be then? The accepted view that Matthew and Luke used Mark, or something closely Marcan, as their "document" agrees very well with the facts so far; and we shall not dispute it. But it would agree without explaining. The presence of the document with Matthew, and likewise with Luke, could not possibly of itself constrain them to divide its features, nor could it press the resulting halves upon their respective manuscripts, each time in the order of first to Matthew and second to Luke. Even with two or more documents allowed, you could hardly, without felt artificiality,

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

make their imagined differences accord with the ramifications of the manifest division—which will ramify further yet. Nor could tradition, developing variously in various communities, be expected to discriminate between files of halves in this exact fashion, any more than the strokes of a bludgeon would neatly shell peas. A documentary or traditionary theory might have been sufficient to explain something more or less *like* what has happened, with the facts less distinct than we shall find them. Neither is sufficient, nor are both together sufficient, to explain what has happened in its own definiteness—always supposing that the facts themselves will be sufficient to show that our problem is a real problem.

It does not appear, I may remark, that the problem would be eased by trying to treat it, on ordinary methods, as one of the composition of Mark's narrative by a "conflation" of Matthew and Luke. When we have the facts more fully before us, it may be seen plainly how prohibitive is the difficulty of getting the two complementary and antithetic accounts by two different writers into existence for a beginning. And the conflation would still be very extraordinary indeed.

A little cleft, persistently present in the petals of a flower, may look *almost* as if it could have been produced with a knife; to learn how it *has* been produced, as it now is, you might have to go deep into the secrets of vitality, and explain much beside it. Our facts are but four, chosen for stark obviousness, but I think they may be just sufficient to illustrate another way of looking at the whole subject.

No one, I suppose, will dispute the scientific justice of the interpretative requirement that "something new and elemental must always be introduced whenever what is known of other elemental facts is proved to be unable to explain the facts in a new field of investigation."[1] But when a cautious modern scholar, after a critical survey of the larger range of facts to which these just given are a faint introduction, becomes unexpectedly convinced that the larger whole is offering him a new problem, and not a gratuitous phantasy, one can hardly be surprised to find him almost equally convinced still that the right way to solve it can only be by some further application of the methods of literary reconstruction in which he is already versed. Quite clear about the immediate naturalness of such methods, deeply impressed by their logical success in dealing with the observations to which they have been applied in the past, and fortified in his adherence to them by their general and almost exclusive acceptance, he finds it difficult to believe that he has now reached a stage of observation at which they will cease to promise any full and final success even in appearance. And yet the more closely he tries his familiar methods the more manifest it may become that he cannot exactly adapt them to the newly emerging demands of the facts, and that he has now no other alternative than either to leave the problem unsolved, or to try some fresh type of solution not within the scope of current practice. I have not so far heard of any case of the evidence now to be presented

[1] Driesch, *Science and Philosophy of the Organism* (Gifford Lectures, 1907–8), Vol. I., p. 142.

having been gone through with scholarly care twice (so as to see the details afresh in the light of the very definite whole which they are found in the end to compose), without the experimenting scholar becoming consciously unable to supply any satisfactory explanation of what is before his eyes, unless he will consent to suppose the presence of some more comprehensive form of *vital* causation behind the present facts than the current literary methods of explanation have led us to conceive as necessary.

The reader may be none the worse equipped for the strangeness of the ways which may ultimately bring him to the same predicament, if he can take to heart point by point (irony and all), the principle of research laid down by one of the most honoured of recent guides into the latent causes of the puzzling appearances presented by things that live: "Never refuse to see what you do not want to see, or what might go against your own cherished hypotheses, or against the views of authorities. These are just the clues to follow up, as is also, and emphatically so, the thing you have never seen or heard of before. The thing you cannot get a pigeon-hole for is the finger-point showing the way to discovery."[1]

It is widely recognised that the narratives of the Gospels are an account of a unique manifestation of vitality in the world. It will probably be admitted that the writers themselves were not unresponsive to that vitality. We cannot, especially in view of the nature of the permanent effects of the writings, *a priori* exclude the possibility that they were pro-

[1] Manson-Bahr and Alcock's *Life and Work of Sir Patrick Manson*, p. 235.

duced under conditions of uniquely intensified vital tension. And it might therefore appear, even upon the face of it, not wholly certain that reconstructive methods which would apply equally to material produced at a quite low vital tension would conduct us automatically to a really sufficient interpretation of the conditions of their origination. And the problem with which we find ourselves confronted on close observation seems to have features in common with the problem of vital development in general—we may find ourselves unexpectedly constrained by the shape of our facts to resort to types of conception and explanation by no means without some resemblance to those to which Driesch of Heidelberg, that great leader among philosophical biologists, has found himself constrained to resort for the interpretation of vital processes going on in the world of space about us. Driesch, it may be remembered, examining in his own sphere what we call the manifestations of life in the world, discovers it to be impossible to account for distinctive types of vital arrangement of material which come before him, unless he supposes a special kind of causality to be at work—a kind of causality which forms not merely collections of material, but definite *unities in material*;[1] unities with a

[1] He speaks of "unifying causality" (*History and Theory of Vitalism*, p. 201; *The Problem of Individuality*, p. 52). He appears definitely to have abandoned his universally spatial conception of cause, which left vital "entelechy" as a source of arrangement without being a "cause." (On "entelechy," compare note, p. 28, *infra*.) Cp. *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, Vol. II., pp. 156–157 and 316, with *History*, p. 207; and on the positive side, p. 203, with the "non-mechanical agent" or "entelechy," as "bearer of individualising causality." (But cp. also *Science and Philosophy*, p. 260.)

principle of their own, and with a constitution not to be sufficiently explained by the piecemeal methods of reconstruction which serve us very well in explaining less evidently vital, less definitely unified, forms of arrangement of material found in the world. He raises, indeed, the question how far, if we could survey the inorganic world,[1] or the field of history,[2] with ampler knowledge and enhanced capacity,[3] we should find there also the traces of a like causality, introducing latent unity in a wider range. Into these speculations I am not now going to accompany him; but I believe that anyone who will carefully and sufficiently follow the quite definitely distinguishable kind of arrangement of material which prevails closely throughout the narratives which are to come before us, and will reason exactly upon them, may find himself confronted by a suddenly increased scientific probability that there has entered into the production of the Gospels, as a total group, a type of causation which is more profoundly allied to that type of causation which is traced in the world of organising life, than to those more divided sorts of literary and traditionary causes on which current theorising about the origins of the Gospels so absorbingly relies—reasonably, indeed, supposing such causes to have been present and to be still traceable with some degrees of probability, but more precariously assuming them

[1] *Science and Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 350; *History*, pp. 216 ff., 229 ff.; *Individuality*, pp. 67, 68, cp. p. 75.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119, 344 ff.; *History*, pp. 216 ff., 222, 229; *Individuality*, pp. 58 ff, 66.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 350; *History*, pp. 225–6, 231; cf. *Individuality*, p. 73.

to have been sufficient by themselves to account for the existing and still traceable types of relation between the contents of the narratives.

The argument for vitalism in Biology depends much on the watching of actual processes and varying their conditions. This is not possible in attempting to determine the causes which may have operated in giving shape to an ancient literature. But though the actual processes are beyond the reach of observation and experiment, the existing facts may suggest their affinity in some sort with those on which organised structure in general is found to depend.

The area of investigation here is narrow, because examination must be detailed; and I need not labour the reasons for a small book. I am here making no assertion about any portion of the Gospels except as I have it under examination; and the facts can hardly be met by discussing the relations of theories of inspiration which I have not advanced to passages which I have not reached. When the proposal that I should occupy a larger area accompanies a thorough handling of the facts here presented, it suggests an obvious line of progress; when it accompanies, or partly forms, an apology for inadequate present examination of what is offered it suggests the endless allurements of futility. The facts now to be pointed out have been acknowledged as sufficient within their own area to raise a question for sincere answer.

Take the few facts already before us—not in any way for proof: it is not time to profess to offer proof, or to ask for it, with only four groups before us—but purely by way of illustration and partial

analysis of one of the forms which unity of action might conceivably be found to take. We are at present using facts of an external and generally visible kind by way of easy introduction. There is in each group, first, a content of Mark (of widely different range in the different examples), which is capable of being treated as double, although we might not, on simple inspection, have thought it so. Matthew and Luke, *together*, can be seen to have treated it as double (whether intentionally or not), by halving it, and severally exhibiting the halves. Suppose for a moment (without exerting that crushing power of negative foresight which can always be worked in entire independence of examination, and which, in the history of knowledge, has produced results worthy of its character), that this exhibition of the halves should prove throughout to bring into relief two cardinal aspects of the story. Suppose when these two cardinal aspects are recognised, in Mark and elsewhere, it gradually becomes evident that the cause of the endless critical trouble, in diversified forms, with which we are now familiar in the study of these particular narratives, has lain just in the failure properly to discriminate these very two aspects, and to carry the discrimination resolutely through—so that when we have done this we unexpectedly find ourselves able to supply a vital solution to a number of familiar and hitherto disconnected problems on *one consistent principle*. Suppose it should therefore appear that the division (which someone compared to a jigsaw puzzle, which he might in turn compare with every example of vital organisation which ever came under his

observation in Nature), is after all likely to be of both critical and narrative importance, if we could assure ourselves of its validity. Who, then, of the three, produced it? We shall show that it could not have been produced in the form in which we now find it, without a special arrangement of material in Mark. But it is not Mark who makes the division of his own material visible: it is Matthew and Luke. Does Matthew make the division? No; he takes only one side, which effects no balanced division of emphasis. Does Luke? Luke would be equally ineffective in this relation without Matthew. *You could not possibly perceive the effect unless you had all three writings before you.* If we are looking at an effect at all (and we shall see how difficult it becomes to deny it), it is in its very essence a combined effect. You cannot discern any portion of it simply by looking at its parts; you can discern it only by looking at it as a whole. And if, in this story, it represents a significantly maintained uniformity in the grouping of the material—a kind of effect continually involved throughout these particular narratives—the contributions of the several writers to the uniform effect would be more or less analogous to the functions of the members of a vital unity combined in producing corporate effects. No one seems able to suggest any other analogy. Nor has there been a single instance known to me of anyone directly discussing the main facts in detail and not in the end admitting the reality of the analogy.[1]

[1] The adequacy of the word "analogy" in this connexion has been questioned. It may stand for the present as a *minimum* statement of the relation. The specific confession of a "real analogy" was contained in that one of the sets of reports upon

V. MISCONCEPTIONS OF VITAL UNITY.

And yet it may be allowed at once that a large number of well-informed objections to the idea of any such unity of balance entering into the composition of the Gospels may be raised forthwith before taking the subject into serious consideration at all. It will probably be found that most of them depend on some latent fixed assumption about the manner in which the vital causation must be supposed to have operated.

There is one form of objection which may seem to be especially liable to afford an illusory satisfaction to a mind which, though versed in the current literary problems of the Gospels, is not well practised in following the subtlety of vital processes. We have spoken of coming evidence of some kind of vitally unified action. But does not each of the several evangelists, it may be asked, persist preferentially in his own particular narrative method, in his own particular style, and even in his own particular grammatical habits? How is this compatible with strands of any kind of vitally governed unity of design in their total product? I do not think the objection remains anything like so formidable if we know how to take up the biological point of view, as it may appear to the objector who is using it as a ground for keeping the biological point of view out of consideration. Take a hint from the biologist in his own field.

the argument which up to now remains the most backward in definite admission of those which I know to have been based upon repeated study. See p. 113.

Driesch's discernment of the limitations[1] under which the vital principle works in producing organic unities leads him to suggest that its action may be characteristically *suspensory*[2]—that is to say, speaking rather roughly, while the constituents of a vital system work, when they do work, strictly according to their given capacities, yet their action may be suspended by the vital influence, and then released under such conditions as will render it contributory to the balanced unity of the organised result. Now higher conscious life regularly manifests itself in a higher capacity for search. And if we suppose inspiration to involve an access of life which promotes search, and which so maintains search as to suspend final settlement of utterance until some fitting form of deliverance has been attained, and its attainment has been confirmed to the writer by a sense of perfected Divine communion in what he is doing, we may be able to conceive sufficiently for present purposes how the characteristic individual aims of the writers should have been left intact to work themselves out, and yet the result of their combined action should include the distinctly traceable, if highly subtle, form of unity which will be exemplified by the narratives which we have undertaken to examine. My object in the present work, however, is not to insist on any theory of inspiration. Our convictions about inspiration,

[1] *Science and Philosophy*, Vol. II., pp. 181–4; *History*, p. 204; *Individuality*, p. 38.

[2] *Science and Philosophy*, Vol. II., pp. 179 ff.; *History*, p. 203; *Individuality*, p. 37. He holds it not absolutely unthinkable that "entelechy" *might* create energy—*Individuality*, p. 36; cp. *Science and Philosophy*, Vol. II., p. 236.

as I shall point out in the conclusion, ought to depend on spiritual perceptions which cannot be secured to us merely by a study of literary structure such as that in which we shall be engaged. Our results will be compatible, I believe, with a profounder conviction of spiritual inspiration than we can logically base upon our present limited enquiry—as the results of Driesch appear to be compatible with a theism at which he does not arrive on the terms of his theory.[1] I am at present only indicating in advance that it might not be impossible, with due patience, to state a reasonable view of inspiration which would cover the facts, and at the same time obviate hastily triumphant objections arising out of interesting preliminary comparisons of literary manner and aim.

Again, as more than one scholar has referred in the discussion to "hypnotism," or "automatic writing," as if I might be thought to be consciously or unconsciously involved in some such conception of what has happened, let me say emphatically that I cannot distinguish so much as even an effective analogy between genuine vital governance and any kind of induced automatism. Look for a moment at vital governance cosmically. The very animal is guided by vital instincts with ends which range beyond its individual planning; but any individuality which it possesses is not thereby limited; and again, at a higher level of life, a man who follows conscience is guided by a direction which he has not fathomed, to ends beyond his individual searching out; but

[1] *History*, p. 239.

he is not the less a forceful personality for that.[1] What reason is there, then, in the nature of life, for supposing that any effective vital adjustment of the actions of the contributors to the most vitally influential group of narratives in the world could show itself only through an infringement of their genuine individuality?

It is one thing to demand sufficiently definite and accumulated evidence of anything of the kind having taken place, quite another to become confused over the delicacy of the problems which vital adjustment raises, and then to make one's own confusion a ground for excluding vital adjustment from contemplation. In examining the most commonplace or the most vivid of objects which exhibits life, you may never be able to explain to the bottom how part works with part as it does, or how the processes in different parts of the living whole keep step with one another, or anticipate one another as required. The great first point is that, if you can *see* that they work in this way, you must acknowledge that they do, and work from that fact. It is never safe to form the habit of accepting facts only as you can explain them; in that way observation and explanations are likely both to go wrong, and we are apt to set down as the effect of an already fully practised judgment what is really due to lack of progressive perception.

[1] Driesch observes that while conscience is as contrary to "entelechy" (the vital agent of arrangement in the individual organism) as entelechy is to mechanics, yet in *some* way it shows a certain similarity to instinct (*Science and Philosophy*, Vol. II., p. 120). He seems to be employing the English word "contrary" merely to signify abstract oppositions.

On the other hand, it should be plain that if the facts force upon us a more "vitalistic" interpretation of the processes underlying the production of the narratives, we do not thereby blind ourselves to the ordinary literary or traditionary processes which may at the same time have been involved, any more than the vitalist, convinced that he cannot wholly explain the vital processes of a plant by physics and chemistry, thereupon turns his back upon his physical laboratory.

And though it is perfectly true, as I have been reminded, that the Gospels have been in profitable human use for nearly two thousand years before I was born, yet if there should be in the familiar writings permanent traces of a vitally co-ordinated activity—traces partly consisting, like the evidence for vitalism in general, of arrangements of material for which it is difficult to find any satisfactory explanation without supposing the presence of some subtly regulative type of causation—I see nothing anomalous in their being first observed in a day like ours. Common salt has been in familiar human use for much more than two thousand years. But, to-day, not only has its internal crystalline structure been investigated by processes the prospect of which, to physicists living not long since, might have seemed wholly visionary, but the living cell also, unforeseen in structure like the atoms of which it is built, is revealing new complexities at every stage of examination. Very important inferences have been drawn within the last generation or two from the distribution of material in the Gospels; and it would seem to be a matter of genuine

responsibility to know as accurately and intimately as we can what that distribution actually is.

VI. THREE QUESTIONS.

The student who proceeds into the subject may find three questions arising in his mind, and may do well to keep them before him in their distinct logical order:

First, do the observable facts, when fully assembled together, raise a new problem? (If this question, taken apart, can be answered in the affirmative while the answers to the others remain yet undetermined, it may conduce to progress to keep this first answer unconfusedly before the mind.)

Second—a less elementary question—does the solution of that problem really require the supposition of a special vital form of causation having been at work in the production of any portions of the Gospels, or can it be solved otherwise?

Third, if the problem cannot be solved otherwise, in what manner must that vital causation be supposed to have operated?

To raise arresting problems involving the third question before one has thought to any conclusion upon the first two, may well tend to disperse one's apprehensions of the clearest evidence.

Chapter II.

The Errand into the Unknown.

Our view of the history will be dependent upon our analysis of the material. The less logical, but perhaps more lucid order, will be to sketch out the history before showing the analysis; picturing nothing, however, for which no analytic reason can be given.

I. CROSS PURPOSES.

The Master was about to leave his disciples, and pass on into the unseen. To him the prospect was real; to them, shadowy. And in the hours between the close of his public ministry and his actual going he taught them, not in words only, but in solid fact, one last great lesson in which the daunting unknown was translated into terms of the familiar and homely, the unseen made substantial even for slow imagination.

His first step was temporarily to leave them, even as he would soon be leaving them more permanently. And as his intended retreat was in Jerusalem itself, he would naturally, at such a time, go before the sun rose, and return after it had set.

I am not overlooking ὀψία, *evening*, in Mark xiv. 17 and Matt. xxvi. 20. There is something to be pointed out about that word.[1]

Unwilling as they had been to admit the thought of his dying, the disciples to-day could not help

[1] See Chapter IX.

realising what it would be like to be without sight of him or sound of his voice. And there was something ominous about the day. It was the 13th of Nisan. On the 14th the people would be attending on the sacrificing of the passover-lambs in the Temple, and then, after nightfall, would come the passover-meal. But Jesus had said nothing of any making ready for the passover to his disciples. In the ordinary course, their preparation should have been in hand for some time already. Was he indeed going to die, and losing concern for future earthly affairs, his own and theirs? That he should have brought them up to Jerusalem, and not be going to eat the passover with them was incredible. He must be going to eat the passover—and not die!

It was well that they should pursue their thoughts now, and remember, after he was passed into the silence, how their thoughts about his silence while yet with them had been traitors, and traitors presently exposed by what they learned about him.

In Jerusalem, hitherto unvisited by them and unknown to them, was an upper room, not unknown to Jesus: between Jesus and the deeply trusted owner of that room it was understood that when the season for his use of the room was come—a use which Jesus alone could have explained to anyone—it should be his. When Jesus left the house to-day it contained a room "arranged ready" for his disciples. But all that day no one saw him there—the room could be approached, Eastern fashion, by an outside staircase, without entering the house below.

In that room, before the blinding shock of his death came upon his disciples, he would eat with them a passover with an outlook towards the fulfilment of all the best that earthly passovers had meant. Held on a day unknown to earlier statute, and without concern for sacrifice in the Temple, this would be a passover liberated from old conditions of time and place, and gathered about a new Personal centre. And one looking back to that night long afterwards, and seeking words to utter the unutterable, as he recalled its glow of manifested love, could not see it simply as part of a succession of earthly events, but discerned it whelmed in heavenly reality.

If Jesus had had fellowship with his own under limiting earthly conditions, and now realised, not only beyond his suffering, but before it, the glow of a limitless fellowship, soon to be enjoyed with his Father, this did not mean that he was leaving the earthly fellowship behind for the heavenly: rather the earthly fellowship with his own began to share in the intensity, and even to enter into the liberation, of the heavenly. He was straitened only in them.

But while he was coming back to them, soon now to begin to disburden himself of the rich secret he had kept till its time, their imaginations were clinging desperately to the fixed and familiar course of the passover-season, to shut out the sight of tragedy.

The sun went down. And as the Jewish dates were reckoned from sunset to sunset, it was now the 14th of Nisan—the very day of the passover-sacrifice. When the sun went down again, it would

be the 15th, and the time for the passover-feast to be eaten. And no preparation was yet given them to make; no place for it, even, appointed.

So when he came again to them, with heaven in his heart, and with the beginning of the secret about to pass his lips, they were upon him with a requisition for the beginning of the regular course. They did not even ask whether he wished preparation to be made. The only question was, "*Where* will you have us be gone and make ready for you to eat the passover?" Anxiety dissembled itself under peremptoriness; fear, perhaps, took on a futile accent of force.

Try to imagine him, with his preparation for his own Divinely tender and far-reaching purpose in hand, *replying* to such an irruption of commonplace. If the narratives are as vital and sensitive as we shall show, is it not decorous that the first revelation of a purpose heavenly in its freedom, and ultimately boundless in its significance, should not appear shadowed by anything so alien, nor emerge as if it were a mere reply to it, but should appear elsewhere in its true force of unique initiative: the beginning of the life of the event?

II. CHARACTERISTIC SPEECH.

On close analysis,[1] it will be found that the similarity between the question in Mark and the command in Luke does not conform to any known type of literary variation. Another explanation of the similarity is possible.

[1] See pp. 153 ff. and cp. p. 221.

We have seen from Mark that Jesus, at the close of the directions to his messengers, repeated the disciples' word[1]; and there could be no more forcible way of quite obliterating their misplaced proposal to "make ready" than by writing over it, as it were, that word, "arranged *ready*." Then he repeated it again, telling them to make ready indeed, but not as they had intended. Now if, as an organic view of the narratives will imply, he had already done something like this, but in ampler form, at the beginning of his speaking to them—in his first command—this at the end of Mark would be a quick sparkle after the first great flash of the revelation of his supplanting intention. Examination might suggest that it was a more frequent habit with the great Teacher than we might suppose, to impress the consciousness of men by reflecting back upon them their own words or manner of speech. And how could he meet them with a more irresistible assertion of his own purpose, driving their frail interference away before its returning wave, than by speaking apart to two of them in disclosure which left their words forceless by giving their sounds to use of which the speakers had had no dream?

"Go your way and *make ready the passover* for us—*that we may eat!*"

That, in this ominous hour, when so much was strange, could only mean an instant and complete making ready—quite different from what they had asked. What wonder if obedience (as the narratives when we examine them may seem to suggest) was

[1] See p. 6 and cp. pp. 148 ff., 172–17.

at first like the obedience of men half stunned, and only gradually awakening to a sense of the path they trod?

He had not answered their question, "where?" and the messengers, told to go, but not told where to go, might have some consciousness of the discipline under which they were come, as the question "where?" naturally passed their lips again, but now in simple enquiry, purged of all assumption. And still he did not tell them where. They were to follow his path into what was to them, though not to him, the unknown.

We learn on historical testimony that Mark's base was Peter's reminiscence. Peter was one of the "two." And when we read Mark with careful psychology we shall perhaps perceive how the narrative is still shaped at points by Peter's remembered suspense in going on that errand to a house unvisited and a host unmet, to do at the command of Jesus what had never been done thus on earth before.

III. CONTACTS.

On that 13th of Nisan, before sunset brought in the 14th, we may picture a going to the Pool of Siloam, near the Fountain Gate, to draw pure water for the making of unleavened bread for the passover. We may imagine one who had joined in this going having been instructed to appear by and by elsewhere, in isolation from the rest, where his water-pot might stand forth as a point of not too marked distinction, and meanwhile so timing his stay at a friendly house as to be approaching a more northerly

portal of the city from within at the hour when the messengers were to reach it from without on their way from the Mount of Olives; then, as soon as recognised, he might turn into his way home without joining them, so that no one might know that they were an intentional group. This would agree with his "meeting" them, as in an opposed direction, and their "following him," as in the same direction. And undistracted in this strange hour by needing to remember waymarks and turnings, undisturbed by conversation with a stranger, they could follow him to the place of destiny.

Jesus may have left but time for them to finish their simple preparation before he himself was at hand.[1] Probably the disciples would follow him, not to attract attention, in twos or even ones and twos, only near enough for those behind to be still *mediately* following the leader who alone knew the way. And why should it be supposed that Mark's "he comes with the Twelve" (xiv. 17) implies that the two went all the way back to the starting-point to join in a coming which might naturally be arranged in circumstances of secrecy rather than of social converse? If, with their task finished, they went but a few steps before they distinguished Jesus coming, and turned and became part of the company moving to the upper room, how would it be less true that Jesus at last came

[1] The time required for preparation may have been comparatively very short. That there was no lamb seems rendered probable by the fact that it was of bread from the table that Jesus said, "This is my body," thus indicating the supreme passover-victim. The presence of a lamb would not fall into the main imagery of the meal.

"with the Twelve," than if the two had twice walked all the way from the Mount of Olives?

Then having sunk back upon the couch at last, in the joy of the beginning of fruition even now,[1] with the strain of longing and secrecy past, he told them what had been in his heart for that night, and pointed them forward to no more earthly passovers, but to "fulfilment in the kingdom of God." It was almost that now: for in the prospect of "passing from this world to the Father, having loved his own which were in the world, he loved them with love ranging to the goal."

IV. ANOTHER HOUSE.

We have spoken of Peter, and suggested that from him we derive a vividness which we shall have to notice in the portrayal of what up to now had taken place. Another of the two pioneers was John; and we shall find under his name the deepest interpretation both of what *had* taken place, and what was still going on. That is what we have next to show. In the beginning, our circumstantial conclusion that *the familiar words of "the Fourteenth of John" turn the disciples' recent errand, with the surrounding experience of the whole passing day, into a closely pursued parable of the impending and eternal future* may seem to be based on unstable conjectural grounds. Let the grounds be pondered till they are severally distinct, and it may become

[1] On the precise conditions under which an expression of desire can imply *non*-fulfilment, see Chapter III.; where also a very distinct syntactical confusion in the now prevalent negative interpretation is pointed out.

evident that it is beyond the power of conjecture to get rid of the force of the manifest coincidence. It can be seen at once that there is nothing conjectural about the statement that we have in the Three Gospels an account of a going to a house with a trusted housemaster, and in John a prospect of another going to a house with a Housemaster for whom trust is bespoken. And more follows.

Jesus told his disciples that he was "faring away." (Reference Sheet, No. II.) If the events had been taking the course which I think we can substantiate by point-by-point comparison, this might begin to mean that the earlier day's faring away and absence, now ended, was only the presage of another soon to begin.

And "where he was faring away, they could not come." This brings up Peter, who would hardly have been Peter if he had not been restive under the restraint of being unable to follow Jesus where he was gone during the day—we are still anticipating the substantiation. But if restrained at first, he had been bidden to follow the path when the time was come. And to him Jesus now says, "Where I fare away, you cannot follow me now, but you shall follow afterwards." How soon would Peter begin to understand?

Observe, by the way, that on the reading which no one, so far as I know, thinks of challenging upon the textual evidence, Jesus, though he speaks of Peter not being able to follow him at once, does not speak of his following *him* afterwards. On the way to the upper room just now, Peter had not followed him, but only "followed afterwards" on the way by which Jesus had previously "fared away."

Could Peter, could they, go on listening, and *not* understand? Jesus had sent his messengers to a house yet unvisited, and a host yet unseen, promising them ample accommodation—"a large upper room." They did not understand then why he should feel, to his heart, the "largeness" of that room. For they did not know his parable. But now he began to tell them of another house yet unvisited, with another Housemaster yet unseen, and again in that house he promised them ample accommodation—now in the range of "*many* resting-places."

Here, indeed, there was but one resting-place, though large, and when the messengers came to it it might have seemed a little lonely and apart amid the "many" rooms in preparation for to-morrow's feast; but if in the city were rooms treasuring up resting-places for a people widely dispersed, here in this one room, so little recognised to-night, was the prophecy of the resting-places for the festal travellers from all lands. Are we surprised that Jesus should rejoice in it as "large?"

In this friend's house, then, Jesus had resource, even on earth, of which his disciples had not known; but if they could see *his Father's* house!

And if he had lately told them they would find in this house a place "made ready," now he told them they would find one in the house yonder. More—*he told them why*.

But first he told them of the conditions of the way. Peter, we think, through Mark, is witness to us of the tone with which he had previously spoken to those whom he set upon their way to this

house in which they now were—we shall find, as we look intimately into what Jesus had said, that he knew what their suspense would be in the going to this house in Jerusalem. But what suspense is like that with which men fare on through this visible world towards the unseen? It is in the same spirit in which he dealt with the going to one house that he deals with the dreaded going to the other. "Let not your heart be disquieted," he says. We shall later see the coincidence here with the tranquilising manner in Mark and Luke.

But why, we may ask at once, ought not their heart —their "heart," not "hearts": their sense in common —why ought not their heart to have been disquieted in going just before on an unprecedented errand to claim the countenance of a host they had never seen? Already when they started, *if they trusted Jesus*, they would be trusting the master of the unseen house in Jerusalem, for it was Jesus who knew him, and assured them of him. And his way of freedom from disquiet for them now is, "be believing in God, and *in me* be believing." And when our examination grows intenser we may perceive that the second trusting—"*in me*"—is presented as if it were the support of the first—"in God."

So comes the "house"—not now just of an earthly friend with whom Jesus seems to have had, indeed, rich and ripe relations of confidence, but, secure in profounder relations of eternal intimacy, "the house of my Father."

And there they will find the many "staying-places." In the earthly house, according to

Mark, he promised them literally a "doffing-place"—a place where you put off the journeying tackle and turn in. In the heavenly, according to John, he promises them "staying-places." Both are travellers' words, both call up the same image; but the first is only upon the edge of the coming quiet, the second right in the midst of it.

And I cannot but notice that he seems to say with emphasis, "many resting-places *are*"—with εἰσιν, *are*, at the end of the sentence. They *are*, though as unseen to the disciples as this house was, not many hours ago; they *are*, as this room is, in which they can now undisturbedly recline, and look at the solid walls around them.

And *this*, he assures them, is not merely expression made strong by "will-to-believe": it is assertion constrained by the truth; for it had been the other way that the truth lay, assertion in *his* kind of speaking would thereby have been constrained the other way: "If it were not so, I would have told you.'

To speak summarily, the proposed punctuation, "If it were not so, would I have told you *that* I am going to make ready a place for you?" throwing away the vital value which belongs, as we shall see, to ὅτι as *because*, not only makes the sentence a reference to something nowhere distinctly discoverable; it breaks up the parallels; it takes the glory from the rhythm, in which the sentences stand like so many several upbuildings of firm truth, till with a beautifully linking repetition before it (ὑμῖν, *for you*, after ὑμῖν, *you*), the last sentence melts into length in the glowing prospect of eternal communion; it presents us with a rolling accumulation of syllables from which it is impossible to rescue the effect of the tender touch on τόπον ὑμῖν, *a place for you*; while it swamps, of course, the graceful insistence of the two ὑμῖν's,

you and *for you*, at the ends of the two sentences—an effect which, in the Greek, will not let one go. To obviate, apparently, an unreal difficulty, it sacrifices power.

For the force of κατάλυμα, *lodging-place, doffing-place*, cf. Grimm, Lexicon, s.v. καταλύω, (*c*). When literal physical description—"a large . . ." is obviously in point, ἀνάγαιον, *upper room*, is used, but the more broadly figurative term here better expresses the idea of refuge and relief. (The notion that Jesus asked for one thing, and expected, and got, another, seems wholly out of drawing.)

V. REMINISCENCE.

It is remarkable that after the guidance for the future has reached the house and its ample accommodation, thus coming to the end of the parallel with the directions in Mark, there should follow the words, "If it were not so, I would have told you." For after the account of those directions Mark (or is it Peter?) adds that "they found *as he told them*": the same word in the parallel place.

Now it might be suggested that the writer of the Fourth Gospel must be following Mark. But when we have compared the data more closely,[1] the suggestion may seem more difficult. On the other hand, imagine Peter actually listening to such words as we have here. He would know perfectly well when Jesus first sent him to make his way hither, that there was no need for his heart to misgive him when Jesus assured him. Why did it? He could *see* how thoroughly needless it was now. It had been altogether safe to trust in the

[1] See pp. 49 ff. and pp. 134 ff.

yet unseen friend, because he trusted in Jesus. And the house was now actual about him, the accommodation as ample as he had been told. He *knew* all along that Jesus would not have told him, either in fact or in tone, of things as other than they were. And had he yet been disquieted? Now Jesus was appealing to them for their own heart's quiet by telling them he would not speak of things as other than they were in the vaster scope of the unseen world. Peter was sure he would not. Then why should his heart ever misgive him—why, when Jesus had given him his word, should he not see misgiving to be as needless in the prospect of death itself as it was in the prospect of coming here? The solid experience of the night, though of itself it could prove nothing beyond itself, set the standard for the solidity of his trust. And Jesus, worthy of the fullest trust that the human heart could offer, had even gone so far in appeal as to say, "*If it were not so*, I would have told you." Perhaps in the words, "the disciples went out, and came into the city, and *found as he told them*," we retain the shape of Peter's self-reminder, often and long afterwards.

VI. FURTHER FRANKNESS.

Through that last day with following evening which Jesus was to spend upon earth his disciples had had their own line of experience; he, absent from them, had had his, blending at last with theirs. We are now to be shown how all fell into that one great closing lesson which was to make the region

into which he was departing something other to them than a shadowy and forbidding "unseen."

Now why are the two parts of the parallel bridged over thus?—"If it were not so, I would have told you; *because* I am going my way to make ready a place for you." He has asked them to realise his sincerity. Now he will even tell them that, for his own purposes, he cannot *afford* to be anything but sincere; if belief is so hard, let them look at it like that. He cannot afford it, because he is not *merely* "faring away," and leaving them behind; he is "going his way"—*on a business*; and the business will bring him into contact with them again. Suppose to-night he had led them to expect more than they had found, or concealed something which might take them aback. What would have been the effect on what was meant to be a time of rich reassurance? It could hardly have been satisfactory. Suppose, therefore, he *now* led them to expect more than they would find. What would be the effect on a future time of fellowship with himself for which he was going to make ready? If he were not perfectly sincere with them now, he would so far lose his labour; for he is going his way to make ready a place for them where there is to be the most intimate communion. Will he take the perfect bloom from it beforehand? His going his way *means* his coming again, his making ready a place *means* his receiving them yonder: "If I go my way, and make ready a place for you, I am coming again, and will take you over to myself; that where *I* am, there *you* may also be." The very foundations of the future as he intends it, depend

on what they will find him to be. They must find that he has been trustworthy in spirit as well as in word. He could not now prevaricate with them, even to cheer them.

The reader of the Greek may notice the inversion, laying emphasis on the "I" rather than on the being, and on the being rather than on the "you." It is *he* who makes the significance of the situation for *them*.

For Jesus himself to put it so, that he is obliged to tell them the truth, whatever it is, because he is bent on future relations with them, is frankness limpid as a rain-washed sky; invented for him by anyone else, it would be a crudeness not likely to appear in the Fourth Gospel, and out of such crudeness could never shine that tender condescension, all the more perfect in manifest dignity because it need not fear to condescend, which dawns upon us here.

VII. CONTINUED PARALLELS.

But observe how the interpretation of the day's substantial parable of the unseen has continued—trace it backwards, if you will.

"Where I am, there you may also be." Let them look about them. Where, and with whom, were they now? And if this meal was what we believe it was, if it so transcended statute which had hitherto been held so sacred, they were emphatically, even this night, apart with him where he was in the spiritual universe.

"And if I go my way, and make ready a place for you, I am coming again, and will take you over to myself. . . ." They were all at a loss, wondering

about the making ready. He came to them, and told them of a place made ready, and took full charge of them. More: there could be no trusting in the privileges simply of Judaism, after thus departing from their rule under his authority. He had taken them over (*παραλήμψομαι*) to *himself* alone (*πρὸς ἐμαυτόν*).

"I go my way to make ready a place for you." Now you may see on examination how unresistingly each of the four successive sentences before this in the chapter, and the succeeding elements of the long sentence after it, fit into line as a significant review of what *had been* happening. Not only the material, but the order of the material, would form a mirror for the past day as perfect as that with which the stillest water reflects its encircling banks. Not a sentence is out of line or place for parallel. And as we thus view the capacity of the words which Jesus is declared to have spoken to his disciples, the question arises: if making ready is his business in going on the path which they are to follow, is that any clue to his business before they came here? Does the parallel fail at this point alone, or while they thought he was neglecting all preparation, and it was growing late, was he himself gone to make ready *this* place for them—not only evincing his personal care for them now, but making this day, on both its sides, a vivid likeness for them of the invisible future? And let us ask ourselves, if their anxiety about making ready breathed some latent, not wholly conscious, distrust of his care, and the answer in the disclosure of "a room arranged ready" rebuked it, how poignantly tender might the

rebuke in that reply become to them, when they learned not only that that room had become ready, but through whose own undertaking its readiness awaited them?

Again, when we remember that the question "where?" may often, in ordinary conversation, express a distressed sense of *the want of any assigned place*—"where are we to . . .?"—we may find it impossible not to wonder whether there was the same quiet recall of former fears of dislocation in the assurance of a "place" to be made ready for them.

A "place" implies what is distinctly marked off to itself from surrounding space. They will not be forgotten: there will be for them, when passed away beyond this visible world, no melting away into the infinite.

Notice how exactly the parallel fits in elsewhere also. If Jesus himself had made ready for them during the day, then he had been to the upper room; and Peter, setting out to the upper room, would be "following afterwards," just according to the word to him at the beginning (John xiii. 36). The same word, ὑπάγω, *fare away*, is used here for Jesus, and in Mark xiv. 13 for (as Luke implies) Peter.[1]

VIII. ORIGIN.

Now we have not yet fully established our position. We have not yet, for example, shown how the Three Gospels mark the place of the silent day. But enough has been said to give point already to

[1] Compare also the special figurative sense of ἑτοιμάσαι τόπον. *make ready a place*, on which Dr. Marcus Dods remarks (*Expositor's Greek Testament, in loc.*): "A figure derived from the custom of sending forward one of a party to secure quarters and provide all requisites." Jesus would thus be presenting himself as going on an errand closely comparable in function to that on which he had sent Peter and John.

the question: How will you esteem this report in the Fourth Gospel of the words of Jesus on that night?

Let us first try to suppose that, in spite of our attempt to trace constant parallel, there is no real connective relation. Then different writers, giving quite independent accounts of the action of Jesus about the time of the Last Supper, have severally made him to present in prospect before his disciples two houses of two housemasters on whom attention is fixed; and have made him, in each case, lead them to expect to find in the house a place made ready for them—the word being radically the same in each presentation. Such an accidental duplication seems scarcely a subject for argument.

Even verbally, we have within the brief space the prominent coincidences of *οἰκία, the house*; the *making ready* (ἑτοιμ-) there; even (πορευ- ἑτοιμ-) *going one's way to make ready* (John xiv. 2; Luke xxii. 8); the other phrase of *faring away* (ὑπαγ-); and the *telling* (εἶπεν, εἶπον) in foresight.

We have all these on both sides; together with the further coincidence that the compact groups ostensibly belong on one side to narratives of an earlier, and on the other side to a narrative of a later, hour of *the same continuous event.*

If there must be a connexion, what is it?

Did the writer of the Fourth Gospel "spiritualise" the account in Mark? If he intended this as a spiritualisation of the events, why did he make no reference to the events on which the spiritualisation is based? A living speaker would not need to make any reference—the events were fresh in the memory of his hearers. The *writer's* readers have

apparently for centuries suspected no reference, and for them his beautiful and elaborate parallel, if he ever worked it out, has been wholly ineffective as such. Hearers, on the other hand, might listen to the words, *after their experiences*, and find the prospect of the unseen marvellously coming home to minds prepared—coming home at a touch, as, to the mind of one on whose memory a fine print on his own walls has stamped in advance the likeness of the features of a great picture, the first grander sight of the unfathomable picture itself comes swiftly deepening home with the paradoxical surprise of familiarity with the yet unknown. Did the writer of the Fourth Gospel, inventing the words, invent also in them this potency: a potency which they were absolutely fitted to exercise on hearers, and which they have never exercised on readers, so far as appears, for two thousand years? What bottomless paradox of invention is this?

Again, these are events shaped under the action and direction of Jesus just before he died and left his disciples; and we see how apt they are in every way, both in what he told the disciples to do, and in what he himself did, to suggest to them what the situation would be after he was gone, and so to fortify them against the depressing influences of absence through death. Are we to suppose that, just before his death, Jesus shaped the events in ignorance of their natural suggestiveness for such a purpose? Then was not their happening in so great an hour one of the strangest coincidences in the history of man and his mortality? By what right do we suppose it? If he was not

ignorant of it, is it a natural supposition that he was silent about it,—though if he had *not been said* to have spoken about it, we should have been ignorant of it too? If he was not silent, then John neither invented his use of it for literary purposes, nor conceived it in mystic trance; for the facts would have forestalled him. And if Jesus spoke, and John did not invent, in what way do we suppose the use which Jesus made of the events to have differed from the use which John reports, and on what grounds?

The living power which the words have exercised apart from recognition of their parallel, does not suggest that they belong to a partly miscalculated design. And even a mystic trance, occurring to the writer of the Fourth Gospel years afterwards, could hardly produce the aptness of the chain of events of which Mark is apparently our earliest present witness.

But if Jesus himself in substance spoke thus in this everyday world on a night of nearly two thousand years ago, what was that night but the 14th of Nisan—*not* the 15th: not the night of the ordinary passover meal? For think out how much is taken from the living parable of venture, and of supremely intimate claim, if the errand was merely a going upon the recognised business of the ordinary passover, and the invitation of Jesus was merely to do as every Jew in Jerusalem was doing?

There is further evidence to present; but it may already appear that while from the Fourth Gospel alone we could not gather the base of events, from the Three alone we could not complete the story of

the events, nor frame the interpretation of their intent. And if the parallel and its importance cannot be denied, then it can hardly be denied that there is here a mutually contributory relation between the Gospels, not traceable upon their surface, but requiring for its tracing the same connective observation which is needed for tracing out mutual relations in organised life.

Chapter III.

"This Passover."

Nearly a quarter of a century ago an unexpected idea was applied to the interpretation of the utterance, "With desire I desired to eat this passover with you before my suffering . . . ." (Luke xxii. 15, 16, Reference Sheet No. I.). It is well known that "How I *longed* for this!" is one of the most natural of ways of expressing satisfaction in the present fulfilment of a former desire; and it had not unreasonably been supposed that these words were an outstanding example of such a sigh from the filled heart. But Dr. F. C. Burkitt and Dr. A. E. Brooke held the views of the Last Supper appearing in the present form of the first Three Gospels to be inaccurate. And in 1908, in the *Journal of Theological Studies*,[1] they hinted support for an opposed view through a new interpretation of these words, which brought them into conflict with the surrounding material. They suggested that in *this* instance the meaning ought to be understood to be, not satisfaction, but disappointment, and that Jesus should be regarded as saying, in effect, that he had wished to eat "the Paschal meal of this present year" with his disciples, but his desire had been frustrated—on account of the speed of his enemies in procuring the means of his death. In the same year Professor G. H. Box pointed

[1] Vol. IX., pp. 569–72.

out that he had suggested a similarly negative view five years earlier.[1] Not the least of the difficulties in the interpretation arises at the point where its advocates seem to suppose it to be especially supported. For I believe it will be found, *inter alia*, to involve an almost incredibly short-sighted view of the bearing of the little word "not" in "I shall not eat it."

Professor Burkitt's broader question—whether the *pathos* of the saying does not imply that the desire is unfulfilled?—seems scarcely to be asked in the presence of the actual iridescence of life. For nothing can more quickly surprise the heart with its own tears in the midst of this world of disappointments, of longings, and then of reliefs which set the mind free for larger longings, than the pathos of some desire fulfilled to the very quick of the soul.

As the logical turn of the interpretation is of very great importance in its bearing on the tone of the occasion, and the negative view is now in currency, I shall make no further apology for examining that view in detail. It may be an object-lesson with other uses. The question seems to be partly one of unnoticed confusion between different forms of expression. And it is not always possible to clear up confusions with so light a movement as that with which they can be produced.

The expression "With desire I desired" has been regarded as a "Hebraism." Less is seen of Hebraisms in the New Testament as more is seen of contemporary Greek. Expressions of this type have classical Greek

[1] Vol. X., pp. 106, 107.

exemplification.[1] And in Greek, I should suppose, the pointing would be rather to intense concentration on the desire than to the simple strength of the desire itself —"I *intently* desired."

I. DOES EMPHASIS IMPLY NEGATION?

Dr. Kennett, in his little work on *The Last Supper: its Significance in the Upper Room*, offers the theoretical explanation that "the emphasis on the word 'desired' suggests that in the present case the desire is contrasted with its non-fulfilment; in other words, that the desire cannot be carried out."[2] But he does not demonstrate the capacity of emphasis for such a negative *by any examples* (lack of examples being rather characteristic of the discussion in general). And if we take an example of actual expression, worth quoting for its emotional parallel, it will be seen at once that emphasis on desire secures no such effect. By what perversion of interpretation would you conceive that William Morris[3] was here expressing his regret that he *would never see* June?—

O June, O June, that *we desiréd so*,
Wilt thou not make us happy on this day?
Across the river thy soft breezes blow,
Sweet with the scent of beanfields far away . . .

See, we have left our hopes and fears behind,
To give our very hearts up unto thee;
What better place than this, then, could we find . . .

Here then, O June, *thy kindness will we take*. . . .

[1] See Dr. A. T. Robinson's *Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, Third Edition, p. 531.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

[3] *The Earthly Paradise*, Part II. (Introduction to "The Love of Alcestis").

The emphasised desire for June is certainly not "unfulfilled"; whether June will fulfil desires is, of course, always another matter.

On the other hand, had the words "I desired" in the text been followed by an adversative "but" (or its equivalent)—"but" which opposes, instead of "for" which carries onward—it would have been plain enough that there was here an expression of *opposition*, and therefore of "desire unfulfilled." And it is interesting to observe that Canon Streeter[1] does give an ostensible citation of "the words in Luke, 'With desire I desired to eat this Passover, but" (*sic*) "'I shall not eat it . . .'." If this is based on textual information not generally available, it is, of course, surprising; if it is based on none, it is still surprising. And unless some sort of "but," not evident in the words as they stand, is required to support the newer interpretation, why does Canon Streeter take out "for," and *substitute* "but"?

What we have in question, so far, is the meaning of "the words in Luke." Whether the words in Luke are what we judge they ought to be is, of course, a question that might open up fields of variously supported or preferred conjecture. We shall have to notice where Professor Box's article leads us to their border.

In Matt. xiii. 17—"many prophets and righteous men desired (ἐπεθύμησαν) to see what *you* behold, and did not see," is a clear example of the other type of expression with which that of the saying here is apparently being confused. "And . . .

[1] *The Four Gospels*, p. 423.

not" conveys, of course, an adversative sense, equivalent to "but . . . not," which cannot possibly be conveyed by a re-inforcing "for."

Dr. Kennett would make good the deficiency by arguing that "it was unnecessary for our Lord to add, 'But what I desired will not be fulfilled'; for after the emphasis on 'I desired,' the non-fulfilment is naturally expressed by *aposiopesis*" (i.e., in a meaning which is intended, though not spoken). But *what* emphasis could determine such an *aposiopesis*? Clearly not the emphasis on the statement of desire: for in our example we have seen such emphasis without the slightest hint of such an *aposiopesis* of non-fulfilment. If there is a stress which *can* imply an *aposiopesis* of the kind which Dr. Kennett supposes, I think it will be found to involve a lingering fall of pitch, a sort of retraction, in the voice—to be purely a matter of tone. And as ordinary writing has no mark by which to convey it, its presence can hardly be inferred except by first judging, or pre-judging, the whole question whether the expression *is* one of lapsed hope or not. And if its presence certainly cannot be deduced from sheer emphasis in the statement of past desire, (as in the poem), the mutual inconsequence of the two kinds of stress—of statement and of qualified sound—appears still more completely from the certain fact that you may weaken the statement—"I rather *desired* it"—or emphasise it—"I greatly *desired* it "—without the change at all affecting the unhopeful accentuation. The two are entirely independent. If the difference is now clear, it should also be clear that of two kinds of stress

possible in speaking of past desire, one is represented and can be perceived present in the written text; the other cannot be represented there; and it is the one which cannot be represented or perceived which would be required to support Dr. Kennett's *aposiopesis* of non-fulfilment. The one which can be perceived has no bearing on it whatever.

Professor Burkitt introduces the adversative idiomatically at the beginning of his paraphrase: "Near as this Passover is . . ." This idiom, of course, is not taken from the text.

The pleadings up to this point are still based unquestioningly upon "the words in Luke." It is now time to observe that Professor Box's note throws out, at least tentatively, a plank for advance beyond them. That word γάρ, *for*, in Luke, which does not assist the turn which the negative interpretation would require, may be represented as probably an unfortunate construing of an Aramaic word which *would* have left it possible. But clearly the logical value of a conjectural sense of this kind cannot be immediately intrinsic to the conjectural sense itself. The logical value, as distinct from the gratuity, of a softening substitution here must necessarily depend at least upon its facilitation of the interpretation of the passage as a whole. If it proves to be nothing but an easing just here of the movement of an interpretation which runs into insuperable difficulties both before and after, we can hardly avail ourselves with much confidence of its momentary assistance. Let us see whether there really is any getting through this way, or whether on experiment we are decisively stopped.

II. "EATING *THE* PASSOVER."

Reading through, we come next to the words, "*to eat this passover*." Now in discussing the interpretation it would be beside the mark to ask what they must mean in the *present* narrative context. For it is one of the advantages of the new interpretation, as presented by Dr. Brooke, that it would decisively detach the words from the present Synoptic story. In its present context,[1] of course, "this passover" would have to mean "the meal now spread before us"; but if it can with certainty be interpreted to mean, not the passover now before the speaker, but rather "the Paschal meal of this present year," and the meaning of disappointment can somehow be made good, the whole saying would be in conflict with the apparent implications of the Synoptic narratives, and it would then be conjecturally referable to a source earlier than their present form. "May we not," says Dr. Brooke, "add Luke xxv." (? xxii.) "15, 16 to the indications, considerable in number, that the so-called Synoptic view of the Last Supper is not the view which lies behind, or is pre-supposed by, the earliest forms of the tradition which they embody?"

What happens, then, if we do consider the words simply as preserving a content of some unknown source with sufficient certainty for them to be set in opposition to their present surroundings? On this independent basis, what is the most natural meaning of the words, "to eat this passover"?

[1] Luke xxii. 8, "Go and make ready the passover for us, that we may eat"; xxii. 13, "and they made ready the passover."

On the one hand, if there were, as Luke (xxii. 13) implies, a passover now before the speaker, "this passover" would certainly be the most simply natural way of speaking of it. But on the other hand, would not the people already gathered to Jerusalem for the express purpose of eating the passover, if they were speaking to one another of that purpose, with no passover yet actually present before them, most naturally speak among themselves in the city quite simply of "eating the passover"? Would they speak of "eating *this* passover"—would that be the natural phrase between their arriving at Jerusalem and the coming of the night? Test it by example. Suppose a variant reading of Mark xiv. 12 were discovered, which ran: "Where will you have us go off and make ready so that you may eat this passover?" We surely should not think it so natural as the simple expression, "so that you may eat the passover." "This" would be redundant. It would probably be thought that "this passover" sounded too much as if they were *showing* him the passover—in fact, had it now before them. Then why should Jesus say "*this* passover," unless he has it now before him?

III. THE EDIBLE SEASON (?)

There is one point which it may not be desirable to urge dogmatically, but which I think should be mentioned, because there is reason to think it has been overlooked in the interpretation. "The passover" is an ambiguous word; and it is true that there *is* a sense in which the phrase "this passover"

might ordinarily be used before the meal was spread. The sense, however, to which I refer implies not the meal to be put upon the table for "eating," but rather the festal season as a whole. It will hardly be questioned that "I go not up to *this feast*" (John vii. 8) means the festival—the festal *occasion*, which no one would think of (literally) "desiring to eat." And I cannot be clear how "this" would be used *before the time*, and used of the *meal*, as the interpretation would require. Professor Box gives the paraphrase, "this (coming) passover."[1] But would not "this coming passover" suggest rather the season, like our "this Christmas," which can be used, indeed, before the time, but not of anything edible? Briefly, we *could* suppose "this passover" to be capable of being used in a future sense to mean "this festival," but we *could not* suppose Jesus to be speaking of "desiring to eat" this festival.[2]

Professor Burkitt tries to get through by another way. It should be quite clear that in the text "this" immediately qualifies *the object of the verb* "*to eat*," and *nothing else*—let that not be forgotten. The object of *that verb*, unless the verb is used in some sense which our expositors do not explain, cannot but be a meal or something edible—and *not* the period within which the meal occurs, whether conceived as day, or year, or however

[1] Repeated in a recent letter of his to the *Morning Post*.

[2] In such a Rabbinic phrase as "eating the days of the Messiah" (cp. Hastings, *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. v., p. 541, col. 2), the eating is a metaphor, and therefore involves no idea of an edible season. It will hardly be disputed that in the text the idea of eating is literal. How then can it be applied to a season?

you choose to think of it. Yet Professor Burkitt apparently sees a prospect, through making reference to *a lengthened period*, of escaping from the interpretation of "this passover" in the more *immediate* sense—and, indeed, *unless the scope of "this" in "this passover" can be lengthened beyond to-night*, the new interpretation, of *to-morrow night's* passover, is, of course, quite impossible. He says: "I believe 'this Passover' means 'the Paschal meal of this present year,' not 'the meal now spread before us'." Here "this" is made to reappear, not in the perfectly definite syntax of the text at all, but in another—and how little equivalent may be perceived when it is noticed that the shift of "this" from "*'this' passover*" to "the Paschal meal of *'this' present year*" would precisely have the effect of making the word "this," which we have specially to interpret as it stands, suddenly capable of permanent application during a period (retrospective and prospective) of no less than twelve months! No one need attempt to dispute that "this" would not have excluded to-morrow if, instead of appearing in a sentence in which it qualifies only the object of the verb "to eat," as in the text, it directly qualified a lengthened period involving many days instead of one, as in the liberating modification. But how does the greatly widened scope of "this," in Professor Burkitt's own phrase (". . . 'this' present year"), help us to determine the obviously quite different scope of "this" in the original phrase ("'this' passover")? And if it does not so help us, what is the purpose of the shift in the paraphrase?

When every periphrastic effort has been made, I think it will be found, on a dispassionate view, that "desired—*to eat*—*this*—passover" is anything but an asset to post-dating interpretation.[1]

IV. WHERE IS THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "NOT (AGAIN)" AND "NO MORE"?

Still reading slowly through, we come to what Dr. Brooke seems to regard as the place of the crux for the old positive interpretation, without perceiving that it is quite as much, and even more severely, the place of the crux for the new negative one. There is a question whether we should read "for I say to you that I shall *no more* (οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ) eat it . . ." or simply "I shall not (οὐ μὴ) eat it." Dr. Brooke points to the superior evidence for "not."

What, then, does "I shall not eat it" mean? Professor Burkitt apparently understands it to mean, "I shall not eat *this passover*," for his paraphrase is: "Near as this Passover is, and much as I have longed to celebrate it with you, it is not so to be, for I shall not eat it."[2] Dr. Kennett's paraphrase,

[1] To prevent a possible confusion at the risk of verging on the ridiculous, it may be desirable to cite an example of the verb "to eat" being used in a technical and not altogether metaphorical sense in which it *does* qualify what is literally not edible: "It was necessary for him to follow a profession. He had already begun to *eat his terms*." (Macaulay, *Ency. Brit.*, 1859, William Pitt.) But if our expositors had been attempting to represent "eat this passover" as a technical phrase of this kind we should naturally expect the attempt to be clearly defined and supported by special example, rather than coloured by paraphrase which, if applicable, would reconcile the interpretation with the ordinary use of language. And "this passover" is only one point of difficulty.

[2] So Professor Box: "*I will not eat it*," viz., τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα.

on the other hand, is: "for I tell you plainly, *I shall not eat it again in this life.*"[1] Here it cannot mean "this passover," for there is no question of eating "*this passover*" again in this life.[2] These two paraphrases, I believe, exhibit the two sides of an ambiguity upon which the chief apparent force of claim in the interpretation depends; and as soon as the ambiguity is deliberately faced, its lack of cogency will appear.

Take first Professor Burkitt's implication that the meaning is "I shall not eat this passover"—i.e., upon the interpretation, to-morrow night's passover. Then read on, and what can be the meaning of saying: "I shall not eat to-morrow night's passover until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God"? If anyone does not eat to-morrow night's passover to-morrow night, how will he eat it afterwards? Is it to be a "reserved sacrament"? What becomes of "until such time as"? The latter part of the utterance seems to be turned into nonsense,—a consequence of which all three articles in the *Journal* appear to be quite oblivious.

It is equally impossible, of course, to understand "I shall not eat *this passover now before me* until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God." We quite freely give that up. The interpreters are right in seeing that that is impossible. But they are

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

[2] That should be clear, whichever individual passover you suppose "this passover" to indicate. If you are thinking of to-night's "this passover," there can be no question of eating *that* again in this life. If you are supposing to-morrow night's "this passover," no one will *then* be eating "again" what, *ex hypothesi*, he has not eaten *till then*; nor will he afterwards eat to-morrow night's passover again.

mistaken if they do not see that the "not" is quite as difficult, as we have just pointed out, for their own meaning, if that be "*to-morrow night's* passover." It would seem that Dr. Kennett's paraphrase must be nearer the only possible meaning—that he is right in not insisting on the individual idea of "this passover" here, and understanding, as he evidently does, *the repeated passover*. The transference of idea, in the course of living speech, from "*this* passover" to the conception of "the repeated passover" in general (*suggested* by "this passover") is quite natural—*especially if a passover is now present*, and is being regarded as *representative*.[1] But it will be observed that Dr. Kennett writes, after all, "I shall not eat it *again*." What is the meaning of that? Clearly that though he *reads* "not," he is understanding "no more" in his paraphrase: for what is the difference between "not . . . again," and "not any more," or "no more"? And he does only what is inevitable if we are to get a clear sense. For "I say to you that I will not eat the passover till it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God" obviously cannot mean that *he will not eat the passover for the first time* till then: for he must have done that long ago. And if it cannot mean for the first time, the only possible other meaning for "I shall not eat the passover until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God" is "I shall not eat it again," or "*resume* the eating of it" till that time: that is, of course, "I will *no more* eat it" till then. And Dr. Moffatt, though von Soden's

[1] On the apparent vital interpretability of this transference see pp. 68, 69.

text to which he approximates has not actually οὐκέτι, *no more*, nevertheless follows out this one possible line of interpretation by translating, "I will never eat the passover *again* . . ."[1]

It is therefore absolutely useless for interpretative purposes to make any ado about the difference between οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ and οὐ μὴ—*no more* and *not*. Dr. Kennett and Dr. Moffatt both bring before us plainly that whatever you *read*, you have still to *understand* "not *again*," to make sense. If you read *no more*, you have a simple and clear expression of the necessary meaning; if you read *not*, you have a more difficult and less clear expression. But whatever you read it comes to the same thing. Dr. Brooke would therefore seem to be under an illusion in supposing that the sense "no more" is necessary for the other interpretation, but not for his own, and in suspecting the presence of οὐκέτι, *no more*, to be due to a special bias introduced into the narratives.

Once the ambiguities are pursued to their blind ends, the general meaning, from whichever interpretation you try to start, resolves itself back into: "With desire I desired to eat this passover with you before my suffering, for I say to you that I shall no more eat (the passover) until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God." There is, of course, absolutely no difficulty in understanding such words to be spoken about a passover actually before the speaker, as Luke's narrative implies. The problem

[1] Cp. C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, Vol. II., p. 586 (Second Edition): "Even without οὐκέτι the Greek words could, I suppose, mean 'eat it again.'"

would consequently be rather to assign sufficient motive for evolving negation out of emphasis, or for detecting the value of "but" through a present "for," or for making "this" ambiguously qualify a time when it directly qualifies something eatable.[1]

Οὐκέτι, *no more*, it may be observed, appears in the *basic* text of Nestle, which, we shall find later,[2] here yields remarkably consistent results.

But we must compare meanings in another way.

V. VISION THAT IS ALMOST TOUCH.

I have said that Dr. Moffatt's "I will never eat the passover again . . ." gives the inevitable *general* interpretation. I venture, however, to think that in straightening out the grammatical connexion something of the fine essence of the meaning is missed. "I shall no more eat *it* (αὐτὸ)," just by transcending grammar, by *not* meaning simply "this passover," as grammatically it would, and yet keeping touch with it as if it did mean it, seems to contrive to gather together *in one* over the passover-table the old line of repeated passovers, pregnant with undeveloped promise, and "this passover" on the very borders of realisation, and

[1] The fact seems to be, in brief, that our interpreters are trying to get the words to mean what they might have meant had they been merely, "I greatly desired to eat the passover with you before my suffering, but I say to you that I shall not eat it." The rest—"this," "for," "until, etc.,"—do anything but help them. But I suppose that the extended conjecture of an Aramaic original which contained the required words, and those only, would leave their case barer in appearance than the devising of paraphrases which suggestively mingle the words of the existing Greek text with others.

[2] See Section IX. of the present Chapter.

the heavenly fulfilment itself—all under one word. That appears to be the point of scintillating paradox, as it is also the point of illusory hope for the newer interpretation. For the very sense of the hour is that of the indistinguishable oneness of present experience with the fulfilment beyond.

It seems remarkable that this comes out with paradoxical force in two uses of this very word οὐκέτι, *no more,* ascribed to Jesus in another account of this same night. Already the sense of the present seems merged in the sense of future conditions, when, according to John, Jesus says, "You behold me *no more* (οὐκέτι)" (xvi. 10), although for the moment they *are* beholding him. Just after (this is not yet the other use I meant), this is modified to something less paradoxical and more ordinary, "*a little while* and you behold me no more" (xvi. 16). Is it without significance that the paradox occurs just after "I fare away to the Father"? Is it not the expression of sober ecstasy, in which the thought of going to the Father almost blots out the present as present, and makes it past? A little later we have even "I *am no more* in the world (οὐκέτι)" (xvii. 11), words addressed *to* the Father, and seeming for the moment to ignore the speaker's own brief remaining presence here; though the very next words show that this is no lack of care for what is here: "and *they* are in the world." In all the nearly fifty uses of the word in the New Testament writings, there occur, I believe, no similar examples.[1]

[1] Unmodified use, with present tense, of present action or condition literally in force.

Is it accident that in the near neighbourhood of the Last Supper, where heavenly anticipation seems to be making the future all but present, we should have these two strangely exceptional uses, which seem so to anticipate the future by present realisation, in the near sense of the Father, as to thrust the transitory present into a hastened companionship with the past? And does not the saying before us in Luke exhale the selfsame atmosphere? And do we really breathe it while we follow an impulse to construct a meaning, apparently without any but the slenderest conjectural guide of comparison, so as to bring in the idea of non-fulfilment, and into this quietly intent rapture of anticipation, which is even now all but heavenly realisation, import a hankering after to-morrow night's Jewish passover? There seems to be no evidence at all that the meaning proposed could be carried through the barriers interposed by the necessary connexions of the language. Is there any evidence that it would, either, interpret the mind of Jesus in this hour?

Bunyan saw his pilgrims, a little this side of the river, entering into a country "whose air was very sweet and pleasant"; the way lying directly through, "they solaced themselves there for a season; yea, here they heard continually the singing of birds . . . In this country, the sun shineth night and day; wherefore this was beyond the Valley of the Shadow of Death . . . Here they were within sight of the City they were going to; also here met them some of the inhabitants thereof; for in this land the Shining Ones commonly walked, because it was

upon the borders of Heaven. In this land also, the contract between the bride and the bridegroom was renewed . . ." I suppose that he who once breathes that air loses his fear alike of seeing old age, or of never seeing it.

On the surviving and coherent evidence which we shall have to examine, I think we shall find room for asking: Was that atmosphere ever breathed so distinctly upon the earth as on the night of the Last Supper? So to insist upon the advantages of our own earthly wishes for ourselves as to feel that heavenly promise can but doubtfully outweigh them, may be in accord with the mental tendencies of our own day; does it so certainly interpret the mind of Jesus in the prospect of passing to the immediate fulness of the presence of his Father, that we can be sure that his pointing of his disciples to fulfilment in the kingdom of God was a pendent to nothing better than an expression of his extreme regret that he could not eat the passover with them to-morrow night?

It is true that Dr. Kennett, in his paraphrase,[1] pictures Jesus saying in effect, "But in spite of all this, the desire which I came up to Jerusalem to gratify need not be disappointed." But is it usual for men to bring their lately precluded desires to the very forefront, and stress them with the fullest emphasis, in a quite unmodified way, when they have no disappointment to speak of? One may, indeed, distinctly say, "I wished for what I could not get, *but* I am not disappointed"; this, however, requires again a "but" which no "aposiopesis" derivable from the text can be made to supply. And when the "but" is inspired by the sense of the unfailing presence of God, it is likely to be far

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

too significant and triumphant for suppression, while our own past desires are preferred for *ex*pression. Dr. Burkitt imagines no "but": "I believe the words to be an expression of disappointment and regret." And, on the interpretation, I believe we must be content to leave it there.

If this holding of the passover was an act of supremely authoritative and declarative force, surely the position is but ruinously represented in a picture which has for its centre a baffled man, who forthwith cannot but express his keen regret at finding himself in such circumstances as he is in to-night. If it is a true picture, we must face it: but on what base of ascertainment does it rest? While the interpretation was presented in Dr. Brooke's article as an added support to a pre-existing theory which challenged "the so-called Synoptic view of the Last Supper," it has itself, so far as I know, remained unsupported by any direct examples, being illustrated in the absence of these by suggestively loaded paraphrases, which are the Benjamin's sacks of interpretation. Psychologically, it seems to have begun in a bright idea, and to have taken shape through happy thoughts, rather than through definite tests based on search into the actual conditions of human speech; logically, its chief apparent strength seems to arise from trying to hammer in the nail of negation, shaft and head, at a particular spot of the sentence, regardless of the fact that the material would be thereby split at once to its end; and its prosperity may be seen to depend upon an oblivion of ambiguity in which Dr. Burkitt's and Dr. Kennett's respective paraphrases will

hardly allow anyone to rest who has found how legitimately each can disturb his satisfaction in the other. It seems to bear all the marks of floating intellectual illusion; and the relative view which it would involve of incidental attraction and heavenly outlook in this hour surely renders it also spiritually improbable.

VI. THE PASSOVER—THE SUFFERING—THE ABSENCE—THE FULFILMENT.

"The hour," the expected hour, "was come." Jesus "sank back" (ἀνέπεσεν—not simply ἀνέκειτο, *reclined*, Matt. xxvi. 20) on his couch at the actual feast. And in the relief of the hour, in the joy of its attainment, he opened his heart to his disciples, and showed them its secret, hidden till now: "With desire I desired to eat this passover with you before my suffering: for I say to you that I shall no more eat it until such time as it shall be fulfilled in the kingdom of God." This one last eating of the passover, and next—fulfilment: he is looking straight out from this table into the unseen, and its hidden promise.

And why, with this direct prospect, did he wish to eat this last passover *with his disciples* before his suffering? We must look carefully at the language, and—what is often so important if we wish to learn from it and not to impose our own assumptions upon it—look *comparatively*.

"Before *I* suffer," is hardly the translation; "before my suffering," is only a little better: there is really no exact English for the objective

πρὸ τοῦ με παθεῖν. But whenever in the New Testament this particular type of phrase is used it seems to imply that the subject is being looked at, not from the point of view of the person who is being spoken of as acting or suffering, but from some other point of view apart from his. Jesus, speaking with this deep and manifest emotion, even so near the cross, is thinking not of his suffering as it will affect himself, but of his suffering as it will affect his disciples.

There are eight other examples in the N.T. of the use of πρὸ τοῦ with the Infinitive. All involve the subordination of *subjective* interest in the event on the part of the actor, or subordination of the actor's *own part* in the matter concerned:

(1) *Absence or subordination of subjective interest:*
Luke ii. 21: Pre-natal process; the subject naturally not being viewed as capable of subjective interest.
John xiii. 19: An event comes to pass: the subjective interest of this cannot be for the *event* itself.
John xvii. 5: *The world* exists—but is hardly conceived as *itself* affected by the fact.
Gal. iii. 23: *Faith* comes—does *it* know it comes; or does its coming simply affect beings other than itself?
Acts xxiii. 15: Paul's own drawing near *specially supposed as unconscious to himself*, while interesting the watchers.
Gal. ii. 12: The observers' coming interesting for *reflex* effect on Peter.

(2) In the remaining instances, we have *subordination of the actor's own part in the matter concerned:*
Matt. vi. 8: Before *our* asking our wants are known—*we* are not set mainly in prominence.
John i. 48: Before Philip's movement Nathaniel is in view to *another*—Philip not mainly in prominence.

The uniform subordination of the grammatically inverted subject, or of his subjective import, should be manifest.

And when he goes on to say that he "will no more eat" the passover, he is surely thinking still from their point of view rather than his own. It cannot be a matter of great concern to him personally, with the eternal prospect directly in view, that he will not be eating the earthly passovers. He is plainly assuring *them*—"for I say to you" —that they must look for his presence in that way no more. So far as his more open presence with them is to be hoped for, there is only one spot of the future on which they can safely fix their eyes without the certainty of disappointment: that is the time of fulfilment in the kingdom of God.

The succession of thoughts, if you will look at it, even on paper, is *historical* in its simplicity: first, "this passover," now present; then, "his suffering"—that will come next; then his eating of the hitherto continued passover no more—that follows; then the fulfilment in the kingdom of God at last—exactly the path of experience which they must traverse from this spot where they now are with him till they shall be with him like this again. He longs to *fix* that prospect of fulfilment plainly before them, and calls them to look off, not vaguely nor hesitatingly, from other fancied prospects which can only fail them—to look yonder. So here is this present fellowship, the outlook of which sweeps over all the intervening earthly prospect of suffering and absence, and carries them forward to that

future fulness of divine accomplishment which is his own direct prospect. And if you could measure the difference between their blindness, and misery of earthly apprehension, and his vision, and serenity of heavenly confidence, and also the strength of his solicitude for them, you might perhaps measure the intensity of his "desire."

VII. "—AND OMEGA."

John puts it very gloriously—blindingly at first: perhaps no words ever written are more literally "dark with excessive bright." "But before the feast of the passover, Jesus, knowing that his hour was come that he should pass from this world to the Father, having loved his own which were in the world, he loved them—" I cannot translate it: perhaps to the willing eye I might presently show why it is easier to look at it and find oneself dazzled. "*And as supper was going on.*" Is that bathos? Let us see.

For some reason one modern English version follows another—Weymouth, Twentieth Century, Moffatt—in translating εἰδὼς, *knowing*, by "knew," and accompanying this with a punctuation which has an effect like offering separately pinned petals in place of a flower, artificial simplicity for continuous splendour. The margin of Westcott and Hort, again, suggesting that "having loved . . . to the uttermost" might be placed in parenthesis, seems merely to offer an ultimately very circuitous by-path in place of the direct effort of realisation required for reading the passage through in anything like that triumphant unity which properly belongs to it. And the variously adopted, but so far as I know, never impressively reasoned, idea of

it being an introduction (one of two!) to the washing of the disciples' feet, is presumably due to failure to distinguish how overwhelmingly resplendent and gracious an introduction it is, in its unity, to the whole account of the supper. (Moffatt's "*so* at supper," is exegesis.)

I *think* "before the feast of the passover" should be taken as correlative to the preceding "six days before the passover" in xii. 1. It would then mean the day before, with the enumeration of intervening days now naturally dropped—*pridie*, in fact. (Cf. Bengel, *Gnomon*.)

εἰς τέλος is not exactly "*to the end*"; for it is anarthrous, and does not define an end. Both this and "*to the uttermost*" are perhaps too static and separate from the verb. I do not think εἰς τέλος implies that love's movement towards its goal has ceased. Being anarthrous, it blends qualifying with the active verb "loved"; especially as preceding it. (The force of an anarthrous expression I take to be that it indicates character rather than form.)

πλήρωσις (cf. Luke) is fulfilment in completeness; τελείωσις (cf. John) is fulfilment to an acme.

The feast of the passover was coming, and the eyes of men—and of the disciples—were upon it; but it was not to that that Jesus himself was looking: he knew that he would never see it here. His prospect was in something larger and more glorious, free of earth's changing seasons—he would pass beyond it all, and go to the Father. But "his own" would not so pass; they were in the world, and its trial of incident, year in, year out, was still for them. Did he despise that trial of incident in his own prospect of the eternal? Nay, rather, he forestalled incident—"before the feast of the passover"—by another incident which was in its essence beyond all incident, and part of the eternal. In this light we may be able to follow John

Jesus is going to the Father; and John realises that in gathering his disciples thus about him just now he is loving them with a love which is measurable only in the terms of his own glorious prospect with the Father. He begins, "Before the feast of the passover"—and, after opening language so incidental, you might naturally expect he would *tell* you of some incident happening at that time.[1] But when he comes up with the incident, and realises afresh what it was, he finds himself looking into no incident, but into a personal revelation divine in its intensity—Love in its reach towards the everlasting bounds of the boundless. Dazzled, he lets the dazzling for a moment into his language and transmits it to us. He never explicitly tells us of the incident of which he seemed to set out to tell us, but at once conveys it and completely covers it up, whelmed in an utterance of the unutterable. The gradual footsteps of his history which we were so far following up become lost to sight for the moment in a bright overshadowing cloud of declaration of which "he loved them to the last fulfilment" might be a tame translation, and the full tidal movement of which "he loved them with love ranging to the goal" might a little more reflect. The incident of which he was *going* to tell us "before the feast of the passover" is never after all seen standing out in its limited earthly shape until its happening is assumed *afterwards* in the resumption of the history which the love had temporarily eclipsed in

[1] Weymouth, perceiving thus much, becomes opaque where John is remaining opalescent: "Now just before the Feast of the Passover this incident took place." John does not so stultify his illimitable effect.

light: "and *as supper* was going on. . . . ." The holding of the supper is now assumed as already known; for it was there, *intended*, underneath the amazing glow of the language. A supper held at this time was the occasion, but the occasion is not seen at first glance, because of the dazzling emanation by which it is attended. It is as when, in an open night, you look up at the moon, and your eyes are upon it, but distinguish at first no features, because its face is so simply overspread by the brightness of its own shining; then the features re-shadow. "And as supper was going on" is no more bathos after the glory of the love than that. But you have to understand that it was of this very supper, "before the feast of the passover," that John was already telling you in the very act of speaking of the love which gave it its significance, though you might not perceive it for the moment by reason of the glory. Surely none but a sincere passion, which genuinely carried the mind away upon its wing, could thus maintain intimacy amid sublimity.

The commonplace "before the feast of the passover," and the commonplace "as supper was going on," both belong to the finite incident in its earthly aspect. But with Luke we learn that if we could recover and realise what it was to have Jesus sitting thus at table, we should be looking out to the eternal fulfilment; from John we learn that the eternal fulfilment began to be there.[1]

Did "his own" think him unconcerned for

[1] Reference Sheet No. IV.

their future, because he said nothing of any preparation for the coming passover? What a small thing! He had a larger thought, and reserved its surprise, that they might thoroughly learn for time to come what his silence and disappointment of their little anticipations were like. And "before" the disappointment of their resolved anticipations about the feast of the passover could come, he, who was directly looking forward to his perfect eternal fellowship with the Father, had already cut across the movement of time, and set them face to face with what they would enjoy in eternity. Conceive—we cannot conceive—the force of his "desire."

The anxiety of the disciples when they put their question about making ready for the passover seems to be that Jesus should be with them—"where will you have us make ready *for you* to eat the passover," Matt. xxvi. 17; "in order that *you may eat* the passover," Mark xiv. 12. But *he* meant to eat with them a passover which would imply that final parting from "his own" could never be. "For you," they said. "Make ready the passover *for us*," he says—that is in Luke (xxii. 8, not xxii. 12). And in Mark, where the command is first reflected, it is again, "make ready *for us*" (xiv. 15). Wherever the command first appears in any account (for it does not appear in Matthew), there is that "for us." And in John, again, it is "make ready a place *for you*" (xiv. 2). And while the phrasing of almost every sentence changes (and changes, as we shall find, significantly), from Gospel to Gospel, in the message to the host one phrase remains everywhere unchanged: "the passover *with my disciples*"; and yet again, at the table it is "to eat this passover *with you*"; and the glorifying is, "that where I am, there you may be also"; and in that opening passage in which John speaks of the abiding attachment of Jesus to "his own which were in the world," I am not at all sure that

in the last elusive word he does not play with their fears about "the end"; for he does *almost* say "the end," but when you try to look at it, it seems to be one that can have no end: for here, in the near sense of going to the Father, is love going out to the bounds of the boundless.

But if Jesus speaks of "this passover," why does not John tell us that the meal was the passover? We shall see later that it is not because he is unconscious of it. To his Jewish disciples Jesus could most plainly express himself through a passover; but what he expressed, when once it *was* expressed, was beyond every conception that the passover had ever led the mind of a Jew to frame. John begins at the very fulness of what he expressed, and though he does not forget, he never goes back to the introduction of the meal as a passover. And indeed, the last we hear of "the passover" in the Three Gospels is apparently at the very beginning of the supper (Luke xxii. 15).

VIII. THE OUTLAW FROM THE PASSOVER.

Let us see how it appears that John does not forget that this supper is the passover.

Peter, of the sword in the garden, under cover of the lips of John, put the significant question—who *was* that unspecified traitor? (John xiii. 24—*see* Reference Sheet, No. III.). And Judas, who had definitely ascertained that Jesus had his secret, and that he was at the mercy in that room of the one he had meant to ensnare, now found that, amid the rising heat against the unknown enemy, Jesus himself became his protector from

the surrounding spirit of vengeance. He gave him "the sop"—token of the host's distinguishing consideration for his guest: and none of the guests who would honour the host could ever in an after day come within that guard. (And for which of his guests had the Good Shepherd actually most solicitude that night?) Thus was the betrayer only protectively revealed to John; and whenever the revelation should become known the tone of the question would be seen to have been rebuked—and this was effected without any chill having been cast by open rebuke in an hour of fellowship.

Such magnanimity to a traitor, if it could not break the purpose to which the spirit of Judas was wedded, might have put into him some protesting ruth for what he was doing, in seeing to whom he was doing it, that would have kept him from the very worst within the worst of what he did. It moved him only to revolt: so is the spirit of evil affected by seeing itself the worse in contrast with goodness. And Jesus, that this condition of spirit might not last to the man's more destructive injury, bid him hasten the blow against the Saviour's own breast.

His companions saw him go out into that world where preparation was in train for that passover-feast on which they had so set their hearts for to-morrow night. For the moment some of them forgot why they were there—to eat the passover to-night—and their own old thought recurred. Surely Judas was gone out to make purchases against the feast![1] It is a trick the mind will often

[1] John xiii. 29.

play upon us for the moment, when our keen purposes have been upset, and a jolt of events throws us back upon the thought of them. (Presently we see straight again, and say, "How stupid of me!")

The change to the imperfect ἐδόκουν, "(some *were thinking*)" suggests the temporary condition of mind, while the change, again, to the present, λέγει "(that Jesus *is saying* to him)", might suggest the force of illusion under the then present condition.

To others another idea occurs. Judas had been rebuked last night for a proposal to give to the poor. To-night he had the seat of honour next to the Master on the other side from John, and was observed to be in whispered conversation with him[1]; and to him among them all the distinguishing "sop" had been given. Surely Judas was taken back into renewed favour, and was being commissioned to go and carry out his own benevolent purpose after all!

And so, if you will observe, you have just the kind of paradox on which this writer so characteristically seizes. Judas, in sight of the lofty magnanimity of Jesus, was become more debased; but at that very time, the disciples, whose imaginations were far below the level of the delicate handling of a soul which was taking place before them, but who could see that Judas had the bag, were *here* forgetting the purpose of Jesus in bringing them here to-night, and *there* remembering the professed purpose of Judas in his slight to Jesus the night before! Judas may often have seemed more easy to understand than Jesus.

[1] Matt. xxvi. 25.

John might seem to emphasise the isolation of Jesus in his spiritual aim. "But *this*" (τοῦτο δὲ, emphatic at head of sentence), "none of those reclining there knew to what purpose he said it to him." The previous protective revelation had been hidden from all but John; *this* quintessential delicacy of care for a soul was utterly beyond their conception. Their interpretation is based upon the material and the commonplace.

If you see the contrast between Jesus and Judas, you may understand why John should deliberately cherish this selection from unimaginative supper-table surmisings, as one might cherish a fragment of stone for the sake of a crystal. If not, I do not know whether you can find any reason why he should. For indeed, so far as I have been able to find, the twofold content of the passage is invariably left without interpretation, and I am not aware that so much as one other suggestion upon it exists to-day. But if this is the passover, and John is recognising it, his pointed paradox seems both clear and characteristic.

On the other hand, unless you accept, here as elsewhere, the close, if silent and easily misinterpreted consilience of the Fourth Gospel with the Three, the base is gone, the paradox melts into nothing, and we are left, so far as I see, with the never-interpreted verse still upon our hands. The point essentially overlooked by the disciples (and not mentioned by John) is that this is the passover.

And it is from the passover that Judas goes out into the night.

Judas, "therefore, having received the sop"—his safe-conduct—"went out *forthwith*": escaped without delay from the room, and from groping

indignation. ἦν δὲ νύξ, *"but it was night."* It is not said that it was "dark"—and, indeed, it was the time of the paschal moon—but that it was *night*. Now the law of the passover was that "none of you shall go out at the door of his house until the morning." (Exod. xii. 22.) The night around the blood-stained portals of security was symbolically the night in which destruction was abroad. It matters not to us, it does not matter to John, whether all the Holy City was, by present interpretation of the law, held to be within bounds. Security for that little company was to be with Jesus where he was, where love was ranging to the goal. Judas, bidden to act as the outlaw that he was, went out, safe enough from human reprisal, only into the night of his nemesis.

Is it not noteworthy that we have these two opportunities just together of substituting precise interpretation for vague interpretation or no interpretation at all, on condition that we recognise that John recognises the passover—recognises it here by taking note of the failure to recognise it, and there, by implying, with a latent sublimity of sudden dreadfulness, its spiritual finality?

IX. THE MASTER'S FAREWELL.

We saw at the beginning of the chapter what could be made of certain language at a low tension of comparative accuracy. Will the reader be patient if I ask him to try what can be found in the same language if we raise the tension, and endeavour to deal with it in close accuracy and close comparison?

According to Luke, as I understand him, Jesus gave his disciples a most radiantly suggestive farewell. It is a subject which one may almost fear to touch, but I must say what I see, and you must determine what you see.

There would appear to be two ideas which he would impress upon them: one, steady in its glow, that they were together for a while now as they would be for ever; the other, brighter in its flash, and more difficult for them to grasp, that they were actually parting, not to say parted, and the parting was instinct with immeasurable *hope* for them, just *because* it was so real a parting in spirit that they could not share his sense of what it meant. According to Luke, as I gather, he expressed his thoughts in word and deed. He ate a meal with them as upon the verge of the fulfilment of their fellowship, and told them how eager he had been to do this *with* them. When it came to the wine of the feast, "the yield of the vine," the intenser symbol of the awaited final fruition, he gave it *to* them and said, "Take this, and share it among *yourselves*." What did he mean?

Dr. Kennett (*op. cit.*, p. 12) points out that there is in the Greek no explicit emphasis on the pronoun, "*I* (shall not)," over against "yourselves." Quite so; there is precision of thought without aimless rigidity of expression. Besides, we shall see that the emphasis changes from "you, but not I," to "not now, but then." The two could not naturally be combined; and the emphasis on "I" is sufficiently implicit for logical purposes in the distinctive "among *yourselves*," and the change of grammatical subject.

He desired to eat the feast with them; the wine

of the feast he will not drink with them. So in the very crowning of the feast of fellowship together on earth, he shows himself most vividly to them as parted from them. The full fruition of which that feast was the presage was still so far beyond *their* thoughts that it might fitly be presented to them by symbol: to him, who in a few hours would be upon the cross, the fruition was too near for any symbol. So they were parted: where he was faring away, they could not come. Only distantly could they share the realisation which was his even now. But that the parting was intense beyond their thought, should intensify their joy of fellowship; for they should follow afterwards. He gave them the wine of gladness to drink, not yet knowing what they drank.

Let us see whether such construing of the thoughts expressed in the feast and its wine has any confirmation. Be willing to observe delicately whether there is delicacy present, and do not be content with the rough handling which alters what it handles. How would you expect the living *tones* of the utterances about feast and wine, thus made articulate in farewell, to differ?

If anyone is sensitively telling those with whom he now is that he is looking forward to being yet with them, his tone will naturally be level, and his speech will breathe of continuity. If he seeks to stimulate them with the sense of a real parting, and an unseen glory in it, his tones may be differently animated, incisive rather than level; while his speech, instead of prophesying continuance, begins to promise surprise. And if we observe Luke's

Greek (I follow the mutually confirming readings of Nestle's *basic* text throughout) what tones does it appear naturally to render?

(1) Even the very transitions are differently accented. Where Jesus has spoken of being with them in the feast, we pass continuously into the sequel through the *legato* of "*for I say to you that . . .*" But where he is parted from them in their drinking of the wine, the accent changes, and we break into the sequel across the *staccato*, "*for I say to you: I will not . . .*" The action is abrupted already.

In *legato*, notes are smoothly connected; in *staccato*, distinctly divided.

(2) Next, where the sense of being with them is predominant, we look back upon his sharing of the meal *hitherto:* "I shall *no more*," "no longer," "no further," (οὐκέτι). This expresses the cessation, and therefore necessarily *implies the recognition*, of continuous action in the past. Thought is still gliding. But where the thought of parting is predominant, attention is fixed sharply and absolutely on *the moment* of breaking off: "I will *not from now*" (ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν). Again we may realise the *legato* and *staccato*, and recognise the already present abrupting.

Even if you do not read οὐκέτι, in xxii. 16, the sharp stop of ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν after the verb in xxii. 18 contrasts with the absence of such a stop in xxii. 16. But when οὐκέτι, "*no more*," glides in *before* the verb in xxii. 16, the balance is perfect, and so is the internal harmony with the word of development, πληρωθῇ, *shall be fulfilled*.

These may be points of more delicacy than it is the fashion to notice; but I do not see why the adoption of

methods which render us incapable of perceiving them should be the first requirement of a sound criticism. There is little use in psychologising without psychological observation of data.

(3) Quite similarly, in defining the attitudes of awaiting the future, Luke (perhaps availing himself of the minting of classical Greek) reproduces, on the one hand, the continuousness of looking forward to "*whenever it shall be,*"[1] (ἕως ὅτου); and on the other hand, confronts us with the defined arrival, in its own moment, of the "time *when,*" (ἕως οὗ) When we think intently of *parting*, to meet again, the "now" of parting, and the "when" of reunion, are sharply distinct moments; if we live in the sense of an abiding fellowship, then, through the interval, we are waiting and longing for renewal, "*whatever*" the delay.

(4) And finally, while Jesus is with them in the feast, he will have them think of the feast, familiar from of old, being carried forward into new conditions—fulfilled in the kingdom of God. But when he is constraining them to realise the parting, with prospect beyond their realising, the climax is not in anything being thus familiarly carried forward; but the kingdom of God itself is to "*come,*" breaking upon them with its own transcendent and now inaccessible revelation of its quality. The intercalation of a new advent, beyond

[1] Though my implied syntax here is not English, but an imitation of Greek, the word "whenever" as a translation should be taken in its English force of *extended outlook*, not in that peculiar Scottish sense of *emphasised finality*, of which an example probably not intelligible to the great majority of English readers is apparently to be found in Moffatt's *New Translation*, 2 Kings xiv. 5.

all but heavenly search or control, divides between the "now" and the "when."

So he had continued to eat the feast with them for the moment, and they were being carried forward with him into the kingdom of God. But with arresting incisive emphasis, he will *not crown* the feast with them under a shadow; they cannot realise, as he realises, what the crowning will be when it comes in its own revelation. Present with them in the feast, he makes his farewell visible over the very symbol of joy in fruition—inevitably visible to those who had been determined not to believe it for fear. See action and words in their setting of circumstance, and could there be a more decisive and revealing farewell?

If Jesus spoke in Aramaic, the delicate balancing of the Greek, which suggests his changing tones, must have taken shape in the recording mind. But what man would work in so exquisite a latency to impose upon the world a fiction of his own?

Chapter IV.

The Message to the Host.

We resume the study of form begun in our first chapter.

One brief passage in the narratives—the message to the host (*see* Reference Sheet No. I.)—unique as being addressed to a third party, offers a study in form apart by itself. It occurs in the second mass, where Mark and Luke are coincident, and Matthew is not coincident. In Mark and Luke it takes the form of a question: "The Teacher says, 'Where is the lodging-place where I may eat the passover with my disciples?' "

The meaning of the question may seem simple; the psychology of it, especially in such a season, is complex and subtle. The crux which I foresee for the reader, inexpert or expert, lies in the need for carrying simultaneously in mind what cannot be presented simultaneously in writing. Failing such persistent "co-presentation" to himself, he may search his mind in vain for the justification of that kind of comparison between Mark and Luke on the one hand, and Matthew on the other, on which we shall insist; and the intimate interpretations based on that comparison may seem groundless—not because they are so, but because the grounds have quietly slipped out of recollection before they could be tested in use. Some voluntary repetition may

be necessary. But I do not promise that even careful and repeated study of this chapter by itself would make its contents throughout convincing. I suspect that those who are most fully convinced, without being *convinced too readily*, (for that appears possible), are those who have returned to the subject after wider study of the narratives has made them able to see it in the setting which rationalises it.

In a word: on a first reading of this chapter by itself its accuracies may seem amazingly futile; it cannot possibly be perceived at once that in a small crystalline specimen of related changes we are beginning to study a latent suggestiveness which will prove to be definitely characteristic of the narratives in every sentence.

I. "*MY*"-SIDE AND "*THY*"-SIDE: ANALYSIS.

It is natural to suppose that the lending of the room would be arranged in a previous mutual understanding,[1] and with this the form of requisition quite agrees. For if you have had a previous mutual understanding with someone—an understanding that he will produce for you, whenever you care to ask for it, something which he in particular is able to supply—you may, if you are on familiar terms with him, or in a position to command, ask for it, when the time comes, simply by saying, "Where is it?"—he will understand you.

Because the requisition is essentially *reminder*, it

[1] Cp. p. 33.

suggests an appreciable lapse of time since the understanding took place. Because it is *in-breaking* reminder, it suggests that Jesus had not been seen by the recipient, nor probably by those in the house, during the day[1]. His known, but unseen, presence would not interfere with the psychological effect.

Now a mutual understanding has two sides. And if one of the two parties is speaking to the other about it, the two sides will be what we may call the "*my*"-side and the "*thy*"-side: (the familiar *meum* and *tuum*). And it will prove very much worth our while to ask what are the differences, the sole differences on either hand, between Mark and Luke? On the one hand, Mark has an additional pronoun of the person speaking: "*my* lodging-place," which Luke has not. On the other hand, Luke has a pronoun of the person spoken to: "*To thee* the Teacher says," which Mark has not; (and his slight variation of the Greek word-order in bringing in this addition may be considered part of the same change).

Let it be duly noted as not without importance that we are not *selecting* among a variety of differences present for observation. Mark has additionally the one kind of syllable which could develop the "*my*"-side, and that only (μοῦ, *my*); Luke has additionally the one kind of syllable which could develop the "*thy*"-side, and that only (σοι, *to thee*).

It not only comes out quite neatly; it is open to suggestive use It can point out to us a capacity *in the question* which would be there whether these

[1] Cp. p. 33.

complementary pronouns were there or not, but which we might not *see* without them. Let us be psychological.

If you ask for something simply by saying, "Where is it?" you are certainly not asking whether you may have it; you are assuming that it is yours to receive on requirement. In its present setting the question seems to combine with genially familiar reminder a full assurance of command. And the assumption of claim at will, habitually present, when we come to think of it, in this form of requisition, is made more *specifically* present by "*my* lodging-place." The speaker assumes that it is potentially *his* to require.

It has been justly pointed out that the pronoun of "my lodging-place" itself suggests a previous arrangement with the owner of the house. (Cf. Allen on *St. Mark*; also McNeile, *Gospel of St. Matthew*, *sub.* xxvi. 18. They do not notice the congruent force *of the question*.)

On the other hand, when you ask for a thing by saying, "Where is it?" you are not necessarily implying that you are going simply to take it for yourself. It is in the power of someone else to produce it, and in that aspect the enquiry may be an appeal to *him*. This aspect, also naturally present in such a form of requisition, is developed by the phrase "*to thee* the Teacher says . . . ." That the addition σοι, *to thee*, if not grammatically emphatic, indicates what is being emphasised in the rendering, is confirmed when we observe that, on Luke's side, the enquiry is particularly introduced as directed to "the housemaster *of the house*."

There is specific recognition that the accommodation is his own, held in his possession to bestow. He is "the housemaster of the house," and "*to him* the Teacher says . . ."

If we return to Mark, and look further, we may observe that in another way the "lodging-place" is not baldly appropriated. It is "my lodging-place *where I may eat the passover with my disciples.*" And "*my* lodging-place," coupled with such a statement of the speaker's purpose, seems to invite the hearer's sympathy with what he is going to do, and with his whole situation, or as it is put elsewhere, "his season."[1] It is "mine" for that last meal together, "mine" under the shadow of all that that last meal implies. "*My* lodging-place—where . . ." tinctures the demand with the sense of the speaker's own feeling of the growing time. And one feels that he expects the hearer to understand.

Luke, we say, seems to be thinking of the hearer. And his "to thee," like Mark's "my," lights up in the glow reflected back upon it from the end of the sentence. "*To thee* the Teacher says" becomes an address to one who is chosen for dependence in the heartfelt recourse of a deep moment. It is *his* to supply, in such an hour, "the lodging-place where I may eat the passover with my disciples."

II. "*MY*"-SIDE AND "*THY*"-SIDE: SYNTHESIS.

We have seen, first, that a requisition in the form "Where is it?" naturally implies presumptive

[1] *Vide infra.*

possession, and yet an appeal. That the presumptive possession is brought out by Mark's additional syllable, *μοῦ, my,* and the appeal by Luke's additional syllable, *σοι, to thee,* seems difficult logically to deny; and when we read through to the end, we see how the speaker's own season gives the appealing quality to his assumption of possession, and how, on the other hand, his distinguishing address to the man of his choice in such an hour would naturally express heartfelt personal recourse.

Now because of a suspicious use which I am going to make of this—a use, I mean, which may cut hard against prejudice—it may be well to look for the bad psychology here, and see where I am false in my deduction. For if all this is true to common usage and natural feeling, then it has somehow come about that the form of the message in Matthew is so shaped as to bring out the sense of the form of the message in Mark *and* Luke, and its two clauses together develop the two aspects which are developed by their several different emphases.

First, it is evident that Matthew's two clauses respectively stress the same two sides which are stressed by the sole distinctive points of Mark and Luke. "*My season* is at hand," in fact, holds the same additional pronoun (beside "*my* disciples"), as Mark, and there is no question about its vital stress upon the "*my*"-side. The second clause opens with the same pronoun and the same emphasis with which Luke opens: "with *thee* (*σε*)"—impressively involving the "*thy*"-side.

Matthew's idiom would imply, of course, "at your house"—though the house is not mentioned, and the

stress is left to fall simply on the personal relation. Cp. Dr. Robertson, *Gr. Gk. N.T.*, on πρὸς—the word here translated *with*. "The idea seems to be '*facing*,' German *gegen*" (p. 623). "There seems to be something almost intimate, as well as personal, in some of the examples of πρὸς" (p. 624). "It is a natural step to find πρὸς employed for living relationship, intimate converse" (p. 625).

Compare the force of the "my's" in Mark and in Matthew. If through Mark's "my" we felt the speaker's absorbing situation in coming to make his claim, this sense of his absorbing situation is developed into unmistakableness in Matthew: "My season is at hand"—the time of the approaching passion under the shadow of which the supper is held.

And if in Luke's "*to thee*" we felt the address to one who was chosen for dependence in heartfelt recourse in this hour of "the passover with my disciples," in Matthew, again, we have most touching recourse: "My season is at hand: with *thee* . . ."—"with *thee*," at such an hour!

If, again, the note of assured assumption for oneself is inseparable from a requirement couched in the form, "where is my lodging-place?" such a note will be found again in the slight but expressive Matthæan change, "*I hold* the passover with my disciples"—which is certainly procedure without a trace of asking permission.

And if, finally, we give ourselves range, and feel how "I hold the passover with my disciples" brings the closer throb into "*my* season is at hand," we may but deepen what we felt when we realised how the like closing words in Mark brought out the pathos

in "*my* lodging-place"; and on the other side, in its significance, this closing phrase in Matthew makes the resort to "thee" a tender personal distinction, even as it made the appeal "to thee'" in Luke a profoundly distinguishing choice amongst men.

Looking back to Mark and Luke we may reflect that if the mutual understanding be between a Master unspeakably revered, and a very humble disciple, and the Master chooses to overwhelm the disciple by recalling it in terms of familiar intimacy, there are two ways in which the sense of worth in it can be specially developed. The speaker may magnify *his own* side of it; he may magnify *the hearer's* side of it. He may say in effect, "This understanding of ours, you remember, is bound up with *my own profound interests and movements*—not hidden from you"; or he may say, "In this profound moment of my affairs it is to you—to *you*—that I resort." He may put something specially of himself into it—as Mark a little suggests; he may make something specially of the other in it—as Luke a little suggests. And he may do both, as Matthew plainly suggests, and let the manifested weight of the season for himself fall in honour upon one whom he has called into special confidence in it.

Matthew is Mark *and* Luke "writ large." Their distinctions are in his clauses, and even their pronouns are his.

III. CRITICAL COMPARISON.

Now you have here, if you will look closely, very much the same kind of problem as you had in the

examples of division, with which we began, though we have already treated this example less in first skeleton, and with more regard to the richness of the meaning. For here again, though in a different way, are aspects seen together in one Gospel, and separately, so far as distinctive stress on them is concerned, in two others.

Observe the exegetical value of the differences. If Mark and Luke did not differ just in these respects, who would have realised, first of all, that a request in the form "where is it?" *has* those two aspects of assumed potential possession, yet of depending recourse? Nevertheless, once it is suggested, one cannot but perceive that the analysis is psychologically true. You will find that if merely in an emergency in a strenuous "job," you make requisition of the big hammer someone has offered you a while before, and make it in the downright form, "Where is it then?" you are assuming potential possession, and at the same time having dependent recourse to the offerer. I do not know that there are any other syllables than those two obviously complementary ones of Mark and Luke which could possibly thus bring out the *essential* iridescence of this form of request. And once it is brought out, we can begin to perceive that Matthew's form of the message clearly images the same psychological values. But which of us would have perceived this, without Mark's and Luke's thus pointedly apt little complementary stresses to stimulate his observation?

But again, if we had only Mark and Luke, the two stresses would nowhere have been combined thus. Without Matthew, the data, if they were

interpreted at all, might seem to leave you to think of the emphasis in Mark's way *or* in Luke's way. It is Matthew who shows the two stresses combined, and exhibits plainly *both* the aspects which could belong to the message. For the message, we have seen, *is* capable of implying both; and Matthew's is no gratuitous combination. We have found that, even *without* the written stresses, the question is already latently iridescent. "The Teacher says, 'Where is the lodging-place where I may eat the passover with my disciples?'" would already imply assumption of possession for an occasion now arisen, together with personal recourse. And if but *such* a message were spoken significantly to a faithful servant who was, on the one hand, made sensitive beforehand through a personal revelation which Jesus had once given him of the coming final import of the hour, and on the other hand was keenly alive to the honour which Jesus was doing him in coming to him, we may imagine that what was heard might split up upon the sense of the hour and the consciousness of the honour, and convey to him, even while it was spoken, this twofold sense: "*My season* is at hand; *with thee* I hold the passover with my disciples." It might convey through the ear to the heart what Matthew develops, and what Mark's and Luke's several stresses imply.

Observe, too, that Matthew takes the only conceivable way of rendering the two stresses together *effectively*. If we *simply combine* the two touches of Mark and Luke in a single written sentence (which cannot reproduce the inflexions of a living voice):

"To thee the Teacher says, 'Where is my lodging-place where I may eat the passover with my disciples?'"—their effect of complement is lost: it is hard to distinguish their suggestiveness. (I wonder how many readers, in fact, will read the form of the question just suggested without noticing that it differs in two points from the form suggested in the preceding paragraph.) Apparently the only way to get the stresses *together* and yet *distinct* is by re-casting. Matthew re-casts: and with such perfection that the difference of form keeps the combined stresses quite distinct (in two clauses), and the psychological affinity is so close that there can be no reasonable doubt of what he is re-casting.

The effect, we shall find, is one of extraordinary economy. The message has by its very nature a twofold latent iridescence. Mark and Luke give you the effect in analysis; Matthew gives it in synthesis. Each appears needed to interpret the others. Nothing more is required.

IV. A PHANTASY OF ORIGINS.

Now let me assume (what may not happen all at once), that the reader has succeeded in putting the essential facts before his mind with diagrammatic distinctness. What, then, of their literary origination? What would need to happen for this complementary combination to be produced by accident?

First of all Mark—or whoever they may be who are behind our present "Mark"—puts down a sentence suggesting a reference to a two-sided

agreement (or, if not that, *unquestionably* a sentence implying "*I* want it, *you* have it"); and puts into it *one* detachable element which has specific reference to one *side*. (There is, you will find, no other word but "my" similarly detachable—no other word could be simply detached without practically destroying the sentence, except the other "my" before "disciples"; and the absence of this would produce an unnatural effect. ἐστίν, *is*, is not detachable, because if not expressed, it would have to be understood.) This, and the presence already of an introduction, "The Teacher says," have left it open (by accident, we are to imagine) to some other writer to do a very neat, if absurdly purposeless, thing. He may, if he chooses, effect an exchange, and in a sentence which psychologically, whether he knows it or not, is capable of suggesting assumed possession, and yet appeal, he may remove the one word which develops the assumed possession (μοῦ, *my*), and insert one exactly corresponding word which expresses appeal (σοι, *to thee*).

Luke, as a matter of fact, does the neat thing; but, we must suppose, with no idea of correlation to govern his action—however curious it may seem that on one side the opportunity should have been given, and on the other side the opportunity should have been taken, of exactly, (*in fact*, at any rate), completing the perceptible differentiation of the two complementary aspects involved in the question.

Matthew also writes: "And a remark handed on from commentary to commentary undertakes to tell us what motive governs his attitude—he "avoids

the question."[1] He produces other material. But relatively quite by accident, we must still suppose, his material consists of just two clauses, and no more; and relatively quite by accident, again, the first of these two clauses, without reproducing the question, turns to the aspect—the speaker's side—which was a little more emphasised by Mark's version of the question, (and, as part of the total accident, includes Mark's extra pronoun as an essential constituent). Similarly, by accident, again, the second clause, still without reproducing the question, turns to that aspect—the host's side—which is a little more emphasised in Luke's introduction of the question, (and yet again, as part of the total accident, includes Luke's distinguishing pronoun). And finally Matthew reproduces the statement of purpose which concluded the question.

But something is yet lacking. For "my *season*," being so absolutely personal, brings the speaker's side most definitely before us, but does not as yet definitely touch the note of claim to a lease and use *in the house* which was heard in "*my* lodging-place." But when the re-cast comes to that concluding statement of purpose which it *does* reproduce, the balance is restored by an assured "*I hold* the passover πρὸς σὲ (i.e., *chez vous*)" which fully establishes that same note of confident claim to lease and use. And when we have seen this, "*my season*" reveals itself behind as holding the germ of an ample disposing authority. The whole

[1] Matthew's "avoidance of questions" is a theorem in comparative psychology involving a range of facts too large for the present monograph. In testing its balance, I think I should begin with Matt. xvi. 13—or Matt. xxvi. 18.

movement is simply obeying the demand of the Master's own great occasion. What for the moment we thought we missed in Matthew was, even when we missed it, beginning to grow upon us in a grander form.

The grandeur of the development may not be perceived without some patience. It is the manner and the mystery of a vital activity to work out in minuteness more than appears in display. But the question whether the succession of literary processes involved in the existing arrangement of facts constitutes at least a literary problem may be raised apart from any perception of grandeur or mystery. The very latently one-sided development of a two-sided conception in Mark; the equally latent other-sided development of the same conception in Luke; the visibly two-sided development in Matthew, partly by the same means, of a new form in which, on analysis, the several elements of the original conception can be distinctly traced—all this can be seen by plain logic, without much uplifting of mind. But can plain logic see *through* it—I mean, can the succession of the processes be explained from what we know of the directions regularly taken by purely literary activity, (or, if you will, traditionary development)?

You might think you could pretty easily take up the various changes involved in producing such an arrangement and rearrangement of the ideas of the message, and give a fairly workable explanation of how each disposing action might have come to be taken with the literary material there before the writer to prompt him. Perhaps you could; but to

do this *only* would be to miss the continuous problem which the facts begin to define: much as the more mechanical sort of biologist may be held to miss his problem by assigning ingeniously piecemeal causes for a continuous train of activity. Suppose, for comparison, he is examining the processes entering into a far-reaching instinctive performance: he might first analyse the chain of actions involved, and then show by what comparatively simple law *this* action might be explained, and then by what equally simple law that action might be explained, until he had given reasoned explanations of them all—*one by one*. But we might not be clear that he had yet explained what caused them to happen to such a definite result on the whole, or how they happened so aptly *one after another*. In Biology, or in our little preliminary literary crux, we may be able, first of all, to take up the changes which we perceive, and interpret them as being separately and severally apt reactions to some given material—that is a usual critical attempt; and, viewed in this way, all that is happening may never strain our thinking outside the limits of its accustomed competence. But these very same changes, when we come to look connectedly at what they have left behind them, and ask, "How did they come to do *that*?" may face us with the deeper problem of the arrangement of the actions—which were done *one by one*—into what has certainly proved, in its effect at any rate, to be a unifyingly constructive *series* of actions. This little area which we have taken up first for full analytical scrutiny could have offered the writers very ready opportunity for *vaguer forms* of mutual

divergence, with a consequently more evident display of literary "accidents"; why then do they follow one another up in working out what can be looked at as a closely unitary effect—a complex one which we can characterise quite definitely, and pursue (as we shall find) suggestively, and use as a beginning for further and connected observations of the same kind? Why does accident, if there is no essential order in the sequence, nowhere betray itself? Why is the combination of processes haphazard, and the result symmetrical? But be it observed: as soon as we begin to relieve the paradox involved in unfailing accident by supposing here or there some element of designed correlation, we are already on the borders of something ominously different from the accepted views of the literary or traditionary origination of the Gospels.

To put the Matthæan form before the Lucan would only increase the wonder. Matthew would then accidentally furnish synthesis in advance.

V. BLOOM.

But now, do the differing forms of the message, when we have thus analysed them, seem to enable us to look at all into the finer life of the incident?

As *in-breaking* reminder, the question would naturally be delivered as soon as the messengers arrived, and therefore in the interval in which the host and they would yet have something of the feeling of mutual strangers. We may realise that to send a message of *open tenderness* to be delivered in such circumstances might rather violate than sustain the charm of deeply privileged intimacy between

sender and hearer. But the delicately familiar tone felt in the message, under the form of the question, while it might reveal to the messengers the fact of intimacy and honouring, could not reveal to them much of the secrets of the intimacy; though that same familiar tone and evident allusion, heard by the host himself, would be admirably suited, as we may perceive on a moment's reflection, to revive the very flavour of past intercourse. Perhaps in Matthew we see what speaker and hearer saw in common through the question, beyond the messengers, as the contents of the floor of a stream are visible through the running water. No exhibition of the words in Matthew can bring out the starry majesty and dewy tenderness of their combination unless you find the place where you can *feel* it. And certainly to us, as readers to-day, Matthew might suggest an idea of what the earlier revealing conversation might have been like as Mark and Luke do not.

The ποιῶ, *I hold*, of Matthew especially suggests the original arrangement.

And when we have gone further in the examination of the division of the narrative-content, we may find that Matthew's is the one account of the three most suited to contain what the message said without the messengers themselves hearing it. Matthew's is the account which does not touch the experience of the messengers.[1]

If we look at the question in Mark or Luke, we may see plainly enough now, as we ponder it, that it

[1] See Chapter V.

would be vitally and exquisitely suitable to put *into the lips of strangers* to revive the remembrance of former intimate and tender communication. But who would have seen this, unless we had Mark's and Luke's differences breaking the question open before us, and identifying its latent content with the more open-bosomed content of Matthew? It may save more intellectual exertion than it will cost to call the perception an over-refinement. But does the perception involve itself less delicately and inextricably at once with the words, and with the known and felt realities of living intercourse, than the fruitful information that Matthew "avoids the question"?

VI. LOGICAL ECONOMY—UNITARY DESIGN —CONTRIBUTORY FUNCTIONS.

Now is there any way by which you can really be sure of the force of an idea, and therefore be in a position to offer a reasonable criticism of it, except by *testing* its force? It seems difficult to complete the observation of the facts without thinking of *functions*. Will you fairly and frankly try the force of the functional idea—testing its capacity to deal appropriately with the complexities before us, to fit into them without having occasion to overlook any of them, and to absorb them without interfering with them?

Take the principle that *economy of means is evidence, not of accident, but of design.* Mark and Luke, with extreme economy of means (a minimum of one definitely complementary syllable apiece), latently provide for our becoming aware that the

question which they both handle has naturally two "antithetic" aspects—that is, two aspects essentially one over against another: potential assumption of possession for oneself, and yet distinguishing appeal to the original possessor. Each of the two syllables, in combination with that close of the sentence which expresses the purpose of the evening, is admirably adapted to guide attention to the two main human relations of the communication—the sympathy which the speaker seems to anticipate from the hearer in the occasion, and the honour which he has conferred upon him by his distinguishing association in it. Where two expansive illuminations are drawn out of their latency from the same spot by two lightest of perfectly directed touches, it is hardly the place to question the economy of means. Next, there does not appear to be any means, as we have seen, of *combining and distinguishing* the two aspects except re-casting. Matthew re-casts: and in re-casting combines, distinguishes, develops; perfectly preserves the note of assumed possession by combining the change in mood from the subjunctive "I may eat" with the forceful adoption of a more constructive verb, "I hold"; and leaves it open for the explanatory close of the message to breathe the same twofold life back right through his two clauses as it breathed back upon the varying form of the question. He does this with an expenditure of words so economical that they can all be deliberately repeated in six seconds. And through all his change of language, on close examination, he will not be found to have employed a single word which does not bear upon, or illuminate,

what our analysis has shown to be already essentials in the question. The economy of means in effecting development of the contents of the other narratives at this point—the expansive perfecting within limited range—is, on analysis, almost beyond admiration if there be design, and quite beyond conception if there be none.

The reader who has not made up his mind to exclude a more "vitalistic" kind of interpretation than he has yet seen tried, until he has gone far enough with it to see whether it is likely to fit the facts more closely and intensely than can be hoped of more ordinary literary constructions, may be interested in one more detail which might be described, in technical phrase, as curiously "homological." It has been held as a cardinal principle in the study of vital developments that living structures tend to be modified in adaptation to the requirements, *or non-requirements*, of function—a principle highly expressive of vital economy. Now the two primarily revealing pronouns in Mark and Luke needed to be detachable from their sentence if they were to function by suggestively replacing each other in it. In Matthew, where the two are assigned positions side by side in separate clauses, they no longer need to function detachably. And it will be observed that they have become so inwrought that the removal of either from its clause would be absolutely fatal to all personal definition.

But there is another aspect of absolutely definite economy which admits of the most rigid statement in perfect accordance with the facts. From economy of relative construction we pass to economy in total construction.

We have seen that we have before us a delicately expressive antithesis between *the situation of the speaker* and *the recognition of the hearer* who are

involved in a necessarily two-sided arrangement. To present an antithesis in *analysis* (i.e., to show its two sides *separately*) requires exactly *two* contributory actions. (Cp. Mark and Luke.) To present it in synthesis also (i.e., with the two distinct sides combined into a present unity) requires *a third* action. (Cp. Matthew.) *If this be so, then, for the ultimate organisation of the complex effect, there is none of the three whose contribution we could spare.* On the other hand, *with the three, the logical effect is definitely complete;* for *analysis* (cp. Mark and Luke) and *synthesis* (cp. Matthew) together form a *logical complement* to which *nothing more of the same kind can be added.*

The precisely *attributable,* not to say definitely observable effect, is therefore one which would employ *exactly three writers and no more, with perfect economy of function.*

It now should be observed that exactly the same is true of those first examples of division which we presented in skeleton. For manifest division there must be the clear presentation of the material to be divided—which requires one writer; there must be the presentation of the divided parts—which requires not less than two: three in all. Three are required, *and no more,* to complete an effect of division. But if the part supplied by Mark, Matthew or Luke were missing, who would think of tracing any division?

Whether, then, we are dealing with the observable division of features, or with the demonstrable antithesis of the message, we have a logically complete effect of a kind which is not produced,

and could not be produced, by any one writer, or two writers, apart from the three. But together, consciously or not, accidentally or not, they certainly produce the effects in a perfectly definable logical completeness—for where does either the division or the analysis-*cum*-synthesis fail to meet the exact requirements of logical symmetry without any redundant member?

Suppose, however, you put those first appearances of division down to accident—for strange things may happen by accident, and one must be upon one's guard. But more examples, both of the same kind of exactness and of other kinds, will crowd upon us—we have already met with another kind in the present chapter. Suppose, then, with persistent liveliness of thought, you put the appearance of analysis and synthesis also down to accident—for strange things may happen by accident, and one must be upon one's guard. Is the putting of different forms of distinct accuracy indifferently down to accident, to *be upon one's guard?*

What should become irresistibly manifest—what I understand has been found irresistible when the coming and cumulative evidence has been allowed to play upon the open if at first resisting mind—is that the narratives have somehow come to development in a highly complex state, quite definite, and definitely recognisable on analysis. That the simple theories of origination which are being so carefully substituted one for another to-day have not been leading us to form the most elementary conception of such a state ought not to hinder its recognition if the facts show it where the theories have overlooked

it. I would offer two suggestions. First, that if theoretical explanations are to be sure of dealing with, or even recognising their own problem, we need to be careful at least that the problems of the preliminary description of what is before us to be explained have been in some way adequately mastered. And second, that a few days of first unprejudiced verification and collection of the facts now to be presented, so as to hold them in order just as they are to be seen with the eye, or distinguished by analysis which may be found to owe very little to conjecture, followed by a few days of closer and more comprehensive tackling after an interval, may be sufficient to assure many among us that the preliminary problems of description are after all manifold beyond the current theoretic anticipation.[1]

Now if there be design, and not accident, the design can hardly be the writers'. For how should they imaginably combine themselves deliberately to produce these different effects? To say the least, the only known analogy, so far as I am aware, for the production of combined effects thus definite in latency is to be found in the realm of vitally co-ordinated activity. And I recall the words of perhaps the most cautious of my critics, about the facts of the division: "Unless the biological analogy is a clue, I see no clue at all."

[1] Cp. Driesch: "A natural system passes from one state to another which is more complex. It is no longer a mere sum that can be described by a few elementary conceptions; it has become a *whole*, a totality, a unit, that requires a great number of conceptions for its description, since it abounds in a variety of relations" (*The Problem of Individuality*, p. 53).

VII. GIVE ME LEAVE A MOMENT.

In what way has our observation—so implicitly controlled in England by an imperiously constructive influence not native to us—in what way has our observation become so refined as to assure us past question that the Gospels are *not* the product of a vital energy capable of expressions more subtle and manifold than we can match or mimic by the mechanical systems of reconstruction which we are now content to take as our working mediums for viewing the contents of this unexampled literature? Do we really know so much about it? A philosopher has lately been pointing out that the enquirer who "attends only to those aspects of reality which harmonise with his preconceived picture of it, and which prove suitable to his method of treatment," cannot expect to be in command of a full range of fact. Are we establishing our assured settlements of knowledge by limiting our expectations by our explanations, and our observations by our expectations, while at our foot is a depth into which we never look? If the memoirs of the most living being that ever entered our race are alive, and their life is not for an age, but for all ages, if life wrought deeply in them for men unborn, and life be in its heart more skilled in fashioning than our science has ever yet become in discovering, why should they contain nothing to be investigated in ways which only the strangeness of the facts themselves can teach us, and which even the facts themselves can teach us only if we are willing still to learn from them afresh?

Chapter V.

The Foundations of Division: The Second Masses.

We have now to look more widely about us in these second masses, and see how the unexpected appearance of division founds itself there.

The way in which the same form of division which is variously traceable elsewhere appeared to be developed upon *Mark's masses* as a whole, was that Matthew took the first mass as he did not take the second, and Luke the second mass as he did not take the first[1]:

Matthew.	Mark.	Luke.
Overture of the Disciples	Overture of the Disciples	(.....)
(.....)	Details of Directions	*Details of Directions*

This means, for the second masses, that Mark and Luke are together, Matthew separate from them.

On inspection (Reference Sheet, No. I.), it will be seen that the nearness of the two writers and the separation of the other writer in the second

[1] Cp. pp. 11, 12.

masses can be expressed more particularly. There is a distinction of topics. In their accounts of the Directions of Jesus to his messengers, which mainly constitute the second mass, Mark and Luke are showing *the experience of the messengers as viewed through the foresight of Jesus* (whether that foresight be regarded as miraculous or not); Matthew shows that they have to go and deliver a message, but *does not touch upon their foreseen experience in doing so*—not even by a single word.

Similarly, in the little summaries which follow, Mark (xiv. 16) and Luke (xxii. 13) show the messengers going and finding as Jesus told them. To *go and find* is progressive experience; to find *as he told them* is to make proof of his foresight. Matthew naturally does not summarise what he did not touch before: he finds it enough to remark only that the disciples did as Jesus appointed to them.

The line of distinction between Mark and Luke together on the one hand, and Matthew alone on the other, is thus perfectly definite, and maintained throughout.

But it is obviously a line with two aspects, *either of which may be emphasised*. In showing experience foreseen, you might stress the progressive experience, and hint exactly how it would be felt; you might stress the foresight already possessed, and suggest the certainty of its outlook. If Mark learned from Peter[1] who actually went upon the errand, it would be very natural if in his account particularly we should find traces of the felt experience; and when

[1] Cp. p. 5.

Luke writes a story which from the first specially regards the standpoint of the Master himself, it is not unnatural that in his account of the Directions some additional stress should fall upon the Master's foresight.

And yet if it were accident, it would be accident of a curious kind. It would mean that while the Directions as recited in Mark and Luke have two main aspects—*experience* reflected in *foresight* (I do not think you will find a third involved with similar prominence)—Mark would be stressing one and Luke the other; just as, in the message between Jesus and the host, Mark emphasised this side and Luke that. If we find on examination that they certainly do this, it will be a further neatness that Matthew, who, in the message combined the two aspects which the other two writers brought into relief, here does exactly the opposite, and *omits* the two aspects which the other two writers bring into relief. Combined repetition and combined omission are, of course, the two alternative ways of preserving an existing balanced antithesis. I fear I may trouble some readers whose appetite for analysis is soon satisfied, when I say—anyone who will go into it will find that, if complex, it is exactly true—that if Matthew combined stress on both aspects of the Directions as a whole you could not have the present division of the masses. You would not have any division of the masses strikingly uniform with the division of the details; for the division of the details regularly involves Matthew's *omission* of some aspect. The combining of the aspects of *the message*, on the other hand, does not leave the

division of the masses any less broadly visible. Perhaps a diagram may save trouble:



If there is a functional relation between the Gospels, this would be an excellent illustration of it.

On the other hand, if the unfaltering clearness in complexity cannot be due to anything but the odd possibilities of literary or traditionary chance, because our acquired insight into the origination of the Gospels cannot permit it to be anything else, it is such an example of chance arrangement as could not, I believe, be produced from any other quarter of the world: the Gospels have at least the uniqueness of showing chance in a light in which it is not to be found elsewhere within human experience.

If, further, it should appear on examination that Mark and Luke distinguish the aspects of experience and foresight both in the Directions and the following summaries, not at all as if uncertainly, but *systematically*, the appearance of functional relation

will increase, and passive chance will have a still greater load of distinct order to bear.

I. MARK AND LUKE.

It may be well to provide ourselves beforehand with a few psychological "glimpses into the obvious."

(I) In tracing the path of an actual experience, there is very commonly an element of *suspense*. (*a*) We have to *go continuously forward* before we can see what will happen; (*b*) and meanwhile the prospect is *indefinite* before us.

Foresight has no suspense, but continually *sees the end from the beginning*; its prospects are definite beforehand.

So much for the path. Now as to final contacts.

(II) In actual progressive experience, after the suspense, things *break* upon us, or we *break into them*: there may be burstings forth, there may be plunges.

But foresight has no surprises; with settled eye it simply looks forward to the sure fulfilment of what has been planned and prescribed.

It seems necessary at this point to warn the reader that he is coming to a series of psychological comparisons in which *reading* by itself may avail for particularly little. I find myself quite unable by any device of writing to reproduce the exact edge of the points as I perceive them. Unless the reader will deliberately let the several *picturings* which

the different forms of language suggest take shape steadily and distinctly before his own mind, unless he will recall from his own remembrances of life the flavours of experience, the flashes of outlook, required for the psychological interpretation of the differing forms of words, I am afraid nothing here can be done. In a word, there is no substitute for *realisation*; and that cannot be guaranteed in a hurry, nor always secured by a first effort after it.

As to the value of the glimpses, if duly obtained, it might be well not finally to make up one's mind in a negative sense before returning to that other experience of the disciples which Jesus could foresee as they could not, and about which he said, "Let not your heart be disquieted."

It might, by the way, be more easy to follow Mark's movement, if we had more logically punctuated texts. The two opening imperatives ought to stand out quite distinctly: "*Fare away to the city.* And there shall meet you a man bearing a pitcher of water: *follow him.*" (The sentence surely ought not to run right on to φάγω, or "disciples")! It may be necessary to avoid confusing the lines of the editorial *grille* with the lines of Mark's own picture.

(I) *Approaches.*

(*a*) Take first the contrast between experience inevitably making its progress in suspense and foresight's instant imaginative presence at the goal.

For first slight distinction, observe that where in Mark we have first of all, in due order, the gradual approach: "Fare away to the city . . ."—we find ourselves in Luke at once contemplating what is

to happen at the entrance: "*Behold,* on *your entering* into the city . . ."

Luke, indeed, had πορευθέντες, *going your way* in xxii. 8; but that, as we shall see,[1] is correlative with ἀπελθόντες, *going off,* in Mark xiv. 12: and the contrast which we have just noticed does not stand alone.

Exactly the same kind of contrast appears in the summary at the end, where in Mark we do not escape that first continuous treading of the way before anything happens, which we know so well in *progressive experience*: "The disciples *went out,* and *came into the city,* and *found* . . ." In Luke, just as in foresight, we have but to think of the *start* and, with no intervening process as in Mark, we are instantly at the point of *discovery*: "And going off, they *found* . . ."—there is but this one finite verb.

Observe the next stage of the movement. In Mark, you have "a man bearing a pitcher of water: *follow him.*" However you punctuate, the clause breaks here, and so leaves them *following.* And if *we* thus break off here, we are inevitably left with the image of their continuing progress before us. Here is the feeling of the progressive experience—with the goal not yet in sight. But foresight in one glance sees the goal from the very start. They are not left to indefinitely progressive following, but seen *there* forthwith: "*Follow him into the house* into which he goes in."

In Luke, both the entry into the city and the entry afterwards into the house are seen forthwith.

[1] See pp. 154, 155.

εἰς, *into*, is three times repeated: the note seems to be one of assurance—"go right in." Mark's ἐὰν, noticed just below, conveys in this respect a closely similar effect.

So much for the progress into experience and the instant flash of foresight. Consider now on either side *the prospect of the goal* before it is reached.

(*b*) In Mark the goal is at first described simply through an indefinite pronoun: "wherever," or indeed, "*wherever it be* that (ἐάν) he goes in." And on reflection you will find that in implicitly following a guide to a place unknown to you you *would* be feeling that you were going to a "wherever." During the suspense of actual experience that indefinite and relative expression may very well represent all you feel you know about the precise position of the unseen end of your way. In Luke the goal is quite simply defined to view from the outset: "*the house* into which he goes in." And plainly, if you had foresight, you would from the start be thinking of the goal as "the house"; *and you could not possibly be thinking of it as a "wherever."* The psychologist will hardly question the contrast.

So to the doubting human eye, one's future place in the unseen may be a dim "wherever." We feel at once what a serene foresight that must be which can genuinely speak of it as "the house"—"the house of my Father."

(II) *Contacts.*

Pass on now to the next group of experiences. Twice there is a personal contact—first with the guide and second with the host.

The differentiation between the descriptions of contact with the guide is very slight, but sparkles vividly with actuality. In Mark, they are met by the man, literally, coming *from* somewhere[1]: which is just how meetings break upon us in the midst of actual experience. But there can be no breakings in upon foresight—which sees rather the preappointed conjunctions succeeding one another in their fulfilment. In Luke, with less weight of contingency, and with the utmost delicacy, the light flashes simply on the designed *concurrence:* "a man shall *meet with* you."[2]

Mark's language rather more suggests the man "turning up," as he would for progressive experience; Luke's rather more suggests his fitting into the arrangement, as he would for assured foresight.

The other contact is with the host. Here both accounts are emphasised. Appropriately it is Luke who *first* becomes emphatic about the man *whom Jesus knows*: "And you will say to the housemaster *of the house*, '*To thee* the Teacher says . . .' " All this sounds like the approach to one familiarly known by the speaker, and distinctly recognised. It is not the yet unaccustomed touch of fresh experience, unused to the place, and not knowing the person. One who knows him and his position, who speaks as if visualising the look of old acquaintance, is singling him out from afar. And after the message has been delivered the same note of having securely found what was designed continues: "*that same one*

[1] ἀπ-αντήσει, "meet *from*": ἀπ—point of origin.

[2] συν-αντήσει, "meet *with*": συν—point of junction.

will show you a large upper room"—for their procedure, that is to say, they are pointed to one *already* in view. *That* is the one—they will find themselves perfectly in the line of implied arrangements.

Cp. Robertson, *op. cit.*, "The 'anaphoric' pronoun 'is one that denotes an object already mentioned, or otherwise known,'" p. 693 (quoting Monro). "This is the more frequent use of this pronoun" (ἐκεῖνος), p. 707.

In Mark, on the other hand, there is no emphasis till after the delivery of the message, and then the emphatic pronoun is "*he himself* will show you a large upper room arranged ready." The host *himself* will show it to them previously ready—so, manifestly, it is there waiting to break in upon their experience. The emphasis clearly indicates that the important readiness is not to be produced, but simply experienced, by them.

It remains to notice how the messengers, urged forward by the development of their experience, themselves break in upon things—that is in Mark—and how foresight sees them definitely at a completed stage of the appointed way before beginning another—that is in Luke. In Mark, they have been following the guide. The guide takes the expected, but not altogether foreseen turn, and forthwith they are *launched* upon the business of the errand: "Wherever it be that he goes in, say ye to the housemaster that . . . ." So in the course of experience a turn of the situation plunges us upon action—here, on our view, it would be a critical committal. In Luke, they are already arrived at the house.

So there they are. Then, thus arrived, they will follow out the prescription provided for them: "And you will say (ἐρεῖτε) . . . ." For foresight there are no launches: only settled procedure.

Even the absence of the conjunction ὅτι, *that*, in Luke will be found to help the vignetted establishment of the effect in contrast with the movement of Mark.

The contrast produced by the presence or absence of καὶ, *and*, in the closing sentence is similar.

The future ἐρεῖτε, *you are to say* (Luke) is appropriate to foreseen obedience.

Now, when it is recalled that the message to the host has a separate complementary working out of its own, and that Mark's "for us" (xiv. 15) is not wholly unrepresented in Luke (xxii. 8), it will be found that there remains *nothing* else in the way of differences throughout the Directions.

And immediately beyond them we shall find what looks like curious confirmation.

(III) *The Concluding Summaries.*

Each of the writers appends to the Directions a little concluding summary of what happened. And it will be perceived that here in both Mark and Luke the movement of the language is from the aspect of the *experience—they went and found* —to the aspect of *foresight—found as he had told them:* just like the movement from what we have held to be the emphasis in Mark to what we have held to be the emphasis in Luke.

We might show the relative stresses in the accounts of the Directions, and the movement of the

summaries, in a preliminary diagrammatic form, thus:



In these summaries, then, the *movement* into experience, and the *precedent* foresight are laid out side by side in almost analytic readiness for handling. We can here get almost visible answers to two pointed questions:—

(i) Which of these two phrases, if either, dwells more than the other on the disciples' *gradually progressive movement* into their experience: (*a*) "the disciples *went out*, and *came into the city*, and found" (Mark); (*b*) "*and going off, they found*" (Luke)? We can choose only between not answering the question, and selecting Mark.

(ii) On the other hand, if either of these two following phrases brings the *precedent* foresight into more notable *relief*, which is it?—"they found as he told them" (Mark); "they found as he *had* told them" (Luke). Again there can be but one answer.

Mark xiv. 16, εἶπεν, *told*; Luke xxii. 13, εἰρήκει, *had told*. English versions do not observe the distinction.

Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 840, protests against Winer's inconsistent confusion of aorist and pluperfect, and confirms Goodwin's distinction that the aorist refers the action to the past "without the more exact specification" of the pluperfect; adding that "the speaker or writer did not always care to make this more precise specification." Here Mark does not, and Luke does.

If we are wrong in discerning that Mark and Luke are respectively stressing the aspects of the experience and the foresight, would it not be curious, on the facts, that they themselves should respectively be all but visibly stressing these two aspects in their concluding summaries?

For sure comparison, collect the total effect, if you will, diagrammatically:—



Suppose it to be said that, apart from any question of special trends here, it is naturally to be expected

that a vigorous writer like Mark would more elaborate the action, and a precise writer like Luke more exactly distinguish the priority. The only way to test the consistency of such an explanatory assumption with the facts is to compare each writer with himself. It happens to be possible here to do this very definitely.

Go to the previous similar parallel statement in each Gospel—there upon an errand (that to Bethphage), under different conditions (Mark xi. 1 ff., Luke xix. 29 ff.).

You will find that there (xi. 4) Mark does *not* elaborate the action. He has simply "they went off and found." Thus *Mark* is only less passing in this previous instance than *Luke* now becomes in our story.

One might think that even the little change of Mark to "went *out*" in our story just strengthened the effect of venture—of moving out to face something.

And again unfortunately for any attack on the special distinctiveness here, it will be found that there Luke does *not* so exactly distinguish the priority: he is content with "they found as he told them" (xix. 32—merely like Mark here: and without Mark's example, too (cp. Mark xi. 4)). Nor does he develop the distinction when he uses the phrase again *after* our story: "they found as the women told" (εἶπον, xxiv. 24). *Once* in his Gospel he deviates into using the phrase which indicates special care to bring the telling into distinct relief before the event. And it is where *we say* he has been especially stressing the experience as foreseen.

If we are judged to be wrong, is the judgment being formed simply upon an exact examination of the facts, or upon what surer ground than examination of facts is it framed?

Once again, in point of the movement into experience, Luke is not only more weighty there than he is here, he is, in fact, the more weighty of the two: ἀπελθόντες δὲ οἱ ἀπεσταλμένοι εὗρον, *they that were sent found.* But here in our story he has distinctively the lightest possible touch—no direct statement at all, but one mere fugitive participle—*going off.*

For the testing of such an alternative presumption, the facts could hardly be expected to be more apt, or more contrary. It is quite evident that here Mark specially (and exceptionally for *him*) develops the progressive experience, and Luke specially (and exceptionally for *him*) distinguishes the precedence of the foresight. It is difficult to see how, if a subtle but continuous distinction between the two essential aspects of the Directions *had* been designed, it could have been made more completely evident, short of artificiality, at every point of examination.

(IV) *Bethphage and other Comparisons.*

If we look back from the conclusions into the Directions, and examine similarly, we shall find no encouragement for any attempt to reduce the distinctions to lines of difference between the writers' habits.

We have been looking at the end. If we look at

the beginning, we notice that Luke, in xix. 30, follows Mark in opening with ὑπάγετε, *fare away*; in xxii. 10 he does not. The *only maintained* difference is that in xi. 3 Mark has εἴπατε, *say ye*, for which Luke substitutes ἐρεῖτε, *you are to say*, as here (but perhaps adds ὅτι, *that*, instead of subtracting it). But so far from illustrating a habit of style, this form of command appears nowhere else in Luke's Gospel, while the imperative *say ye*, which he does not use here, appears with him in x. 10, xiii. 32 and xx. 3.

(We noticed, in beginning to distinguish the division in our story, that Luke does not use the word "disciples" in his narrative-framework, and Matthew does not enumerate the messengers as "two." In the other story, where there is no similar parting of the ways, both Matthew and Luke retain the word "disciples," and both indicate that they are "two.")

It may be admitted that Luke's first word, Ἰδού, *Behold!* is indeed so frequent with Luke, though very rare with Mark, as to represent relatively a habit of expression. And we are not suggesting that there is no trace of literary habits in the passages—that is not our position.[1] What ought to be clear is that the habits neither conflict with nor account for the correlations. And it is difficult to detect the conflicting influence of habit where a passage developing the anticipative vision of foresight opens with "Behold!"

[1] Cp. Chapter I. v.

II. ADD MATTHEW.

Turn now to Matthew. We have seen that he very richly handles the import of the message; and he points to its delivery to someone in the city; but there his dealing ends. He is parallel to Mark and Luke so far as that he gives a version of the Directions; he is separate in so far as that version is fundamentally clear of every word that marks out any foreseen experience for the messengers The whole foundation of the distinction worked out between Mark and Luke is wanting.

Outside the message, the introduction of the host by τὸν δεῖνα—almost like our *so-and-so*—is too colourless to define any specially foreseen experience. It is a substitute for specific designation.[1] Specific designation may be by name or otherwise. It is, I think, a mistake to conclude that its use implies that *Matthew supposes* the designation to have been by name. In a compressed report like this it surely cannot safely be taken as marking more than that Matthew himself, in omitting whatever designation was given, supplies the lightest possible substitute.

What, then, comes to view if we closely compare the three writers as a group? There are two distinct aspects of the detail of the Directions which are originally capable of development—the experience and the foresight. Can any third be found to compare with these? There being two, then, in the group of three narratives the two aspects are severally developed by two writers, and no more. The remaining writer not only does not develop them, but does not touch them. If this were actually part

[1] See examples in Moulton and Milligan's *Vocabulary*.

of a design, it would be a perfect illustration of functional economy. The difficulty of treating it as anything else may appear clearly on comparing the alternatives. For *if* we conceive a correlated group, the bringing of two aspects into separate relief would manifestly afford a distinct function to two members of the group, and not necessarily to more. The third could then function negatively by omitting the two aspects. Contrast, internally between the first and second, as positive group, and again between these two and the third, would thus be definite at every point. And what other than that very effect do we now see? *If*, on the other hand, there were no functional economy, then where three accounts were connected only by the general verbal dependence of the later two upon the other, you would have to reckon with the uncounted possibilities of literary permutations and combinations of expressions. What then would keep the several treatments within regularly distinct lines, and prevent them from repeatedly overlapping across them? Yet instead of overlapping, they manifestly, when examined on a definite principle, touch one another with an absolutely clean edge. What one word can be found to infringe the lines of clear distinction? And on what analogy would this be by chance?

And, further, observe the bearing on the cleanness of the division. The masses of the story are divided, we say, as its internal elements are divided.[1] And now we may perceive that the result of the exact working out of aspects is that the division of the

[1] Cp. pp. 11–15.

masses in particular is not merely suggested through Mark's and Luke's having a *general resemblance*, while Matthew is *vaguely different*, but is definable on a principle so exact that it might easily have been definitely infringed by chance, but is not so infringed by a single word:

SECOND MASSES.



In the directions for Bethphage, Matthew maintains general parallel with Mark and Luke; and in the conclusion of the directions for Jerusalem he maintains parallel with his own phrasing of the errand to Bethphage, though with a more settled emphasis (see Reference Sheet, No. I., foot).

It might seem as if that errand of the time when they "drew nigh to Jerusalem," with so critical a prospect, was a first trial, to give them confidence for the issue of the momentous errand to a stranger within Jerusalem later; and this, again, was to give them confidence for the momentous errand through life into the unseen.

It would, of course, be surprising indeed if, in the study of the Directions, other interpretations could not be offered for expressions at this point or

that. And it would be rather surprising if someone did not, on particular grounds, prefer the other interpretations. But the interpretations now adopted have a peculiar force of consilience; clinched, moreover, by the almost visible treatment of the two aspects in the concluding reviews of the writers themselves. And the whole complement of Mark and Luke fits into the other very obvious structural fact of the division of the masses, and in such a way as to render it anatomically perfect.

Is there no problem here? Then on what more distinct, measurable and complex grounds is a problem identified *anywhere* in the study of the Gospels? Exactly what does it take to constitute a problem?

III. ADD JOHN.

It is hardly difficult to say where, for us human beings, the thought of foreseeing the conditions of coming experience becomes of the most profound and unique interest. Is it not when we think of that final prospect of inevitable passing into the unseen?

Now in that passage in John which moves parallel with the errand of the messengers, there is a distinct alternation—"in God"—"in me"; "my Father"—"I" (John xiv. 1, 2—Reference Sheet, No. II.).[1] It is an alternation between one who is Divine, in the unseen, and one who is humanly[2] present and

[1] Had the "I" been emphasised in the Greek, that might have suggested quite another sense: "I (and no one else)." The simple *alternation* is quite sufficiently determined by the unemphasised use of the first person singular.

[2] The passage implies more than this about the speaker in *essence*, but this is the contrast of his *situation*.

communicating. And if we examine the second alternation, we may recognise that when Jesus says, "In my Father's house many resting-places are," he is setting forth *a sphere for the disciples' future experience*, as certainly as when he told them of a house in which they would see a large upper room ready for them; and, on the other hand, when he says, "If it were not so, I would have told you," it may be perceived on a moment's reflection that he distinctly claims to speak of what is to be found or not to be found there, with *a foresight beyond any which the disciples themselves possess*. He distinctly makes confidence in his own preacquainting veracity, close at hand on earth, the basis of sure conviction about what is yonder in heaven. And precisely as in the conclusions to Mark (xiv. 16) and Luke (xxii. 13), the conditions of experience are mentioned first, the capacity for foresight clearly implied afterwards. And the elements in both parts, dealing severally with the future sphere of continued experience, and with the foresight of it, *are those already familiar to us in Mark and Luke*—the "house" and the "telling."

If we look at the alternation immediately before this, the presence of this same distinction is arguable, but not so obvious. "Be believing in God, and in me be believing," may very naturally be interpreted to mean: "be continually supporting your belief in God by belief in me"—in God, unseen, through your confidence in me, who speak of him near at hand. And on this view we could account very perfectly for the reversal in the language. "Be believing—in *God*"—plainly the object of belief is

here verbally the remoter element—"and in *me*—be believing"—plainly the object of belief is here verbally the immediate element. We have, then, belief in God, sustained through belief in the speaker, as a means of keeping their heart from being disquieted. Surely, then, we have the same elements as before. For how can believing even in God operate with complete effect to prevent disquieting of heart, *except* precisely as the belief involves a full settlement of mind about God as the ultimate source of future *experience*? And how can believing in Jesus as the revealer operate to the same effect, if not as a full settlement of mind about his *foresight* of the range of experience which God is holding in store?

It is Luke who especially brings out the point that the host whom the disciples have not seen is one in whom Jesus himself is placing confidence. And Luke has here a continuity of effect to which I find no parallel in Mark. Mark, in the Directions as a whole, develops the hearers' side—the experience of the messengers; but in the message to the host he develops the speaker's side—"*my* lodging-place." Luke, in the Directions as a whole, develops the speaker's side—the foresight of Jesus; but in the message to the host he develops the hearer's side—"to *thee*." This, however, means ending in a harmony finally developed in Luke: Jesus details the arrangements to the messengers as something which *he already knows* (foresight), and which they may therefore take as reliable; again, he addresses the host through them particularly as one whom *he already knows* ("to thee"); and they may therefore take *him* as reliable. In John we again find the reliability of the unseen Master of the house made secure to the disciples upon the assurance of Jesus.

We have so far pursued a reversed analytic course through the sayings. Centre now upon the beginning: "Let not your heart be disquieted." And what is our heart, on the one hand, but the centre in which experience is felt, in which it comes home to us as ours, and which can therefore be disquieted by anticipations of what experience is to be? And on the other hand, if anyone were to bid us not to be disquieted at heart, and did not foresee what our experience was going to be, where would be the authority in his bidding?

If after this analysis, begun from the end, (where aspects naturally develop into most distinctness), we now watch the development from the beginning, we may trace an effect singularly like that of two-sided vital germination. You might drop a mustard-seed, and see its two germinative developments rising up at first concluded in one common fold; then more widely two, but bending in one direction; and then branching their several ways. And when thought is charged to the full with still and triumphing life, it can open unperceived, it might seem, with something not wholly unlike the unconscious beauty of new germination. The opening general exhortation, "Let not your heart be disquieted," *blends* the subjective centre of continuous experience and the present subjective[1] assurance about its lot in one

[1] So far the direction is simply that *they* should remain assured; no objective ground is yet given. The first thought is entirely (except by implication), in the subjective sphere; the next double thought links the subjective to a sphere beyond it by belief; the two conjoined thoughts which fall in the third place exhibit at last a sphere securely objective. Notice how naturally the bidding to "believe" leads up to the objective assurance that the many resting-places "*are*."

expressive phrase. Next the indication of the essential process of obeying this exhortation, "Be believing in God, and in me be believing," points *both* to the objective source of continuous experience and to the objective present means of assurance about it, in phrases separated in sequence but united in oneness of form; then this process of obeying the exhortation is justified *in different forms*, on the one hand by developing objective conditions of continuous experience at last quite circumstantially—"In my Father's house many resting-places are"—and on the other by confirming the present objective assurance about them against all possible question—"If it were not so, I would have told you."

Thus, if we distinguish patiently, we shall find that the two factors of securely continuous experience and the assurance of present foresight, from being involved in germ at the beginning (single clause), *gradually* develop into separate distinctness by the end.

Now did John *derive* this development of the implications of experience and foresight from Mark and Luke? If he did, he would at least be confirming us in supposing that the stress on experience and foresight is discernibly present with them. But it is difficult to see how copying, or any ordinary kind of literary imitation, could be made probable. The presence of the distinction between experience and foresight in Mark and Luke may be clearly demonstrable; but it is *latent*, so that its discovery is a matter of research; its presence in John is similarly latent; and manipulative *copying* from

latency to latency would involve a process so novel as to be difficult to explain. Besides, in the passage itself in John there is a development, as we see, from relative implicitness at the beginning (single clause), to relative explicitness at the end, where the foundations of future experience and the assurance of present foresight appear plainly side by side at last, with the distinct intermediate step of the *twofold* believing in between. This looks more like the result of natural growth within a mind originally conceiving a thought than the adoption of an already completely developed idea from outside: especially as the idea of the experience of the disciples and the foresight of Jesus, though distinctly developed, is not forced, nor even put forward as the main idea of the passage, which insists more directly on the guaranteeing conceptions of *the Divine reliability* and *the present sincerity of the speaker.*

It would probably seem easier to advance a bald theory of derivation of this complex, but perfectly natural, movement of thought before we had mastered the elements and their combination, than afterwards.

Let us try an entirely different way of looking at the subject. The persistent differences of Mark and Luke in reporting what Jesus says to his disciples would *stereoscope* perfectly to this effect: that Jesus understands the coming *experience* of their *heart*; and his *foresight* is bidding it *not to be disquieted*. In Mark's account, with its Greek breathing short and deep, you have the elements of suspense; in Luke's, with its Greek breathing light and even, you have security always ahead of you.

Now be willing, for the sake of fair experiment, steadily to contemplate for a while the possibility that Mark and Luke are interpreting a living content which was once in the many-sided mind of Jesus, and which could not conceivably be rendered with similar distinctness by any single account. Observe what would follow; and judge whether it is natural. It would follow that when, a very little while afterwards, he himself was heard saying, "Let not your heart be disquieted," he would now be *re-expressing* himself to them. Not to be disquieted was what he meant to secure for them when he was speaking before; it is what he still means to secure for them in a larger way. Then, in the very spirit and interpretation of his former speech, in which he had known their heart, and meant to keep it from misgiving, he develops his far-reaching thought—lucid at a height of serene command, the angle of which our faint theories of literary derivations, and traditionary influences, and all kinds of secondarinesses, whatever ends they serve, were never adjusted to catch —and in the intimate atmosphere of the Upper Room the revelation which lay embosomed in his first sending them to a surely foreseen experience, steadily unfolds into its own authentic shape of immeasurable and fathomless assurance.

On our first examination of this utterance in John, we noticed in what paradox we should be involved by an attempt to dissociate it from Jesus himself. We have now examined it further. And we find that according to Mark and Luke first, and John afterwards, the same line of thought, even the same *latent* and inexplicit line, is firmly held by their

speaker. And the development in John seems to bear the marks of a still continuing originality and freshness, not of something borrowed. Continuity of freshness suggests the single mind. The single mind is plainly not that of any evangelist. And it is represented by all as being that of Jesus—the unity of their representation being not a mere surface unity of narrative statement, but unity profound and unobserved through centuries, coming only the more exactly into view the more exact we make our analysis to-day.

But the development of the speaker's thought as used by Mark and Luke becomes an edge on which the main division of the narratives is sharply and quite definitely effected. Where then shall we seek the roots of that division the facts of which we have yet to gather?

That is a question on which we may find some suggestion later. But it may be seen already that the functional appearance is here spreading in a very distinct manner through the *Four* Gospels, and in a way which suggests that the first rooting of it all must lie in the mysteriously living and perfect way in which the utterance of Jesus successively unfolded itself that night. Initially Mark and Luke, dealing with what he said at the beginning, severally develop in it the aspects of the experience and the foresight. Matthew combines the two aspects of the message to the host, and seems to carry us to the living depths of it. But it cannot be Matthew who will similarly combine the two aspects of the Directions in general, and exhibit them in their suggestive unity; for he cannot do this and

maintain the division of the masses in its distinctness.[1] The combining, however, though thus not falling within the sphere of the Three Gospels, *is* shown, as from a later period of the evening, in the Fourth, in a very distinctly developing way which is as unlike as possible to anything accidental, not very easy to ascribe intelligently to John's origination, and apparently due to the serenely balanced grasp of situation appearing in the Master's own controlling utterance. Now if this later discourse represents the thought of Jesus that night, and the fortifying combination of the aspects of continuous experience and assuring foresight was his, then Mark and Luke are authenticated as together presenting genuine and intended aspects, also, of what he began to say earlier. According to Mark and Luke, Jesus said something in which the two aspects were latent. According to John, when he spoke again, the two aspects were still latent—in the first sentence—but before long had broken even into verbal distinctness. The *whole* process is logically continuous.

IV. THE SILENT DAY.

I have delayed the further evidence bearing on the absence of Jesus from his disciples on the day before the Last Supper until we should have made some advance in our study of John. I will append it here.

John opens his first account and his last account of a visit of Jesus to Jerusalem each with a strikingly

[1] Cp. pp. 117, 118. Why the maintaining of the division of the masses should matter, may be seen more distinctly by the close of the following chapter.

effective introductory parenthesis. The plainly enclosed parenthesis at the opening of the first account is the story of the expulsion of the traffickers from the Temple. The plainly enclosed parenthesis at the opening of the last account is the story of the supper at Bethany. The plain enclosure in each case can be seen in the distinct resumption, after the stories, of the very same points as were set out before them. Indeed, the sentences before and after the supper at Bethany, if they were together, would be read without any sense of break: "Six days, therefore, before the passover, Jesus came to Bethany, where was Lazarus, whom Jesus raised from the dead. A great concourse of the Jews, therefore, knew that he was there, and came not on account of Jesus only, but that they might see Lazarus also, whom he raised from the dead" (John, xii. 1 and 9). The supper intervenes between these two naturally connected sentences, the second of which so clearly contains the resumption of topics from across the narrative. And again, before the story of the traffickers, we read: "The passover of the Jews was at hand, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem. And he found . . ." After reading of what he found, we are immediately borne on to the final breaking forth of his indignation, present here in the narrative as the number to which one is counting up is present in one's mind all the time one counts—accompanied by a very strikingly arranged *second* list of the offending objects, so set over against the first as to yield a sense of perspective. Then after a parenthesis which has carried us forward even beyond the resurrection, the

first topics are very definitely resumed, much as after the supper, with, "but when he was in Jerusalem, in the passover, in the feast. . . ." (John ii. 13 and 23).[1]

According to Mark (xi. 15 ff.) the clearance from the Temple took place on the second day of the last visit. Matthew (xxi. 12 ff.), Luke (xix. 45, 46) and John all use it as a frontispiece to their accounts of the controversial relations of Jesus with Jerusalem, showing his opponents with nothing to stand for, and not standing. In John this use, of course, moves the story further out of historical position, since observation of Jerusalem begins earlier, and at this distance it is enclosed in parenthesis. With corresponding value as a later frontispiece, the story of the supper at Bethany lights up the opening of the last visit with the gleam of resurrection before dark.

When John takes two several incidents and places each of them differently from the other Gospels, and

[1] I have dealt with the subject more fully in an article on "Two Johannine Parentheses," in the *Expository Times*, Vol. XXXII., pp. 520–3, and have there examined the highly pictorial comparative structures of the two lists.

I did not mention in the article that I am favourably disposed to the view which assigns the "forty-six years" of John ii. 20 to the earlier re-building by Zerubbabel. There are points both in the Three Gospels and the Fourth which seem to blend with it in effects of special psychological vividness.

In a note to the article I have vindicated the Johannine value of John ii. 23–25.

On p. 523, col. *a*, line 12, of the article, for "trust" read "wrist." Dr. R. H. Strachan (Vol. XXVII,, p. 233) takes exception to the play of ἐπίστευσαν . . . οὐκ ἐπίστευεν, in ii. 23, 24, as "nowhere characteristic of the Johannine style," unless xi. 12 is regarded as being so. But in i. 11 the word ἴδια is turned about, ἴδιοι . . . οὐ to show a different face, and become more penetrating by force of changing light, in a similar way.

effectively for his own purposes, one at the beginning of his first, and one at the beginning of his last, account of a visit to Jerusalem, and immediately after each of them resumes almost point for point what he was saying before, there ought to be no great difficulty in recognising parenthesis.

And John never says *when* the supper took place. "They *therefore* made him a supper there," is a connexion of *reason*, not of time. He comes, his previous relations are remembered, the recognition is set on foot, and if it took the form of a semi-public village celebration it might naturally take a day or two to arrange. Jesus himself may have delayed it; for according to Mark, the purpose took effect the very night after his public ministry was over. We may feel the appropriateness of the time. In a word, *οὖν = therefore* is not *τότε = at that time*; and John makes *no* affirmation about the time.

The *historical* justification for John's placing appears in each instance to be that a *prompting* towards what happened later arose at the time just reached in his main narrative.

It is curious that in each instance the link is a "making," which is a process involving the passage of time. The making of the supper might naturally include the handling of preliminary arrangements. Even the making of the whip of rushes from the floor may include by Johannine reflection the gathering of individually lowly and ineffective elements of popular force in a grip which made the actual scourge irresistible to ignominious time-servers.

If the Marcan placing remains thus unchallenged on a reading of John in John's own light, it follows that we have not one evident word in the Three

Gospels of anything seen or heard of Jesus between the night of the supper at Bethany and the time when the disciples put their question. But this means that in the records, here generally so full, we entirely lose sight of Jesus for a day. And this losing sight of him exactly fits in with the parallel in John, where the ideas and the very language of the other Gospels reappear, but where also it appears distinctly that Jesus is "faring away," and leaving his disciples behind—with Peter to follow not now, but afterwards; and with a result that they will find a place made ready, as they certainly did to-night. The vacancy in the Three Gospels, and the filling by parallel in John exactly fit.

And if there is a functional relation between the different Gospels it appears to admiration when the absence of Jesus, which prefigures that absence which continues to this day, is indicated in the direct narrative in an absolute silence, a silence which is filled with significance as from his own lips in indirect narrative afterwards.

This retirement to the upper room would take place on the day after the continuous visiting of the Temple was over. And when John marks the close of the public ministry of Jesus in the words, "These things spake Jesus, and went away and was hidden from them" (xii. 36), he might seem, with characteristic pensiveness, and with quite his own love of what is opaque from without and transparent from within, to be seeing Jesus at once hidden from the throngs who would seek him in the Temple, and hidden, as *we* may perceive, in the upper room in such wise that it becomes like the intimate beginning of his being hid from all earthly sight.

What follows to xii. 50 appears to be in the nature of review, and its effect is like the glow still vibrant in the heavens after the sun has already gone down, or perhaps, in its force, more like the farewell of bright inevitable setting, felt nearer and nearer till the last rim of brightness disappears.

NOTE. The following extracts from Canon Streeter's *Four Gospels* may here be of special interest for comparison of observation.

"A standing difficulty of New Testament scholarship has always been to explain why the author of the Fourth Gospel goes out of his way, as it were, to differ from the Synoptics on points having no theological significance. First and foremost there is his adoption of a chronological scheme glaringly at variance with the other Gospels. To a large matter like this, or like the day of the Last Supper, he may have attached special importance. But he also contradicts them on what seem quite trivial points; affirming, for instance, that Bethsaida (not Capernaum) was the city of Andrew and Peter, or that the Anointing at Bethany took place four days earlier than the other Gospels put it, and that Jesus departed and hid Himself (John xii. 36) between Palm Sunday and the Passion." (P. 417.)

"And is it not possible that John had information that Jesus, the very first time He came to Jerusalem, after having at the Baptism felt the call to Messiahship, vehemently denounced the Temple traffic? We should certainly expect Him to make some protest, although on the first occasion He may not have followed His words by action. Assuming that he had information to this effect, John would at once relate it with the prophecy in Malachi iii. 1–3, "The Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to his temple . . . he shall purify the sons of Levi . . ."; he would then be quite sure that Mark had misplaced the incident." (P. 420.)

Chapter VI.

Further Examination into Division.

I. THE DIVISION AND THE "READYS."

At the very outset of our study, we pointed to an unusual and apparently significant *double* form of expression in Mark—"a . . . room arranged *ready*, and there make *ready* for us."

The objectivity of the first part of this phrase is substantiated not only by its own conversational force,[1] but by the repetition of the same word yet once again that same evening in John, with an effect of revealing in the first utterance a still intenser latent force of reply,[2] and thus stamping it as something lying in the inward parts of the incident, and not merely upon the surface of a story; and the second use, "and there make ready for us," is its effectively natural sequel. But if we have here a transcript of something said in the midst of the incident itself, and reflecting its contents, we have also here, surely, our earliest glimpse of that distinctly *dividing* way of handling the features of the incident which is so pointedly developed in the written form of the story. The first "ready," (even in promising an experience to the messengers), becomes a forcible reply to the position of the *disciples*,[3] while the following "make ready" indicates the line to be taken by the *messengers*. It looks like

[1] Chapter I. ii. [2] Chapter II. vii. [3] Chapter I. ii.

the Master's summary of the whole situation as he dismisses his messengers to action, bringing its two sides one into relation with the other. And this, we shall find, is exactly what is effected in every example of division which we observe in the story. The division, as will become increasingly plain, regularly takes place between something in Mark, which bears upon the side of the disciples in the incident, and something in Mark which bears upon the side of the messengers in the incident.

Of all the divisible features in Mark's story, this, which is given not as a part of his *own* narrative framework, but as an utterance of Jesus himself in the midst of the incident, is the most conspicuous. It is visibly double, even to repetition. And at the same time its two expressions—one, we say, answering the disciples' position, and the other prompting the movement of the messengers—fall, so far, on the two sides of the parting of the ways. It will be interesting to see what becomes of it in that division in which, otherwise, we find Matthew taking the first part and not the second, and Luke taking the second and not the first. How do they handle the two "readys"?

If I said that they handle them according to the principle of division exemplified elsewhere in the story, I believe I should be making a true and demonstrable statement. I might not on that account be making a statement the truth of which would be instantly obvious to those who do not realise the general conditions of the application of structural principles and causal laws alike. "All laws of causation," says John Stuart Mill, in his

chapter on "The Plurality of Causes and the Intermixture of Effects,"[1] "are liable to be . . . counteracted, and seemingly frustrated, by coming into conflict with other laws . . . All laws of causation, in consequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated in terms affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results." Here it is not a question of conflict with other laws, but of necessarily simultaneous application of one and the same principle. The application of a principle of structure to a major feature may preclude its explicit application at the same spot to a minor feature. In Luke the example before us is perfectly simple. We can see at a glance that he takes the second and omits the first. Matthew, on the other hand, omits the second, *and does not take the first.* And according to the largest application of the principle of division, he would *not here* take the first; for we have seen that it is part of the application of the principle of division to the main masses that Matthew does not touch what refers to *the foreseen experience of the messengers*, and we have also seen that the finding of the "room arranged ready" does belong in one of its aspects to the foreseen experience of the messengers. If, therefore, division were carried out with a functional precision, Matthew would be omitting the first "ready" in accordance with the requirements of the general division of the masses, and omitting the second in accordance with the requirements of the application of the same principle of division to the particulars here—that is to say, in the ordinary course of division of two-sided

[1] *System of Logic*, Book III., Chap. X., Sec. 5.

features we should expect him to omit the second, which is a command to the messengers. And the result would be exactly what we see:

MATTHEW.	MARK.	LUKE.
	ready	
	make ready	*make ready*

This can be explained by the perfected working out of the law of division in more than one direction: the result being the entire absence of visible balance in Matthew. Had this been a more ordinary kind of phrase, we might not have perceived that there was a doubleness to divide; but as the doubleness is distinct through sheer repetition, we can logically trace the counteraction, and deduce its material cause.

II. THE TWO BEGINNINGS.

There is another, rather similar, but less obvious example of repetition in Mark, securing the unexpected effect of something like two beginnings, or a beginning over again, for his two-sided story.

In Greek, when the writer has once spoken distinctly of "*his disciples*," (οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ, xiv. 12), it is a literary unexpectedness to hear him repeat "two of *his disciples*" (δύο τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ, xiv. 13) immediately afterwards. "Two of the disciples" is sufficient. If the "his" is repeated in the Greek, it has an effect either of redundance or of slightly emphatic repetition. In fact, Mark's language here may give one, if not exactly a literary shock, at least a literary pause, much like the repetition of "ready and there make ready." He speaks exactly

as if the disciples had not been mentioned before—(in fact, he here continues, or resumes, exactly as he begins his whole story in xi. 1). And it is curious, after our study of functional relation, to observe that Luke makes the beginning of his whole story exactly at the spot where Mark makes his second beginning, and, of course, begins *without* anything having been heard of any disciples. Mark's "*second* beginning" was, in its unusual shape, precisely of the kind to form a laminating foundation for Luke's beginning. And Matthew, it will be observed, has Mark's first beginning without a trace of his second, while Luke has his second beginning without a trace of his first:

MATTHEW.	MARK.	LUKE.
begins with the disciples	begins with the disciples	
	begins with the messengers	*begins with the messengers*

This is distinct from the division of Mark's masses. Matthew's beginning is in his Marcan, Luke's in his non-Marcan mass.

As a study in the misleadingly obvious, it may be worth while to point out how easily Mark's little doubling with regard to "his disciples," might go to support a documentary illusion, if it fell on the lines of an already adopted theory.

Before the second beginning of the narrative he is following the line which Matthew follows: onward from it he follows the line which Luke follows. How simple, then, to suppose that he has combined the two accounts, and with that carelessness the supposition of which so often helps a theory past a corner, has left the selvedge showing. But such a theory, once accepted amid the various surrounding correlations, lies dead, and cannot move amongst them.

The antiphony of "his disciples *say to him* . . .

he sends two of his disciples, and *says to them*," helps the effect of opposition within Mark. When the reader is thoroughly familiar with the contrasts, he may feel that this new beginning in Mark *shuts out* the effect of the other beginning, somewhat as the repetition of the words of the disciples in the command in Luke shuts out their question in Matthew and Mark. Alike in passing from the beginning with the disciples in Matthew and Mark to the beginning with the sending of the messengers in Luke, and in passing from the first beginning to the second within Mark, we may feel that the effect is in a subtle way one of independence in the sending of the two.

III. ANALYSIS OF A "RECONSTRUCTION."

We may here pause to examine into that repetition of the words of the disciples in the command in Luke more closely, and to observe whether it works out exactly in accordance with any ordinary idea of the results of mere literary variation.

The interest of the peculiar precision of the repetition lies, I think, like that of the division, in the two aspects of its critical value and its narrative suggestiveness.

Take first the critical value. The other two narratives begin with a question of the disciples to Jesus; then with entire reversal of current Luke begins with a command of Jesus to his disciples; and the language is so much the same as that of the other Gospels that it looks exactly like a reconstruction. Quite true: but what kind of reconstruction is it?

Take the words of the question in Mark, one by one.

(1)—(2) The two opening words *ποῦ θέλεις, where wilt thou?* express a double misconception. They assume the will of Jesus where he has expressed none (*θέλεις, wilt*). They ask for an explicit direction which it proves, to the end, not to be at all his intention to give (*ποῦ, where?*). We can perhaps understand that the words would be put better in their place by being passed over in silence than by any reply

For the rest:

(3) The starting participle, *ἀπελθόντες, going off,* with its note of haste, is replaced in the command by another starting participle of more dignified and deliberate tone, *πορευθέντες, going your way.*

This word, used by Jesus in Luke of the messengers going to make ready the passover, is the same as that used by Jesus in John of his own going to make ready a place.

(4) The verb *ἑτοιμάσωμεν, make ready,* appears in the command in the form *ἑτοιμάσατε, make ready,* in a different syntactical connexion.

(5) The conjunction *ἵνα, in order that,* appears in the command in a different syntactical connexion.

(6) The verb *φάγῃς, eat,* appears in the form *φάγωμεν, eat,* in a different syntactical connexion.

(7)—(8) *τὸ πάσχα, the passover,* appears in the command in a different syntactical connexion.

This completes the account of Mark's words, but

(9) The command in Luke has one word, and one word only, which does not repeat a word, or

even the grammatical form of a word, in the question in Mark. Matthew also has one word, and one word only, which does not appear in Mark. Matthew's one additional word is the dative pronoun, σοι, *for thee*. Luke's one additional word is the corresponding dative pronoun, ἡμῖν, *for us*. But this appears in Mark's own rendering of the command a little later, xiv. 15.

In John we have the dative pronoun, ὑμῖν, *for you*. In all the instances the dative pronoun is the indirect object to ἑτοιμάζω, *make ready*.

The command in Luke is thus built up without containing one word which has not a particular parallel of its own in Mark and Matthew—without containing one word which does not either repeat some particular word, or (being correlative) repeat the exact grammatical form (starting participle or dative pronoun) of some particular word in the question of the disciples.

On the other hand, except those two words, ποῦ θέλεις, *where wilt thou?* which imply an assumption of the will of Jesus, and which contain a question which is not directly answered in any of the accounts to the end, there is not a word in the question in Mark and Matthew which has not a particular parallel of its own in Luke.

Observe the economy, from whichever side you start. And the persistence in economy is not less marked when the forms of the words are preserved where the words themselves will not serve. Were this done deliberately we should say it was but to add the closeness of finger-work to handiwork.

Besides this, we see, one of the words in the command in Luke which is not represented in its own substance in Mark's rendering of the question —πορευθέντες, *going your way*—is directly present in the utterance of Jesus in John (with the same following verb); and the other of the words (ἡμῖν, *for us*) is directly present in Mark's own version of the *command*.

Now suppose the case of a writer in free literary variation dealing so independently with the *significance* of his material that he does not scruple to change the whole current of conversation at the beginning of the narrative, and yet so developing his change that when he has finished he cannot be found, in a single word which he has chosen, to have fallen out of touch with the very words of the original. Is that exactly what you would have foreseen as the issue of free literary variation?

Suppose it accident. But why do the accidents so exactly eke one another out, among so many other exactnesses, without any assignable slip? Why does accident nowhere thus betray itself? And how do we recognise accident if it does not betray itself, and by what right assume it for intellectual protection, if we cannot recognise it by any sign?

Why does our author thus change the sense and keep the words, or, where the words cannot be kept, keep the very shadows of the words, if this is the work of an ordinary author which we undertake to explain accordingly, and neither a series of exact accidents, nor an example of that unexplained flexible precision which is the regular mark of "vital" activity?

And there is no sign of anything laboured. The newly constructed command not only is command, but moves with the instant force of command. Our English is inevitably loose: the Greek is two strokes on an anvil, and so ends.

Moreover from the narrative point of view we may be struck by the effect of replacement and advance. For an errand hastily improvised, there is one in perfectly organised progress; the mention of "the passover" comes in with quite new weight; and if the disciples were concerned about *him*, he is providing for them all. Of all that they have thought, he is thinking, but goes further. They must walk in the line of his provision. And the skill in Luke's Greek rendering might suggest that the replacement of the first proposal is established by a quick handling of the proposers' very words which leaves them with nothing to say, because all that they have said is overlaid.

And, as we have already seen, a little sustaining touch of *repeated* repetition falls later (Mark xiv. 15, Luke xxii. 12).

As to free variation (which might, by the way, remind us of the "indefinite variation" which has suffered heavy discount in Biology through comparative observation of the actual development of living things) there is this further difficulty. We observed from the very beginning that it is the divergence of Luke's first mass (containing the command), from Mark's and Matthew's, and of Matthew's second mass from Mark's and Luke's—it is the divergence of these two that measures out the division of the masses, and gives to the structure

of the whole narrative-group its present characteristically balanced form. Thus the special content of Luke's first mass co-operates with the special content of Matthew's second mass to determine the division. How then can an essential of an operation in which Matthew is equally concerned be explained by supposing Luke's free individual variation?

And it seems to be a further point of some critical importance that here, where it is so necessary for interpretation that the effect of two beginnings to the incident should *not* be lost by stultifying the two as a mere literary confusion of one, the effect should be almost physically arranged in a form which makes a theory of free literary variation look wooden.

For it has been assumed that there is a broad divergence between John and the Three Gospels about the relative dates of the Last Supper and the passover. From a superficial literary point of view, it might also appear that there is a divergence of statement *within* the Three Gospels: since two make the incident begin with a question of the disciples, and one makes it begin with a command of Jesus in very similar terms. But if there are two beginnings, of which one is *not* the mere literary variation of the other, but points to a real replacement within the incident, the divergence within the Three Gospels would mean that the passover was being hastened beyond expectation, and therefore the passover of the Jews would fall later, just as it does in John. The two apparent divergences of John from the Three, and of Luke within the Three, would thus only confirm one another's truth to

historical event. The mutual reconcilability, on one principle, of two apparent divergences so totally different in form, is not very likely to be either accidental or privately designed.

IV. THE FIRST MASSES.

I wish now to raise a question which I shall not attempt immediately to settle: is there any distinct balance between the arrangement of the first and of the second masses of the story? We saw how, in the second masses, Mark and Luke had a topic with two aspects. Each brought one into special relief; Matthew dropped the topic involving both. Have Mark and Matthew, in the first masses, similarly a subject with two aspects, and does Luke correspondingly omit them?

Proof will depend on a principle of structure to be considered later. Here we shall deal with the subject only provisionally, without at all professing cogency.

It is evident that Jesus had been silent to his disciples about arrangements for the passover up to an hour when the time for the sacrifice was not far distant. This makes it probable that the question urging him to make declaration of arrangements was an intervention prompted by anxiety—anxiety lest no arrangements should be made in time, or even lest the whole matter should be allowed finally to slip. This is confirmed by the little touch in Mark, "Where will you have us *go off*"—"where will you have us *be gone*" (ἀπελθόντες)—"and make ready so that you may eat the passover?" And again, to say, "that *you* may eat," when arrangements, of

course, would be made for the whole party, would quite agree with their pressing something upon *him* to which they felt he was not attending for himself.

It would appear, equally, that if they felt anxiety, it was dissembled. The question assumes most absolutely that Jesus *will* make arrangements—the only question is "where?" People instinctively try to influence others by appearing quite sure of their expectations from them.

And in ordinary speech, the dissembling of anxiety may take the form of a quick peremptoriness, as if all were a matter of course; while yet the anxiety which is dissembled may betray itself at unawares by a certain furtive hastiness—a touch of hurry in the manner—and a suspicious *particularity* in describing the hope about which the speaker wishes to appear so sure: the thing is clearly felt *not* to be altogether a matter of course.

It is in Matthew's brevity, rather than in Mark, that we should have the more sheer and simply peremptory assumption: "*Where* will you have us make ready for you to eat the passover?" (Matthew's Greek here almost makes one smile, if one is not thinking deeply.) In Mark we should have just the touch of haste—"Where will you have us go off" or "be gone"—followed by the explicitness—"*in order that you may eat* the passover"—by which anxiety would naturally after all betray itself.

Construction with *ἵνα, in order that,* is frequent with Mark. But to point out that a composer is addicted to the use of a particular form of chord is neither to interpret nor to explain the effects which he obtains by his use of it.

So then, if the question expresses, as it naturally might by its form and circumstances, an anxiety which was dissembled, you would have rather anxiety *dissembled* in Matthew, and the dissembled *anxiety* in Mark. And Luke would neither add nor repeat. The messengers being under orders, there is naturally nothing left to urge or to dissemble.

On this view, which we shall confirm later, the *fuller* definition of the division of the Marcan masses would take the following form—both on the whole and in composition a form of complementary balances, and thus (if you overlook the angularity of the diagram) a form of after all very biological appearance:



V. THE FIRST DAY.

Perhaps we shall find a task which we can handle with more immediate conviction if we try to penetrate the shell of the opening example within the story—that of the "first day:" (its being "of the unleavens" raises a well-known critical problem which we shall have to leave till afterwards).

So far as Matthew and Luke are concerned, interpretation does not seem difficult. A "first" is properly the first of a series, and naturally implies a succession to follow. In Matthew, "on the *first* of the unleavens" the disciples come to Jesus hoping that he will commission them to make ready for the usual observance of the feast-time. The familiar succession of its days is before their minds, rather than impending tragedy. It is on the *first* of the season—so Matthew, appropriately to their question, begins. Luke, on the other hand, stands from the beginning at the point of view of Jesus sending his messengers to make ready the passover which presaged the end. From that point of view this day is no "first," but the day which will see *the end*. No festal series is to be anticipated. All attention concentrates upon "the day" of supreme happening. The appropriateness of the change in Luke is obvious. (And it may be noticed how Luke does hold up the day for attention apart, making it the proper subject of a sentence to itself.)

But how are we to explain the linking term in Mark, "the first day"? Apart from a functional relation between the narratives, I do not think

we can explain it in any intelligible relation to the content of Matthew and Luke. But if you allow the phrase a suitable function, it will most readily assume it, and display within itself the germ of the aptness shown elsewhere. While the simple "first of the unleavens" turns your outlook at once across the coming series, "the first *day* of the unleavens" gives you a little first platform of time on which to stand while you are looking across. But even while you stand upon it, even within the space of that first *day*, something, of course, will be happening; and what happens in it—who can say?—may cut off further prospects, and limit attention sharply to this one day itself. Then this "first day" would prove to be "the day," as it is in Luke, instead of simply "the first" as it is in Matthew.

If you think of it as a "first," you will find yourself sharing the outlook of the disciples through the ordinary season; if you think of it as "the day," that import of it towards which the messengers' faces were being turned, seeing or unseeing, inevitably comes before you.

That the presence of the word "day" implies an outlook over the content of the day is confirmed by the fact that where the word "day" explicitly appears (Mark and Luke), we have a reference immediately to the day's sacrificial content; where it does not (Matthew), we have none.

The reading of the Textus Receptus, ἐν ᾗ, "the day within which," would agree with the idea of content, but is not well attested, and does not seem rhythmic.

It is curious to observe the suggestion of a "probability that the evangelist would have written τῇ μίᾳ," if he

meant to indicate specifically "the first day of Unleavened Bread"[1]—i.e. not τῇ πρώτῃ, adjectivally "the first," as here, but τῇ μίᾳ, first in current enumeration. But it will be recognised, I believe, that if Mark was thinking, not without irony, of the "firstness" of the day to the disciples, and not aiming at current enumeration, which, as we shall see later, his whole phrase does not represent, the present *adjective* would more expressively be his word.

VI. THE CRITICAL AND THE NARRATIVE ASPECTS OF DIVISION.

Now we could see at the outset, without understanding anything—a child could see—that Matthew takes the first half of Mark's phrase, "the first day," and Luke takes the second. We may perceive now that Matthew is taking the part which is naturally associated with the disciples' side of the story, and Luke the part which is naturally associated with the messengers' side.

And thus it goes with every example of plain division which we find within the story. Again and again, with what looks like functional sureness of selection, it is the mass, the feature, the detail, which bears upon the disciples, standing in the old way of Jewish ceremonial, which reappears with Matthew—somehow not *the other. It is the mass, the feature, the detail, which bears upon the necessity of the new turn which the messengers must take which reappears with Luke—somehow* not *the other. And beyond the story, in the remoter introductions of the passover-season, we shall find something exactly*

[1] Archdeacon Allen, *St. Mark* (additional note on Mark xiv. 12).

complementary. Both in the story and in the introductions the division seems consistently to fall, in complementary forms, exactly upon the line of the parting of the ways—the way of outworn, though retained ceremonial, and the way which leads forward to unforeseen fulfilment. This seems to be the interpretative aspect of the sharp division—with its sharpness accentuated where Luke, the companion of the Apostle of the separated way, does not so much as admit in his narrative framework the general term which would link the messengers with those who were at first seen standing in the old way.[1]

But if the division had appeared only in this vitally suggestive aspect, it would not have forced itself upon our attention so simply as it now does. Formally, it is just a division of first and second points, undeniably such whether their position and handling is held to mean anything or nothing. It is because Matthew, in taking his particular aspect of the story, quite visibly takes the *first* of Mark's divisible points, while Luke in taking his aspect as visibly takes the *second*, that a division becomes so unavoidably manifest. The correct apprehension of points of *significance*, indeed, depends on insight, and their presence is therefore open to discussion; the distinguishing of points of position, first and second, requires but the use of sight. And apart from textual problems, which here give us little room for question, there can be no debate as to which of two points is first, and which is second, in Mark's narrative, and which of the two reappears

[1] Cp. pp. 12, 13.

in Matthew's, and which of the two in Luke's. The division has thus an absolutely visible embodiment, of the presence of which even the unwilling mind, once it has fairly observed and considered, can hardly rid itself without realising that it is dismissing facts. And its more outward features seem, so far as they go, to offer a clear test of capacity for perfectly frank admission of what is to be seen.

This uniform distinction of firsts and seconds in the area before us constitutes a first critical aspect of the division. It forces upon us a critical issue so elementary in its plainness that we must either logically disperse it, or face it, or distinctly not face it.

Once we fully admit what is primarily undeniable, once this bare outward form of division, remarkable rather for its simplicity than its intellectual richness, has compelled our attention, and will not let us go, it may gradually become evident that there is no rest for us short of acknowledging that it does appear to fall constantly and significantly, in the story, and (as we shall see) in the introduction, upon the line of distinction between a way of things Jewish, and a way which leads still from dawning into dawning beyond. And when we thus perceive the parting of the ways, we may come back with fresh light to the *main* critical problem, discerning that the much-discussed divergence between John and the Three means, for one thing, that the Jews in John were in the old way, where the disciples stood, and not in the way of Jesus.

And then we may wonder why it all should be—a question which we are not by any means so simply

able to answer about vital phenomena in general. Biology would be a very backward science if its votaries had steadily refused to accept observable facts as significant or worthy of serious consideration, unless they were furnished with satisfactory reasons *why* the facts should be as they were. Still, we may say something even about the "why" in the end.

But now, the fact that Matthew *can simultaneously* take Mark's *first* points and points which bear upon the disciples' first attitude, while Luke can simultaneously take Mark's second points and points which bear upon the messengers' final position, shows that the present form of the narratives can never be explained simply by considering the Matthæan and Lucan handling. For unless the material had first been so arranged within Mark's own narrative that the "disciples'" points *were* regularly first points, and the "messengers'" points *were* regularly second points, no possible manipulation by Matthew and Luke could have divided at once between Mark's first and second points and between "disciples'" and "messengers'" points. It will be obvious, on consideration, that only a special and repeated arrangement of material within Mark's own narrative could render this simultaneous division possible. It is therefore futile to attempt to solve the problem of the ultimate arrangement of material in Matthew and Luke unless we can first solve the underlying problem of the conditioning arrangement of the material in Mark. That is, there is a definite Marcan problem prior to the problems of Matthæan and Lucan derivation.

Test the reality of the Marcan problem by considering how many stories of a hundred to a hundred-and-fifty words long you could produce from the whole range of ordinary literature which *could* be divided as Matthew and Luke divide Mark. If the stories can be produced, the production will still be remarkable. If they cannot be produced at all, by what right do we assume that Mark's is just like an ordinary story, when ordinary stories are not like Mark's? And if Mark's is not an ordinary story, nor the division of Mark by Matthew and Luke an ordinary literary process, how is it scientifically sound to assume that the principles which apply to the ordinary literary manipulation of an ordinary story are the only principles which can apply, in any way worth considering, to Mark's story and its handling by Matthew and Luke?

If you can produce nothing like Mark, and yet assume Mark's comparative ordinariness, and in rough and ready theory derive the developments in the other Gospels from the ordinariness, what is your theory likely to be worth scientifically more than the theory of some biologist who should suppose some very delicately, and at first almost indiscernibly, organised body to consist of "structureless protoplasm," and thereupon show how other similar bodies might be derived from it purely by the action of physical forces? Neither in Mark, Matthew, nor Luke does our story appear to be relatively structureless like a common tale.

The placings in Mark's story of the disciples' mass before the messengers' mass, and of the actual mention of the disciples before the mention of the

messengers, are, of course, matters of ordinary narrative requirement. But the point is that Mark persists in the distinctness of arrangement which renders this simultaneous division of aspects possible even where that arrangement is no longer a matter of ordinary narrative requirement. Indeed, the discriminative arrangement of the two sides as first and second repeatedly in Mark's own narrative amounts to an implicit division of aspects *in Mark*, though the explicit division by Matthew and Luke was required to make it a matter for ready observation as at present. As within the yet unitary living cell a duplicating arrangement of its own internal parts appears, and is fully developed in its division into two separate cells, so in Mark there is a two-fold arrangement which is made fully manifest through the division finally effected in the two separate narratives of Matthew and Luke.

The analogy with the fundamental vital process of *karyokinesis*, or division of the living cell, might be made absurd by pressing it into detail. It may serve, however, at once to suggest that the *nearest* analogy for what is before us is vital rather than mechanical, and to set in a vivid light the difficulty of a purely documentary explanation of what has manifestly happened.

If you mechanically divide an apple in equatorial section with a knife, you may divide its seeds also, so far as they lie across the one plane of division: you do not expect, however, to find that, in the process of dividing, a number of separate planes of division have been set up in different parts of the apple, and that top halves of portions of apple, thus

variously divided, are finally to be observed in association with the main crest half of the apple, while the corresponding bottom halves have fallen into association with the main stalk half. Something a little like this happens in the vital division of a cell, where, by constraint which so far, I believe, eludes scientific investigation, one set of the longitudinally split halves of a nuclear content not originally found in the plane of division passes over to positions in one of the newly constituted bodies, and the other set to the other. And something very much like it has apparently taken place in our story, where Mark's two masses are found severally appropriated by Matthew and Luke, and at the same time details of Mark's story, in various positions, are found split across their own several planes of division, the first halves having passed over to association with the first separated mass, and the second halves to association with the second separated mass.

Now can you definitely and psychologically imagine Matthew and Luke either (1) deliberately making this come to pass, or (2) doing it by accident? YET IT HAS COME TO PASS.

Can you explain it to your own mind any more fundamentally than you can explain how a cell divides? Can you form any clearer idea of the exact mental processes that would be involved than of the inmost processes of changing condition in the contents of a dividing cell?

It is scarcely less difficult to focus thought on the idea of Mark either *deliberately or accidentally* making in his own story the arrangements which render the

division possible. Yet can it be denied that they are present? You cannot divide the regular carpels of an oak-apple, for the excellent reason that they would first have to be there.

Discussion of the subject by scholars to whom these findings have been submitted so far has disclosed two ways of dealing with the facts. One is to examine them with something like the closeness with which they are shown, and to attempt to draw conclusions upon them, favourable or unfavourable to the argument. The result of doing so appears to be regularly the admission of the presence of a new problem. And where the problem is definitely admitted, no other than the "vitalistic" solution for it has yet been proposed. The other way is neither to show where the main observations (as distinguished from the odd points in which one has slipped) are wrong, nor to expose any fallacy in the deductions, but rather to deprecate and complain, without coming to any grip. One may be very patient with the first signs of bewilderment at the unexpected; yet it seems to me that sincerity, as of the eye that looks straight into one's own, demands that before long there shall be either some movement towards the admission of a problem, or towards a reasoned denial as directly and unmistakably concerned with the actually observable facts as the statement of the problem now offered.

VII. BEHIND MARK.

It seems difficult indeed to suppose any simple kind of self-co-ordination on the part of the writers. And yet there can be no real facing of the given

material, unless we are prepared to face the straight psychological question: has the arrangement been brought about by Mark acting otherwise than provisionally, and by Matthew and Luke acting indiscriminately?

Take the second point. Have Matthew and Luke produced the given effects by acting indiscriminately, or by acting discriminatively? If not indiscriminately, then there must be some cause for that particular kind of discrimination which has brought about the results; and it would seem that unless we can say what that cause was, we are not explaining how the stories originated and took the form in which we now possess them.

Can we, then, get at the origin of the discriminative movement? The combination of first and second positions with separate lines of significance in the narrative goes back, we perceive, as far as to Mark. But it would be indeed an extraordinary movement in literary history if on Mark choosing to lay down certain lines of division in a story which he wrote, two other writers should obediently combine to work these lines out. And the division hardly seems, on the available facts, to start with Mark.

It may seem a very strange fact, but it would appear, according to Mark's own account, that before Mark could write, or Matthew and Luke develop what he wrote, a living voice had given utterance to the very antithesis which was afterwards to appear so broadly in the structures of the stories. We began our whole study with some examination of the unusual doubled effect of the

word "ready." We have found that the first of the two uses here is closely built into a complex of narrative which includes a passage from John which we seem obliged, on pain of paradox gaping too wide across the centuries for belief, to accept as a genuine report of the utterance of Jesus. That complex of narrative, with its minutely exact fitting of parts assembled from different Gospels, bears within it the strongest evidence of original objectivity. So intimate a complex cannot have been constructed piecemeal in different places after the time: it grew in the incident, its centre was struck in the action and the utterance of Jesus. At the same time, while the facts are protesting that the utterance is not simply part of Mark's story, it presents the clearest germ of division to be found within that story. Mark's other, more purely narrative, examples of "doubleness" here are structures on the same model, less instantly visible, becoming distinct only through division by Matthew and Luke, where *this* is distinct already by sheer narrative repetition, without further division. But if Jesus thus spoke, then the distinction of aspects —the distinction between the disciples' position and the messengers' position—was first stamped out, before Mark, in already dividing verbal expressions laid most naturally and antithetically side by side. Mark's divided arrangement of the story, made explicit in Matthew and Luke, is nothing but a continuation in less vivid form of the Master's own manner of expressing the transition of that hour.

And on the narrative side, we have in this remarkable expression the two senses of readiness,

preliminary and complete, which would be involved in the incident *if* it contained indeed the parting of the ways—if the disciples, from the Jewish point of view, expected one time, and Jesus prescribed another.

Thus this remarkably authenticated utterance of Jesus, while apparently giving us our earliest glimpse of the principle on which the story has ultimately been told, also certifies the presence of those two senses of readiness which are so important for the interpretation of the story as one of the parting of the ways; and the utterance, as itself at once answer and command—meeting the disciples' question, and re-inforcing and requiring behind it a previous command, such as we find in the opening of Luke[1]—sends out its ramifications far into the given content of the narratives.

Again, in that same parallel in John, which so powerfully authenticates this utterance of Jesus, we find also the antithesis of experience and foresight gradually and very naturally coming into explicitness.[2] And it is that very antithesis which is of the essence of that complement, which on the one hand is developed positively by Mark and Luke,[3] and on the other is crystallized negatively by Matthew,[4] into the division of the masses.

[1] Cp. p. 9. [2] Chapter V. iii. [3] Chapter V. i.
[4] Chapter V. ii.

Chapter VII.

"The Passover" and "The Unleavens."

In the first introduction of the passover-season, outside the story, but closely related to it, is another example of the kind of division which we find so characteristically within the story. Here it affects the festal terms, "the passover" and "the unleavens."[1] We must try to understand their use.

I. CALENDAR AND DESCRIPTIVE USES.

If we refer to the contemporary writing of Josephus, we find that he has two distinct uses of these terms—a *calendar* use, and a significantly *descriptive* use: and each has a way of its own.

The calendar use may be seen from the following passage: "On the 15th" (*i.e.* of the month Nisan) "the feast of the unleavens succeeds that of the passover, lasting seven days" (*Antiquities*, III. x. 5). Here it is clear that "the passover" and "the unleavens" are used of two distinct *parts* of the feast-time, one following the other. "The passover" was the day of the passover sacrifice, the 14th of Nisan; "the unleavens" were the following seven days during which unleavened bread was eaten. But when we come to the descriptive use, it is equally clear that in this use these same terms no longer stand thus for *different*

[1] See p. 15.

parts of the feast-time, but that each covers *the whole feast-time*, the terms signifying two different approaches to the subject: "The feast of the unleavens, *which we speak of* as 'passover'" (*Ant.* XIV. ii. 1, XVIII. ii. 2; cp. IX. xiii. 3, XI. iv. 8, XVII. ix. 3; *Wars*, VI. ix. 3). Further, it will appear that when the two terms are used together, and one of them is distinguished by introducing it with "which *we* speak of as 'passover,'" that title is being used to express some intimate sentiment about the feast, which the Jews feel, but which outsiders (like the Gentile readers of Josephus) are not expected to have occasion to express. And the idea as of some peculiarly Jewish sense of the feast-time is curiously kept up when the cosmopolitan and rationalising historian is disgusted with his fellow-countrymen, and speaks with detachment of "the feast of the unleavens—it is called 'passover'. *by the Jews*" (*Wars*, II. i. 3).

In *Ant.* Bk. III., it seems psychologically very curious that while Josephus refers in Ch. viii. 4 to the month "Nisan according to *the Hebrews*," and in Ch. x. 6 to the feast of Pentecost, "which *the Hebrews* call 'Asartha'," in between, in the immediately preceding section of Ch. x. he uses the *first person* in speaking of the "passover" which "*we*" are said to sacrifice, and now also in speaking of its month "which is *by us* called Nisan"—but changes to the third as soon as he comes to the eating of unleavened bread. *Asartha*, "assembly," is a less provocative title than *Pascha*, "passover."

The distinction is natural, when we consider what the titles imply. "The unleavens" refers to the outward and palpable ceremonial act of the eating

of unleavened bread.[1] This (interpreted by Josephus as a memorial of the shortage from which his people suffered in the wilderness, *Ant.*, II. xv. 1), was a kind of fact in no way incapable of coming under the observation of foreigners; and to believe in its existence would make no demand upon their faith. With the passover—"we thus sacrifice, calling the feast 'Pascha'—it means 'passing over'—because that evening God, passing them[2] over, sent the plague upon the Egyptians" (*Ant.*, II. xiv. 6)—it was different. It would be impossible to credit the validity of that title without a faith with which the average Gentile would not ordinarily concern himself, and to which he might not readily naturalise himself.[3]

The significantly descriptive use of the two terms is therefore not a confusion of the calendar use, but a use with a definite principle, and implying a latent distinction between the feast as an affair of manifest outward ceremonial, and the feast viewed as a centre of incommunicable Divine privilege.

The distinction between "the unleavens" and "the passover" in this sense is not temporal at all, but psychological. And yet it seems probable that it might at first arise on a temporal basis. In the

[1] In *Ant.*, XX. v. 3 the custom of using unleavened bread becomes exegetical of the occasion "hailed as 'passover.'"

[2] "Them"—a past generation.

[3] It might seem to be not without a sense of fitness, and a feeling for smooth approach to climax, as against reversion, that the author, in his account (*Ant.*, X. iv. 5) of the restoration of the feasts by Josiah, disregards temporal order, even in distinguishing the two feasts, and makes literary transition from Gentile observances by putting the "feast of the unleavens" first, and "that known as passover" more remotely afterwards.

feast-time "the passover" was a short-date term, "the unleavens" was a long-date term, and marked the further limit of the period. Hence it might often be convenient to use "the unleavens" summarily for the period as a whole. It is apparently so used in Deut. xvi. 16 in marking the time during which attendance is required. This is reflected in 2 Chron. viii. 13 (cp. xxx. 13). (2 Chron. xxx. 21 [after verse 15, "the passover"], xxxv. 17, Ezra vi. 22 [after verse 19] appear to be pure calendar uses.) On the other hand, the sense of Divinely conferred privilege with which "the passover" was associated appears in the repeated references to "the Lord's passover," or a passover kept "to the Lord" (פסח ליהוה, Exod. xii. 11, 27, 48; Lev. xxiii. 5; Num. ix. 10; Deut. xvi. 1; 2 Kings xxiii. 21, xxiii. 23; 2 Chron. xxxv. 1). And because the flavour of "the passover" extended over the whole feast-time, its name also would naturally become a comprehensive name for the whole season. Thus "the unleavens" might come to stand for the *fact* of the time as a whole, "the passover" for its *significance*.

And if what we distinguish as the descriptive use of "the unleavens" had thus a certain convenience for measuring the length of the feast-time, it was natural that it should occasionally replace the calendar use. We find this happening in Josephus. He not only speaks of "eight days," instead of seven, for "the feast which is called the unleavens" (*Ant.*, II. xv. 1), (thus including the day which in the ecclesiastical calendar was "the passover"), but even speaks specifically of "the 14th of the

month" (ecclesiastically "the passover") as a "day of the unleavens" (*Wars*, V. iii. 1).

It will be observed that Luke, in xxii. 1—"the feast of the unleavens, which is known as 'passover'"—is like Josephus in using the terms for the whole feast-time (though, as we may ultimately conclude, with a sentiment which might never have occurred to Josephus, even in his most pronounced detachment), and in xxii. 7 is like him in making the 14th, the day of the passover-sacrifice, a "day of the unleavens."

When, however, the Jewish historian is definitely *counting* days, he returns to the calendar, and is perfectly clear that "the *second* day of the unleavens" is "the 16th of the month"; which makes the 15th the first, and excludes the 14th from the unleavens altogether (*Ant.*, III. x. 5).

All this does not seem to be mere loose inconsistency, but something the natural laws of which you can follow quite distinctly if you get the right psychological point of view.

From these indications of Josephus, we pass to the Gospels, which were written under conditions of sharpened spiritual interpretation. Something has happened. The descriptive use of "the unleavens" hardens in its contemporary mould, separating more distinctly from that of "the passover," with its sentiment of privilege: and with this hardening, the invasion of the descriptive use upon the calendar use becomes more pointed. Failure to distinguish this very natural, but very forcible, development, has led to a great deal of reconstructive conjecture. It appears on comparison that in the Three Gospels,

"the unleavens," the term descriptive of outward ceremonial observance rather than of mysterious, incommunicable privilege, *means* the feast-time in its outward ceremonial aspect. Apparently it means no more. It appears to be *dissociated* from privilege. But what of the use of the word "passover"? Here we have to distinguish, and the development may not be instantly clear. I do not think it is possible to handle the usage of the Gospels penetratingly without regard to the spiritual significance of the term, though it does appear to be possible to miss their point with the assistance of quite competent knowledge conjecturally applied in a search for commonplace probabilities.

To say boldly that in the Gospels "the passover" and "the unleavens" *divide* under a new stress of spiritual conception; that "the passover," in its simpler use—its use without implied qualification, or hint of supersession, or mark of citation—always points in the direction of what is regarded as *still* genuinely retaining the living secret of paschal privilege, and that after the beginning of the ministry of Jesus this is no longer to point simply to the Jewish passover, but regularly either to the sacrifice of Jesus, or to something which is viewed as essentially implicating it; and that "the unleavens," or "the feast of the unleavens," now means the persisting Jewish ceremonial, which can only bear the name of "passover" as a title current without authority—to say all this might appear, before examination, to be conjecture only too free of any stigma of commonplace probability; and purely as a conjecture I do not at all insist that it would possess

the prime conjectural virtue of probability. But would the reader prefer me, or willingly allow himself, to judge it by its conjectural plausibility or otherwise, rather than by its ascertainable consistency or otherwise with the given facts? The facts will soon be before us. And when once a course of fully comparative observation is carried through all the examples of the use of these festal terms, not only in the Gospels, but in the whole of the New Testament writings, vitally and unexpectedly "autonomous" as they are, I believe it will be found that there remains not a single instance with which the non-Judaically protestant principle of contrast between the still significant "passover" and the now derelict outward "unleavens" fails to harmonise.

And I think a Protean critical problem should cease to trouble us when once we have perceived how pointedly and consistently the two aspects of ceremonial and of privilege are thus distinguished. There has been a parting of the ways and it is felt. We distinguish in the spiritual history of the world two great separating paths. There was that old historic way of Jewish observance which Jesus himself had been content hitherto to follow, in which the disciples are seen still standing at the beginning of the story, and which is yet in evidence in the world to this day whenever a Jewish family meets about its passover-table. There is also that way of the future, the foundation of which was signalised when one said, "*Christ*, our passover, has been sacrificed" (1 Cor. v. 7), and sat at the Jewish table no more, and the separation of which seems to be indicated when Jesus says

distinctively in his direction for hereafter, "*This* hold in remembrance of *Me*."[1] I do not think it can be shown that the evangelists ever, in a single word, write about the subject simply as Jews. It will not be a very large task to illustrate the principle throughout the whole use of the terms in the Gospels.

II. THE PASSOVER-SEASON.

In the Three Gospels—to begin with them—the word "passover" is used twelve times simply and by itself of *the feast* or *the feast-time*. (To the *sacrifice* we shall come later.) In none of these uses about feast or feast-time do the evangelists appear to commit themselves to the recognition of any passover as still in force apart from the death of Jesus. This negative fact might not be noticeable in itself. It is as we proceed to take in the whole range of the use of the terms, "passover" and "unleavens," in the Gospels that we perceive the presence of a latent but commanding consistency.

In one of these uses about the feast or feast-time, it will be observed, "the passover" is directly presented as the occasion of the death of Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 2); in eight of the remainder (Matt. xxvi. 18, 19; Mark xiv. 14, 16; Luke xxii. 8, 11, 13, 15) "the passover" is simply the meal which Jesus appointed before his death, and in which he put himself in the place of the passover victim, saying, "This is my body."[2] This is called *absolutely* "the

[1] Cp. ποιῶ, *hold*, in Matt. xxvi. 18 and Luke xxii. 19.

[2] I find myself in special coincidence with Dr. Kennett about these words (*op. cit.*, p. 38), though my conclusion was reached under different conditions, and, I think, with different consequences.

passover," though it appears from John (who speaks elsewhere, we shall notice, of a "passover of the Jews,") that it was not the Jewish passover.

Of the remaining three instances in which the word "passover" is used by itself of feast or feast-time, two are merely citations of the question of the general body of the disciples (Matt. xxvi. 17 and Mark xiv. 12), and of course do not commit the evangelists themselves.

The other is early in Luke's Gospel, and if we regard its position we may see that it does not conflict with the principle that the festival word "passover" is used by the three evangelists only in connexion with what a Christian (not simply a Jew) might regard as embodying the highest available secret of paschal privilege. For neither Luke nor Paul would have questioned that before the beginning of the ministry of Jesus the highest available secret of paschal privilege was vested in the old historical feast, which in Luke ii. 41, 42 is seen coming up from past history as a "yearly" matter of "custom." But later in this same Gospel comes a change. If Luke recognises the regular Jewish feast as "the passover" before sunrise, yet when he is introducing his narrative of the passion of Christ (xxii. 1), it has become a "feast *of the unleavens*, which is *known as* passover"—standing by itself now as an outward ceremonial observance about which Luke does not necessarily imply more than that it was the custom to credit it with the secret of privilege. Luke was a close companion of him who wrote "*Christ our passover* was sacrificed," and who saw no secret of spiritual privilege in

any other; and Luke was himself a writer of very fine subtlety.

The phrase λεγόμενος, *known as*, is very rare indeed with Luke. It is not clear that he ever employs it except where he recalls a term rather than makes it his own. See Note, p. 205, for all the examples.

III. THE PASSOVER-SACRIFICE.

But then, does not Luke's next and only remaining use of the term distinctly suggest *authority*? For of the *sacrifice* he speaks thus: "the day of the unleavens whereon the passover *must needs* be sacrificed," (xxii. 7). We may understand his movement more easily if we first look at Mark's parallel.

Ὅτε τὸ πάσχα ἔθυον, (Mark xiv. 12), translated "when they sacrificed the passover," may sound at first as if in Mark the Jewish *sacrifice*, at any rate, were being spoken of quite simply as "the passover." But is the expression really so simple, or was it in its own day a significant idiom? The reader who does not know Greek must excuse me if I make the statement that when Mark speaks of a time when they were "sacrificing the passover," he uses ὅτε, *when*, with the imperfect. And perhaps the reader who does know Greek, but has never specially interested himself in the use of this particular type of phrase in the New Testament, may wonder why I should associate it with idiom. There is a reason.

So far as I know, there are in the New Testament writings 15 other examples of ὅτε with the imperfect.[1] And it is very remarkable, but quite true, that in every one of these instances we have

[1] For full list, see pp. 207–210.

something *transitory*, and that in nearly every instance our attention is being called to something either already superseded, or essentially waiting to be superseded, or belonging to a condition of things now past; commonly the something is either futile or relatively ineffective. From this, upon the observable facts, there is no escape.[1]

Either this type of phrase has become *idiomatic*, and specially reserved to the expression of something viewed as transitory, or a number of different writers have combined in a way of which it seems hopeless to attempt to give any account, to use it (and in these writings apparently use it *only*), when they have something futile or transitory before their minds. And it would be an extraordinary position indeed—certainly not one that we have any right to assume—if this were so in every other case, and *not* in the case before us. If this case is like the others, it is difficult to frame an English phrase which would at once represent the form and reflect the innuendo. The nearest I can get is, "when they *were keeping up* the sacrificing of the passover." If anyone can suggest anything nearer to the general trend of the examples, I shall be happy to hear of it; otherwise I will use this. And with what "they"[2]—the undefined people over there—are thus keeping up, the evangelist would not

[1] The preference of Greek for participial construction might leave this type of phrase specially open to the tendency to *desynonymization*, which affects forms of language for which a possible substitute exists.

[2] Not separately pronominal in the Greek. (The "impersonal plural" is recurrent in Mark—see C. H. Turner, *J.T.S.*, XXV. pp. 378-386).

appear to be at all intimately associated by his whole choice of phrase. In short, the sacrificing of the passover does not appear to-day to be mattering much. Is that Mark? The student who does not perceive that Mark has the type of mind which is capable of irony, and can conceal more under an apparent bluntness than others may contrive to display in a patent acuteness, has possibly been taken in by the legend of Mark's simplicity, which was started, and is maintained, by people who read him in the rough.

Now Mark's reference to "the passover" here, it should be observed, falls outside the scope of the contrast between the titles of the *feast-time* to which we set out to call attention, since Mark is speaking not of the feast-time, but of the sacrifice —a subject to which the most studied contrast between "the passover" and "*the unleavens*" could not be simply applied. But though his speaking of the sacrifice directly as "the passover" does not affect our rule, the expression as a whole is in closest harmony of significance with it. There is assuredly no assertion of the validity of the Jewish passover.

The conception that Mark in this verse is pointing exclusively to the *hours* in which the passover sacrifice was going on, instead of generally, as he says, to "the day," imports a gratuity and misses a flavour.

Though Mark is unquestionably referring to the Jewish sacrifice, the translation "passover-victims" obviously does not represent the uniform Greek of Mark xiv. 12, Luke xxii. 7 and 1 Cor. v. 7.

Luke's earnest language—"whereon the passover

must needs be sacrificed"—would thus be the very antithesis of Mark's. But we have found the two in antithesis before. And in the Directions at the head of which these words stand the antithesis involves Luke being specially at the standpoint of Jesus. Is Luke, then, speaking very seriously of the Jewish passover? Another interpretation is open, and I think it will be confirmed by strong and varied evidence as the right one. There were, it must be remembered, two sacrifices upon that "day." Can you easily confine Luke to the minor and temporary offering? Would it be Luke, the companion of Paul, who would be likely, of all men, to write the one passage in the New Testament implying the legal necessity of the Jewish passover-sacrifice—and on *this* day? And it is open to perfectly definite observation that nowhere else in his Gospel does Luke use the same verb δεῖ, *must needs*, which he uses here, except in some immediate relation either to the passion of Jesus, or to his personal movement, or in reporting conversation in which Jesus himself made use of it in expression of his own sense of necessity.[1]

This evidence of congruity and of language will not, I think, easily be disposed of; and it agrees very strikingly with the plain fact that what most

[1] The suggestion of this observation of the Lucan δεῖ I owe to the Rev. Eric J. Roberts, M.A., B.D., of Grantown-on-Spey, to whom also I owe an ever-increasing debt for his able and vigilant editing of this work. The quotation on p. 4 is due to him.

I put the rule carefully, so as to cover the peculiar case of xiii. 14, 16, where the use of δεῖ by the president becomes the foil to its use by Jesus. For list of examples, see p. 210.

obviously distinguishes this one narrative from the other two is that Luke, in this very beginning, is at the standpoint of Jesus himself (and not of the disciples). With this concentration also harmonises what we noticed at first—the stress throughout the Directions on the point of view of the Master (rather than that of the messengers). And is it not also the standpoint of the Master, which, as Peter and John are sent forth, we are subtly invited to share, when we are reminded at the outset that the time has come when the passover "must needs" be sacrificed? Can we really think of that ἔδει, "must needs," and not be reminded of what Jesus must have been feeling as that day "came"? And add even this yet, that nowhere else in his Gospel does Luke introduce a day or event by saying, "*there came the day*." He most feels the coming of a day with its event who has most deeply looked for it.[1] And we know who, as a matter of fact, had most felt the "needs-be" of this day before it came. He had, he said, "a baptism to be baptised with," (Luke xii. 50). And thus, with no human hands seen to offer the sacrifice as in Mark, the story of the calmly foreseen making ready begins from most certainly pre-conditioned sacrifice—and grows into a recital which seems to be pervaded by a tone of glad alacrity which but intensifies its pathos, and to breathe throughout, in a movement of Greek light as a song (up to verse 14), and rhythmic as a song in its opening, the tone of serene self-surrender.

[1] The implication of some solemn forward look in the Lucan use of such a phrase is confirmed by Luke v. 35 (= Mark ii. 20, Matt. ix. 15); xvii. 22; xix. 43; xxi. 6; xxiii. 29.

Then why is not Luke more explicit about what he means? Why does he use language which at first leads us to picture the Jewish sacrifice before we reflect on what we are doing? Luke's lights are soft. I suspect it is because he means to present the new in the familiar vesture of the old: it is amid Jewish conditions, and with significant continuity, as well as an implicit parting of the ways, that we are to begin to catch the revelation of "Christ our Passover"—as yet a passover that must needs be "sacrificed."

Now observe the three. Are they functionally related, or unrelated, or how related?

It is certain, according to New Testament statement, that on this day were offered two very different sacrifices. And it is clear that antithetic reference to the two sacrifices would offer a function, very distinctly appropriate to the ideas which historically have centred about the occasion, to each of two writers. It is certain that, of the three writers, there are two who mention a sacrifice. We know of no third sacrifice. We find no third mention. And unless comparison of usage appearing in unbroken lines throughout the associated writings is fallacious, the language of the two positively concerned is certainly antithetic. Thus there are three writers in the group; you have an essentially two-sided antithesis expressed in two; the third leaves the subject alone—and his silence is marked out at this precise point.

If there *were* a functional relation, exactly how

could it be at once more completely and more economically exhibited?

It is, of course, possible to suggest some merely occasional reason for Matthew's silence. Will the same occasional reason explain why he is either silent, or combines *both* aspects, elsewhere in the story where Mark and Luke are in definite antithesis? Or must we supply separate and quite different occasional reasons for each element of a group of corresponding facts? And how should we be justified in refusing to look at the members of an accurately corresponding group together, or expect to understand them best by taking them in bits, regardless of their consilience?

IV. THE APPROPRIATION OF THE PASSOVER.

This covers all the examples of "the passover" used singly, whether for the feast, the feast-time, or the sacrifice. But now there are also two examples of its use with "the unleavens." One, Luke's introductory "feast of the unleavens, which is known as passover" (xxii. 1), we have already noticed. The other is Mark's introductory "the passover and the unleavens after two days," (xiv. 1).

Now that Mark should speak of the passover and the unleavens as coming "after two days" is noticeable. Nowhere else in his narrative does he thus reckon up days *anticipatively*.[1] It is not difficult to see a reason for it here. The public ministry is just over, and the crisis is now at hand. That is, the story is now leading up to the death of Jesus. See how the inevitable trend is still emphasised just over the immediate border of narrative,

[1] ix. 2 is not an anticipation; viii. 31, ix. 31, x. 34, xiv. 58, xv. 29 are not narrative.

where Jesus, being in Bethany, is anointed to the burial, and the betrayer . . . lo, it is all coming! And pensively the narrator can look ahead, "after two days," to the now well-known position of the event, over the heads of the Jewish council fumbling to find occasion.

Matthew (xxvi. 1–5) agrees that the outlook—"after two days"—is an anticipation of the occasion of the end, and even implies that it is a reminiscence of anticipation uttered in living hearing at the point which the narratives have now reached.

The definite relation of Matthew with Mark here will have further to be examined. What matters for our present line of observation is that we have now before us all the examples of the use of the word "passover" in the Three Gospels, and whatever the implied outlook of the disciples at the time, there is in all this use no sign that *the evangelists* see any permanent centre of meaning and value for the approaching passover-season but the death of Jesus. There is, no doubt, a "feast of the unleavens, which is *spoken of* as passover," but the season is directly "the passover" precisely when the crucifixion is in view, while the stress on the "sacrifice" falls in one direction only, and as for the feast, that observance which Jesus appoints before his death is the only meal anywhere accepted quite simply by these evangelists as "the passover."

And observe more closely the circumstances in which Luke's conception, in particular, of this feast-time is first presented. He has just been bathing our thoughts in the atmosphere of those prosperous-looking days of teaching in the Temple,

seeming to the last to be opening up indefinitely into new prospect—yet so soon over. Almost in the very midst of the eagerness and stir, the transitional sentence, "but there was drawing nigh the Feast of the Unleavens, which is known as Passover," brings upon us a very different atmosphere. With it we are brought to imagine the Jewish outlook to the usual happenings, with their customary religious associations; and thereafter the prospect of a persistently maintained official course begins to shadow the brief sunshine of responsiveness with threatening cloud. If, inwardly and spiritually, Jesus, about to give up his life, foresees the passover, (Matt. xxvi. 2), the outlook of the unteachable governing element of Judaism, bent outwardly and materially on interrupting his relations with the people, is blocked to anything higher than the coming of the days of unleavened bread.

Luke xxi. 37, 38. Reference Sheet, No. I. Note, *inter alia*, the continuous imperfects here at the very end of the account, thus subtly left unfinished. (The effect of xix. 47, 48 is continued.)

The spacing in the printed texts seems most unfortunately conceived.

The complement of the movement in the introductions, before the story of the Jewish council, from the standpoint of Jesus to that of Judaism, with the movement in the story of the making ready, towards the standpoint of Jesus, will be found characteristic of the relations of these two passages. See pp. 227, 228, 233, 235.

Now we have seen Mark, at this same point, just before the story of the Jewish council, speaking anticipatively of "the passover," and using also

that word, "the unleavens," which describes the palpable ceremonial aspect, and which Luke seems to use for the outlook of the Jewish council itself. And we observe that, like Luke and Josephus, Mark (xiv. 1) uses it as a descriptive title covering the whole feast-time—at least, if he means that the passover and the unleavens are alike coming "after two days," and therefore together: as they would, if the distinction here between them is essentially one of spiritual outlook—side by side to the time of the crucifixion, and to the mere Jewish feast. But from this point we have to approach a notable expression of Mark's which has prompted a whole cluster of external conjectures, but which, by aid of the comparisons hitherto worked out, we may find ourselves able to interpret quite clearly by proceeding persistently with our internal analysis. What has made the trouble is that when Mark presently (xiv. 12) uses the ceremonial word again, still as a descriptive title covering the whole feast-time, he does it so as to disclose an apparent divergence of significance from Josephus, and from whoever spoke as Josephus did. It is possible that it may be just a little dull to assume that this could only have happened by inadvertence. Mark might conceivably be more spiritually-minded than Josephus and his like; and it can hardly be said that, in the history of religion, distinction of that kind has never been known to give rise to changes of expression. Had you confronted Josephus with Mark, even in the historian's most emancipated mood, I scarcely think you would have found the two of one mind. I think you would have found

that Mark, being earnest, would bluntly carry an idea to its logical issue, where Josephus would have seen no object in doing anything of the kind. Let us define their difference.

When Josephus is precise, he simply returns to his calendar, and the occasionally convenient idea of a feast which may be broadcast throughout as "the unleavens," or more reservedly described throughout as "the passover," is dropped. When Mark is precise, he does *not* so return to the old Jewish ecclesiastical calendar, that he may do honour in accordance with it to the opening day of the old Jewish feast-time. How should he—to a day which henceforth, in its Jewish aspect, is become a day of the most dark and shameful memory conceivable? He is describing now (xiv. 12) not anything that Jesus did, but the ceremonial use which the Jews made of the first day of their feast-time, and describing it emphatically just as he himself sees it. He sees nothing but a transitory ceremonial going on. And should it be as liable to be misunderstood as resolute ironies commonly are, if he reconceives that great Jewish day of the sacrifice—that day which the Jews themselves call the passover—and speaks of it downright and without reserve as "the first day *of the unleavens*, when they were keeping up the sacrificing of the passover"—or perhaps, to avoid confusion with common calendar usage, "*the primal day* of the unleavens" (πρώτῃ, not μίᾳ)—will it be like Mark to shrink from such significance in bluntness? "The passover," they have called it, and will call it. But to-day they are losing the passover: it is vanishing like smoke from

the fire of their "sacrifice." If he calls the opening day of their serial feast-time what they themselves have made it, what can he call it but the first day of the unleavens? It is not in virtue of *their* use of this day that he will call it "passover." He has written it, not in bitter willingness to give offence, but as the very transcript of a deflowering which it is of no use to hide . . . "*unleavens*." Men who, like Mark here, or like the older Quakers, and I know not what other stalwarts in pioneering days, practise avoidances in language because of their convictions, and make adjustments of familiar terms which take their neighbours by surprise, and perhaps excite their resentment, will *challenge* misunderstanding by keeping the words of their lips for their principles. If Mark resolutely challenged misunderstanding in his own day, I think he receives it sufficiently in ours when his forcible expression is corrected with assuming patronage as not succeeding in being *Jewish*. Jewish apparently it is not; but by what enduring law was it bound to be? Are we to say that accordto all the other uses of such a phrase in the New Testament[1] the accompanying phrase about the sacrificing of the passover is undeviatingly and respectfully Jewish?

It is not quite as if Mark were alone. Mark and Luke here seem each to have his irony—Luke's was first suggested in his "known as," when he spoke of the passover. And here in speaking of the sacrifice, each might appear to be speaking the very language of Judaism—of its custom or of its law—and each in his own way speaks what Judaism never knew,

[1] Pp. 184, 185 corroborated by pp. 207–210.

though it can be spoken in its own language. The language is there, but on plain comparison of the surrounding usage (even of exactly comparable verb-forms) the Judaism is to be found there no more. Under cover of the old festal language, beginning a story which looks at first glance so like a story of the old feast, the hidden, vital parting of the ways already germinates—there is a passover-sacrifice and *a passover-sacrifice.*

And what Mark has done here is, indeed, in one respect, but to go through the verbal gate which current variation of language had left so open to him (we see that from Josephus), and fasten it sharply behind him by saying right out in plain terms which will allow of no future compromise, "The first day *of the unleavens*, when they *were keeping up the sacrificing* of the passover." And if someone had pointed out to him, as a modern scholar has so conclusively pointed out to us, that from a calendar point of view it was practically "a contradiction in terms,"[1] do you suppose he would thankfully have altered it to agree with the calendar? Surely what he intends is contradiction of the now aimless conventions of the calendar. For Mark, with still passion of sad truth which insists upon itself in irony, it *is* on the first day *of the unleavens*, no matter what it is "known as," that they are blindly keeping up the sacrificing of the passover; and the paradox may seem to develop its effect when the disciples come to offer to their

[1] Professor F. C. Burkitt, *The Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus*, p. 87; cp. *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. IX., p. 570, Vol. XVII. p. 293; cp. C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels* (Second Edition), Vol. I., p. 310.

Master the feast which follows the futile sacrifice belonging to such a day.

Ingenuity of conjecture has been pushed to considerable distances in different directions to explain how it was that Mark failed to achieve something more commonplace. But it appears to me that we have here something spiritually original, self-justifying and unconfused, everywhere uncompromisingly straight in its own line, and consistent with the whole remaining range of expression in the Gospels. The reader who does not know, but would like to acquaint himself with, the widely differing reconstructions, suited to a variety of monumental tastes, erected upon this spot, might be referred to Archdeacon Allen's summary of possible views in his *St. Mark*; or to the picturing, in the *International Critical Commentary* on *St. Matthew*, of an editorial translator woefully and wonderfully blundering over his Aramaic base, and the harrowing description of how he went from bad to worse till he made the story as you now see it; or to Professor Burkitt's picturing,[1] without any Aramaic editorial translation at all, of an evangelist imbibing information more or less from Jerusalem, with his eyes on what was going on at Rome, and "harmonising" the two "as best he could," by "perpetrating" a discord of elementary violence. The chief argument against such necessarily inconclusive reconstructions, from our point of view, is that, on a principle which can be applied consistently, as we shall see, to the whole range of immediately relevant facts, they are unnecessary; that they are unneeded where

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 88, 89.

presumably only the idea that something of the kind *was* necessary could induce anyone to develop them for presentation, and that no one of them (I speak so far as I know) accounts for the *coincidences* of problems involved.

Observe the more immediate connexions of Mark's paradox, and see whether, viewed without bias, they are not critically good. In the first introduction of the feast-time you have in Matthew a "*passover*" which is simply such when viewed as the occasion of the death of Jesus; and which becomes a "*feast of the unleavens*, which is known as passover," when its approach merely means that his opportunities of teaching the people are over. I think when we have weighed the whole use of the word "passover" throughout the New Testament, and viewed it in connexion with the trend of that division in which the titles of the feast-time so palpably share, we may conclude that the significance of the whole is that the passover now so definitely attaches to Jesus that the occasion is so named when seen in connexion with his death. I think we may also conclude that the ceremonial base of the feast-time is still retained for the Jews, to whom it belongs here under the ceremonial title of "the unleavens." When from these introductory sentences we advance to the immediate introduction of the day on which the prospective Jewish parting from Jesus is to be finally sealed, the feast is consistently "the unleavens," in each Gospel, and its opening day becomes "the first of the unleavens."

In continued perfect consistency, this particular day is presented as "the first (day) of the unleavens"

—the first of the festal series—when the disciples are seeking to induce Jesus to follow out the usual course of the Jewish feast-time. I see in the definite use of the phrase no sign of anything at all clumsy. It ceases to be presented as "the first," where Jesus is seen to be intending no following of the usual course, but is beginning to handle it as the day of the end. That is the special contrast between Mark and Matthew on the one hand, and Luke on the other, in the first words of the story.

We are told that Sir Patrick Manson, who has been called "the Father of Tropical Medicine," and who was laughed at so heartily for the incredible precision of the facts to which he called attention,[1] used to say that it is the discrepancy which teaches, if you would learn. But it teaches only when you give to facts which are inconsistent with your first expectations and accustomed observations due opportunity to reveal any unknown law which may be latently inherent in them.

One of my readers prompts a remark upon the debated question of an Aramaic base.

I will observe only that if that base existed, it must either have contained the germ of the present distribution of material, or the distribution of the material must have been superimposed upon it in the absence of any such germ. On the first supposition the base would be very remarkable, but exceedingly difficult, I should imagine, to reconstruct in its original vital delicacy.

[1] The astonishingly clear-cut facts of contrast between the diurnal and nocturnal contents of the blood of filariæ-infected patients, giving rise to what is now known as a "Law of Periodicity." See *Life and Work*, pp. 41–52. (His remark on the Royal Society, that "everything, every new idea, takes time to sink into clever men's brains" (p. 174), is worth the notice of clever men.)

On the second, the knowledge of what happened in the use of the base would be of very great interest; but before the problem could be handled with certainty it would be necessary to be sure, in detail, of the original content of the base.

V. THE PASSOVER IN JOHN.

We shall have to return to this subject of the references to the passover in the Three Gospels, to handle it with the closer precision of which the facts admit. But what of the references to the passover in the Fourth Gospel?

John refers to the passover in three different years, always *introducing* them with qualification. The first and the last are introduced as "*the Jews'* passover" (ii. 13 and xi. 55*a*)—a curious phrase, when you think of it. In between (vi. 4), instead of simply "the Jews' passover," we have "near at hand was *the passover, the Jews' feast.*" The change of introduction seems to fit John's exposition like a very skin rather than a glove; for in this instance, as we shall see later,[1] the passover is not to be left quite simply as "the Jews'" passover; someone else who has it in him to confer reality on the passover is already claiming a share in its significance, though it is under their custody, and it is therefore as "the Jews' feast," that its occasion is being anticipated.

And why does John, each time, thus insist on the passover, or the feast, being that of "the Jews"? If you know your John, you know that he is not conspicuous for using syllables without point. Had

[1] See Chap. IX.

the qualification appeared but once, it might have given some ground to a matter-of-fact supposition that John was contemplating readers who would not have known that the passover *was* Jewish. But why does he continue each time to distinguish it thus, unless there is something from which to distinguish it? And from what does he appear to distinguish it? If we look at all his references to "the passover" which are not either immediately under the shadow of these qualifying introductions, or put in so pointedly Jewish a context already that the qualification as "the Jews'" could not be repeated without awkwardness, we shall find but two—one in which the passover is presented in most significant relation to the death of Jesus, and one in which a passover is being transcended in His overwhelming self-manifestation.

xi. 55*b* and xii. 1 are so immediately under the shadow of the introduction in xi. 55*a*, that the qualification, even if intended to remain in force, could hardly be repeated again so soon without disturbing the narrative.

ii. 23 is, as we have noticed, the resumption of ii. 13 (the introduction) after a parenthesis: it is also in a *particularly* Judaic context.[1]

In xviii. 28, the passover which the Jews are anticipating is obviously a matter of Jewish concern; xviii. 39 is a citation no more committing the writer than Matt. xxvi. 17 or Mark xiv. 12*b*.

On the other hand, xix. 14, with the arresting reference to the "Preparation of the passover,"

[1] See the article in the *Expository Times*, Vol. XXXII., p. 522, as previously cited.

at the moment when Pilate finally takes the seat from which he will deliver Jesus over to crucifixion (xix. 16), is certainly not out of relation to the death of Jesus, and the whole is in close parallel, even of language, to Matt. xxvi. 2: ("the passover," and the "delivering over to crucifixion").

And the only remaining instance is xiii. 1, where "before the feast of the passover" something intervenes; which seems rather of heaven than of earth, and which we identify with "this passover" of Luke xxii. 15. This use scarcely more asserts the validity of the Jewish passover than Mark xiv. 12*a* with the transitory sacrifice.

These are all the instances; and if the law which we have discerned for the use of the name of the passover from a comparison of the uses in the Three Gospels is to be corrected as not in accordance with New Testament usage, the correction can hardly come from the examples in John.[1]

VI. THE PASSOVER IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Let us look beyond the Gospels.

There is one example in the Acts (xii. 4)—but it occurs in an account of what is in the mind of

[1] The main point, that John does not contradict the impression that the Jewish passover is always spoken of in the Gospels in a non-committal way, does not seem to be affected by the fact that each feast, as it arises, is for him a "Jews' feast." He so names the otherwise unspecified feast of v. 1; and the feast of vii. 2 is "the feast of the Jews—the Booth-Construction." Westcott notices that the word-order here is different from that in vi. 4—and surely the difference in the word-order makes all the difference in the familiarity of tone in the mention. The curious thing, so far as I can distinguish, is that John seems to speak of the passover at once as of something familiar, and as of something remote.

Herod in his dealing with "the people," and differs from a citation as an account of things thought differs from an account of things spoken. And so explicit is the Judaic context that the very name of "the Jews," the people whom Herod is concerned to please, appears in the immediately preceding sentence—and Luke has told us already that the feast was "known as 'passover'." The conformity with the examples in John is very close. If this be the best instance which can be found to suggest that the law which we have everywhere found exemplified within the Gospels is at any rate not maintained outside them, it distinctly is unfortunately beset and conditioned for the purpose.

If we look beyond to the remainder of the New Testament writings, there is one reference to a passover as in contemporary force, and one historic retrospect.

The historic retrospect is to the original foundation of the passover by Moses (Heb. xi. 28), and may be compared with Luke ii. 41, and the custom of the feast.

The passover still in contemporary force is "Christ our Passover" (1 Cor. v. 7).

With these I think the hope of finding one clear example to the contrary must finally melt away.

On a comparison of the whole of the examples, we find that at the beginning of the ministry of Jesus there was a passover accepted as in authoritative force, and retrospectively its authoritative force is never questioned. During his ministry, there was a Jewish passover which formed part of the circumstances in the midst of which his ministry was

carried on, and which under the touch of his ministry could begin to show capacity for being something more than distinctively Jewish (John vi. 4). At the close of his ministry, when seen as the occasion of his death, it is accepted as indeed the passover. But the ways definitely part, and as an occasion when his death was regarded as of no spiritual account, it was a bare ceremonial feast of the unleavens. "The passover" is even pointedly cut clean out of the calendar (Mark xiv. 12, Matt. xxvi. 17); while on Judaism there was dawning nothing but a "feast of the unleavens, known as passover." On the other hand, the direction which the passover has taken definitely comes to light in the declaration that "Christ our Passover has been sacrificed," and the positive principle of change finds fully distinct expression.

On this view, manifestly in accordance with the contemporary Christian belief, we could view the whole range of references, with all their variety of form, in one coherence. The critical problems which have given rise to so much conjectural labour can be explained without a trace of patchwork—all in one line. The simple way in which the Last Supper is called "the passover" comes into the same line: there is the one ordinance which now represents the full spirit of the passover. Not an instance can be found, I believe, of the use of the much-discussed terms in the Three Gospels which does not answer to the law. If we proceed to John, by the same law we can interpret his fine turn of expression, and again not an instance is found to the contrary. If we pass from the Gospels to the remainder of the

New Testament writings, we find only (1) a futile thought springing up definitely amid the intrigues of Jewish politics, (2) a remote retrospect, and (3) a view of Christ himself as the Passover; and this same view is of the essence of our explanatory principle.

And finally, we thus automatically give a very forceful and continuous significance to the opening "division" of the passover and the unleavens, in the remoter introduction to our story, in accordance with the parting of the ways of which that story seems to tell.

If it could be shown that a principle which would offer a single coherent explanation for a variety of problems, and which would not leave the detail of a single relevant instance unexplained, neither exhibits the credentials of validity, nor calls for serious consideration, how much of what has been securely established as scientific knowledge would have lost its base?

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

I. ON THE LUCAN USE OF ΛΕΓΟ'ΜΕΝΟΣ, "*Known as.*"

Luke's introductory λεγόμενος, *known as*, is a rare departure from his introductory καλοῦμενος, *called* (not used by the other evangelists); used 24 times in Luke and Acts (with ἐπικαλούμενος three times). The very rarity of use precludes more than conjectural conclusions about its significance. (The conjecture would not apply to the other evangelists, of whom Matthew seems to use the introduction with most elastic

significance). Our point is the participal use. Does Luke by the change to λεγόμενος imply that an object is so named, but that he himself is not applying the name to it?

In Luke xxii. 47, λεγόμενος, *known as*, is the better supported reading. Inapplicability, especially at this moment, of the name of Judas—"Praise."

(The phrase can hardly be simply introductory, since Judas has been heard of before in the narrative of the betrayal, xxii. 3. "The passover" has also been heard of before in this Gospel—ii. 41.)

In Acts iii. 2, "the Gate that is known as 'Comely'," cites the title which was in use in the popular acclamation of an element in those æsthetic qualities of the Temple which Luke especially (xxi. 5—"gracing," etc.) showed as presented in vain to One who consigned all to utter ruin. The phrase λεγομένην does not necessarily associate Luke himself with the popular gratulatory use of the term about that which Jesus placed under a cloud. (In iii. 10, "Comely," *simpliciter*, occurs in recalling the *people's* recollection.)

Cp. iii. 11, "called Solomon's"—καλουμένῃ—where no similar point would arise.

Two instances of "called" flank Luke xxii. 1, a couple of sentences away on either hand.

In Acts vi. 9, "the synagogue known as that of the *Libertines* (Freedmen), Cyrenians and Alexandrians," might originally be that of the "*Libystines* (Libyans), Cyrenians and Alexandrians," as has been supposed. If this evidently not altogether unaggressive synagogue did not represent precisely the cream of African society, it would be in accordance with the antique sense of humour among the people to take the very open syllabic opportunity and change the title accordingly.[1] By the

[1] Cp. Edersheim, *Life and Times of the Messiah*, Vol. II., p. 287, (1886), *Dayyaney Gezeloth* (Robber-Judges), by "Jewish wit" for *Dayyaney Gezeroth* (Judges of Prohibitions or of Punishments). Cp. Vol. I., p. 374 on the origin of "Sadducee": ?(*Tsaddiqim* 'righteous' turned to *Tsadduqim* 'desolation' or 'destruction').

use of λεγομένης, *known as*, Luke could recall the side-light on current reputation, without choosing himself to become fully sponsor for the existing popular manner of it.

There does not appear to be any textual evidence whatever of the change having been made subsequently to Luke's writing.

These, with xxii. 1, are all the examples. (On the rejection of the reading in Luke ix. 10, see Streeter, *op. cit.*, p. 570.)

It is a curious little list, to say the least of it; and *looks* rather poignant.

Why does Luke just at these spots depart from his otherwise very distinctive custom?

II. ON THE USE OF ὅτε WITH THE IMPERFECT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Those instances which, like ours, contain an active verb, are marked (+).

In the following we have conditions *spiritually superseded*, and *futile* while they lasted:

(i) Rom. vi. 20: one-time "slaves to sin"; a futile and superseded condition.

(ii) Rom. vii. 5: one-time "in the flesh"; a similar condition.

(iii) 1 Cor. xii. 2: one-time "Gentiles led off to dumb idols"; a futile and superseded condition.

+(iv) Col. iii. 7: one-time "living in" things to be submitted to *necrosis*; again obviously a futile and superseded condition.

Contexts of the above:

(i) "What fruit were ye then having" (τότε with imperfect): futility.

(ii) "Bearing fruit to death"—futility. Again

καταργέω, "not infrequently = 'render idle or inactive'."—*Vocabulary*, Moulton and Milligan.

(iii) "Dumb idols," in contrast to spiritual gifts, among which "tongues" are prominent: futility.

(iv) "Walking in them"—whither? Futile advance.

In the following we have conditions *superseded*, and relatively *ineffective* while they lasted:

(v) 1 Cor. xiii. 11: "infancy"—a now superseded condition.

(vi) Gal. iv. 3: the same word again as "minors"—a now superseded condition.

Ultimately *superseded condition* of youth:

(vii) John xxi. 18: Context: Peter preparatorily girds himself—what comes of it?

Intention *superseded* and rendered null and void:

+(viii) Acts xii. 6: Herod *going* to bring Peter forth.

Conditions *pending supersession*:

+(ix) 1 Pet. iii. 20: long-suffering of God waiting over the disobedient. "Waiting" always a condition which looks towards its own replacement by the event.

+(x) Jude 9: discussion *pending decision*. (For this, see Moulton and Milligan, *op. cit.*, on this passage *sub.* διακρίνω.)

It may be noted that though we might not speak of futility in the two instances above, action is here spent on objects which baulk it of effect.

In the first, note context—the correlative ποτέ, "one-time disobedient": all the waiting and its conditions belong to a now removed historical past.

A state *anticipatively transcended*:

(xi) John xvii. 12: "when I was with them"—an anticipation so characteristic of this season of the Last Supper, in which the present becomes already transcended by force of prospect. (Compare the preceding verse, and see pp. 69, 70.)

A Passive instance *associated with superseded conditions*:

(xii) Acts xxii. 20: "when the blood of thy martyr Stephen *was being shed*, I also was standing by, and consenting, and keeping the garments of those that destroyed him." Here the *associated* imperfect refers to a transcended condition, and a futile one (like those first noticed), utterly renounced. The utterance is of the emotional kind in which psychological diffusion is strong, and ὅτε with the impf. would naturally be used here in connexion with the superseded state as a whole, though not in itself directly expressing such a state. The psychological colour is thus fully maintained.

In the following local instances, futility is not marked, but *transitoriness* still seems suggested:

(xiii and xiv) 1 Thess. iii. 4; 2 Thess. iii. 10: "when we were (being) with you." The recorded visit, lasting only about three weeks, had been brought to an end by a forced departure. If we suppose a longer visit, not recorded, it still remains in evidence that the writer has been intensely longing for more time with them, and feeling himself debarred from it (1 Thess. ii. 17, 18). There is therefore clear reason to suppose that, when he wrote, the time he had had with them, shorter or longer, was by no means presenting itself to him in any strong light of satisfying sufficiency, and that he used the phrase we are examining to express what would appear transitory to his regretful mood—all too transitory for his purposes. There is certainly nothing here to disturb our impression that the phrasing is essentially attracted by things regarded as transitory.

(xv) Mark xv. 41: "when he was (being) in Galilee" —the other Marcan instance beside ours. Again a remarkable situation. The earthly side of human transition in death has just been witnessed by women who remember him who has passed away as being where they would gladly minister to him in every-day things. And when a brief season of bright presence has come decisively to an end, we know how *transitory* it seems! Were the witnesses *satisfied*?

Is it possible to follow the instances, and withhold admission of the trend?

III. ON THE USE OF ΔΕΙ ̂ IN LUKE.

After the use about the "passover which *must needs* be sacrificed," the word is used in the Gospel four times, and exclusively in reference to *the suffering* of Jesus: xxii. 37; xxiv. 7, 26, 44.

It is used twice before of his suffering: ix. 22 (=Mark viii. 31); xvii. 25; and once again in special relation to it: xiii. 33.

The first two uses in the Gospel (where, we say, the last four are of his suffering) are of *his mission*: ii. 49; iv. 43; and there is another use still referring to his own movement: xix. 5.

Ten times, then, it is used of Jesus himself.

Six times beside it is used as in the expression of *his own* sense of necessity (as we have taken it to be in xxii. 7): xi. 42; xii. 12; xiii. 16; xv. 32; xviii. 1; xxi. 9; (=Mark xiii. 7; Matt. xxiv. 6).

This leaves only one other instance remaining in the Gospel: xiii. 14—even this apparently becoming a foil to his own use of the same word in xiii. 16.

It is remarkable that, in this subtly written Gospel, we never get δεῖ away from some very intimate relation to Jesus himself.

The Acts suggests that δεῖ was, or became, a favourite verb of Luke's. In his Gospel he might seem exquisitely to reserve it as a word characteristic of the expression of the life and thought of Jesus.

If this discrimination holds good, and others appear, the delicately differential reserve in the use of λεγόμενος, narrow as its own premisses are, might be psychologically confirmed by Lucan analogy.

Chapter VIII.

The Structural Principle of Gradation.

Of all the three stories Matthew's seems to be the least distinct. That is not a disparaging statement. From the purely literary point of view it might be a criterion of excellence that each story should be as fully self-explanatory as possible. But one emphatic result of our examination is that the literary point of view does not prove sufficient for the discernment of the vital relations of the narratives. It is an excellence for a member of a functional group to be specialised, and in so far as it is specialised it may be dependent on the functions of other members of the group for the completion of its usefulness. From the functional point of view, it is obviously not a defect in any one of the stories that it should be specialised in emphasis, and consequently dependent on the others for its full significance.

In Matthew's account there is no explicit command to make ready, and no clear break in the form of the narrative between the first and second parts of the story. Somnolently read through, it would convey the impression that the disciples made a request and were directed to what they wanted. On this view it might seem difficult to say why the story should be worth telling amid the pregnant narratives of the Gospels, except for the intense feeling of the message in its heart. This very

message to the host, however, makes the commonplace reading difficult to sustain as valid. The disciples and the Jews generally would expect the celebration to be held simply because the season of the passover was come; and why introduce, "I hold the passover with my disciples" with "*my season* is at hand"—the time of the passion? If the time of the passover was come, why was not that enough? To make the connexion quite evident, some link of explanation is required which will nowhere, I believe, be found in Matthew's own narrative. And if Matthew's story, thus not entirely clear in internal connexion when taken apart by itself, forms one side of an intimate division, the most natural thing to do seems to be to seek the missing link through the co-ordination of the story with its group. When we do so, we perceive that the season of the passion *is* a governing factor in the coming to make ready, exactly as it is made to be in this otherwise enigmatic beginning of the message in Matthew.

And now the latent energy of Matthew's whole depicting of the situation may begin to appear. There is something leonine in the combined majesty and swiftness of the movement of Matthew's Gospel. Sometimes the swiftness may be such that the majesty is gone by before we have perceived it; and then we write, "Matthew omits the details." First (xxvi. 1, 2), with the approach of the passover "after two days," the event which the disciples incredulously dread is shown to be even at the gates. And thereafter the bolts are heard withdrawing one by one—"then were gathered together

the chief priests . . then went Judas, one of the Twelve . . ." Amid conditions so ominous, with prospects so certain, the disciples nevertheless appear before Jesus to offer him the passover as if still in hope for the coming feast-time. Undeviatingly he strikes the unalterable note—not speaking to them, but mediately to another with whom he has made an arrangement for the inevitable —"My season is at hand." "And the disciples did as Jesus appointed to them, and made ready the passover."

And it is plain that this independently outstanding note of the passion, about which all the deeper feeling of the story centres, strikes in just where in comparing the stories we get an impression as of Jesus breaking in, with an insistence entirely his own, and just at the point *where Luke*, who confines himself to the standpoint of Jesus, *absolutely begins*.

I. DIVISION AND GRADATION.

We shall now be free to consider a further principle of formation in the accounts, different from that of division, but connected with it, and, like it, traceable throughout the narratives and their remoter introductions.

The story is not only a story of the parting of the ways. From the point of view to which it brings us we cannot think simply of two ways that part and stand opposed: we think of the one as dawning into fuller and fuller self-declaration; of the other as fading away into the region of things that persist

only as superseded. And the structure of the story is not only one of division; it is one of *gradation*. That is to say, if we take the unfolding stories as an organised group, with Matthew's standing at one extreme, and Luke's at the other, we shall find that the presentation of the messengers, and the conditions under which they move, increases in definiteness by clearly marked *gradation* as we proceed from story to story, while the presentation of the position of the disciples becomes relatively less, and vanishes. The presentation of what belongs to the purpose of Jesus is constantly in progressive gradation; the presentation of what belongs to the disciples' first position is in regressive gradation.[1] In the remoter introductions (Matt. xxvi. 1, 2; Mark xiv. 1; Luke xxii. 1), gradations complementary to these are very distinctly observable.

From any other than a biological point of view this ultimate unfolding of the two principles of structure—division from Mark, gradation from the resultant extreme of Matthew to that of Luke—would perhaps be inconceivable. From the biological point of view such a double unfolding is no anomaly. The evidence lies in the *cumulation* of distinct groups of facts. Each group, were it the only one, might easily be discounted as accidental rather than significant. It is not so easy to discount a manifest and continuous uniformity of groupings. I shall put pressure on myself to refrain from elaborating the facts, and to trust to the intentness of the reader's own observation, and the genuineness

[1] Perhaps I ought to say that I use the word "regressive" in a simple sense, without any relation to its Mendelian use.

of his comparisons. Constant use of the Reference Sheet may be found desirable.

II. GRADATION IN THE STORY.

In studying the division we began with the two masses of the story, which in Mark correspond to the two main parts of the incident. And the study of the division led us to recognise *the strong separation between the distinct significance of the second part of the incident*, after Jesus begins to speak, and any to be found in the first part of the incident, before he begins to speak.

In approaching the study of gradation, observe first in what degree, if any, the second part of the story is separated from the first in each account.

In Matthew, whatever new turn is given to the story, whatever new thought, unexplained by what went before, breaks in with the reference to "my season," there is no trace of any formal separation between the two parts. In Mark we can at least *suppose* something like a separation by a new beginning at the opening of the second part.[1] In Luke at this point, there *is* a new beginning, and the second part stands alone, in separation as absolute as it can be: with the first part cut off altogether. It is as if you had a continuous vessel, then a constriction in it at a point, and then a severance at the point where the constriction appeared.

It will be convenient to use the language of development, though I do not suppose the relations of gradation

[1] See p. 151 ff.

to be other than logical relations. To express functional relations in terms of process is not to express an opinion on the order of their growth.

Next in the study of division, we came to the two messengers. This is a group which belongs to the second (and, according to what we have just seen, the gradationally cut-off part of the story). Their separation appears in similar gradation, but more internally. In Matthew, they are not distinguished from the general body of "the disciples"; in Mark they are distinguished, but still connected as themselves "disciples[1]; in Luke, they are noticeably, and with apparent significance, not even connected as "disciples," and the severance is complete. Just as the second part of the story as a whole was in Matthew not distinguishably separated from the first, then in Mark distinguishably separate, but still connected, and finally in Luke not connected, so is the second group within the story disengaged from the first.

Meantime, the *constituents* of the second group become distinct in continuous bifurcation. In Matthew, they are not distinguished from the general body of the disciples; in Mark, they are distinguished from the general body, but not from one another; in Luke they are individually distinguished as Peter and John.

Again, this is a story of their making ready. Take the command which is given them to do so—an appearance of cardinal importance in the incident. In Matthew, it is never explicit; in Mark

[1] See pp. 12–14.

(xiv. 15) it is explicit, but only incidental; in Luke (xxii. 8) it is full and separately distinct.

The gradation is here even arithmetically evident. The number of (Greek) words of explicit command to make ready (including Luke xxii. 12) is 0, 3 and 9—in ascending order, and manifestly not susceptible of any other arrangement in ascending order.

In our third example of division, we came to "the day." Observe how it appears and becomes the separate and exclusive object of attention. In Matthew, explicit verbal reference to the "day" does not appear—only the mark of position in a series; in Mark, "the day" is explicit, yet is still but one of a series; in Luke, attention concentrates simply upon "the day"—no more as one of a series, but a day apart; and the concentration of attention upon it is definitely suggested by its introduction in Luke (and Luke only), in a sentence apart by itself. Again we may observe (i) a relative indistinction from the series, (ii) relative distinction, and (iii) entire separation—in logical development like the others, and quite reminiscent of biological development.

This falls into line with another gradation in the opening speeches, to which my attention was persistently directed by a contained gradation which is of no imaginable significance in itself, but which seemed quite likely, from the general structure of the narrative, to be a clue to some significance. The position of the final verb, *φαγεῖν*, *to eat*, measurably

shifts outward in successive stages. In Matthew, it is embedded in the general sentence: "Where will you have us make ready for you *to eat* the passover?"—where the part of the sentence with the second verb is in no way separated from the first. In Mark, it forms part of an appended final clause: "Where will you have us go off and make ready—in order that *you may eat* the passover?"—where the part of the sentence with the second verb is syntactically more detached from the first, yet essentially connected with it to complete the sense. In Luke at the extreme tip of the sentence, it forms, with its conjunction, a final clause by itself: "Go your way and make ready the passover for us—in order that *we may eat*"—where the part of the sentence with the second verb is syntactically quite detachable from the first: you could now remove it and leave a complete sense. This is quite in the manner. But what does it mean?

Compare Luke with the others, and take a blunt illustration from the ordinary use of language. If in daily life, you are wanting a meal, and find that a meal is available in the ordinary way, you will of course desire to *eat a meal*; if you require a meal, and know of none thus available in the ordinary way, you will desire *a meal to eat*.[1] Compare this piece of commonplace with the particulars. The disciples assume the availability of the ordinary passover, and naturally their point is *to eat the passover*—"Where will you have us make ready for you to eat

[1] To state the case more fully: this becomes the interposed practical desire, the desire to eat the meal being still fundamental. (Cp. Luke xxii. 15.)

the passóver?" Jesus is recognising no such availability, and his new point is *a passover to eat*—"Go your way, and make ready the passover for us, that we may eat." The final emphatic change in the position of the verb thus fits exactly into the circumstances we have supposed.

Now in our divisional comparison of the presentation of the question of the disciples,[1] we found (tentatively) in Matthew that the presence of any shadow of impending change was a thing that must not be recognised—the simple availability of the regular passover for present purposes is most unquestioningly assumed. In Mark, we found the presence of the shadow of impending change recognised in the anxiety which was displayed partly in the very *particularity* which appears through the changed position of the verb—"in order that you may eat the passover." In Luke, in the absolute conditioning of the eating by an immediately commanded passover, the presence of the impending change fully declares itself—"Go your way and make ready the passover for us—*that we may eat.*"

This, again, closely agrees with the gradation of the immediate introductions—the dating. There is to be no question of change—and the occasion is simply the "*first* of the unleavens," with a simple outlook through the successive days of the coming season.[2] And yet there *is* a question of change—and the occasion is that critical "first *day* of the unleavens," in which change, we saw, might begin to develop. (And at the same time, the Jewish sacrifice is looking transitory and insecure.) Finally,

[1] P. 159 ff. [2] P. 162 ff.

change fully declares itself—and the occasion is "the day": to be marked by decisive event, with all the prospect of unchanged procedure cut off. (And at the same time, the sacrifice which the day requires appears with all the new emphasis of necessity.)

Whether you deal with *the day*, *the sacrifice*, or *the opening utterance*, Mark seems to show something under a shadow of transiency, not appearing in Matthew, and Luke shows the established reality that cast the shadow.

Fantastic, no doubt—as the manifestations of vitality sometimes may appear to human imaginations which would forestall life's real fantasies by their own mediocrities. At the other extreme of the biological scale, how fantastic to minds privileged by instinct to know the right sort of facts when they saw them were those undreamt-of periodic answers of *Filariæ* to observation the precise results of which were once satirised by the sceptical enquiry whether the objects under observation "carried watches"?[1] But what kind of success would the ignorance which perpetuates human misery year after year have enjoyed if the certainty of common-sense presuppositions had prevailed over the unexpectedness of observation?

Gradation is not a matter of deductions from favourite historical hypotheses ranged in order one behind the other in regions inaccessible to actual modern observation; it is a matter of direct measurement carried out upon the facts always before us. It is not a suggested constituent of a

[1] Cp. note, p. 199.

scheme of explanation; it is an element of what has to be explained.

It will be noticed that our previous divisional result with the question—anxiety *dissembled*, and dissembled *anxiety*—is exactly in line with our more extended gradational result with the question and command: change scouted (that is, anxiety about it is dissembled); change nevertheless felt impending (that is, there *is* a dissembled *anxiety* about it); and change manifest (the new direction leaves anxiety and dissembling without an object). This confirms the objectivity of the complementary interpretation of the renderings of the question in Mark and Matthew (with their bearings on the division of the masses), unless it can be shown that some other interpretation would fit the gradation as well or better, or that the gradation itself has not been objectively made good.

And that the positions in *Matthew and Mark* lead by gradation into the position in Luke's opening speech adds difficulty to the supposition that that speech was originally produced by indefinitely free individual variation.[1] We have already observed that the detailed verbal relations of question and command are too exact to be like ordinary literary variation, and that the difference of Luke's first mass from the others appears so to function in the totality as to combine with the difference of Matthew's second mass from the others to define the division of the masses—again not a purely individual function, nor one suggesting a wholly disconnected variation.

[1] P. 153 ff.

Passing now to "second-mass" considerations, we might, I think, follow up our noting of the increasing distinctness of the messengers by noting the increasing suggestion of the degree in which they might enter into the very spirit of their errand. In Matthew, hardly any degree is suggested. Men who were almost stunned might carry a message, and "do as Jesus appointed to them." There is, as we have seen, no notice of their experience. In Mark, more consciousness of the strangeness of their errand (which might lead to some germinally stirring consciousness of its significance), appears where they make their way in suspense. The difference is almost as when a finger, numbed by a blow, tingles back into some renewed sensibility. Finally with Luke, where the psychological atmosphere throughout is serene, and the tone is governed by the foresight of Jesus (who in the end "*has* said," and it is enough), we may gather the clearest impression of what their consciousness in their errand might be if they were but fully sharing in the unstained purpose and undisturbed outlook of him who sent them. It would be possible for all forms of consciousness to be present in varying degree throughout—stunned, groping, dependently realising: each relatively prominent in succession

The first answer in Luke might, in the circumstances, be made by men all but dumbfounded.

Thus the features belonging to the errand come out—the elementary ones with a measurable definiteness which can become here or there even

arithmetical or local, the deeper with more demand on realisation—in constantly repeated gradation as we pass through the Gospels in this one particular order. And I believe it would be no more possible to alter the order and obtain such a collection of clearly graded effects than to alter the serial order of those figures 0, 3, 9.[1]

If, however, we look at what concerns the disciples and their Jewish standpoint, we may observe a certain regressive gradation. The "firstness" of the day of anticipation becomes less simple, more precarious, and disappears. The peremptory force of the question breaks down and is swept away by the final revelation. The space occupied by the whole account of the disciples' attempt stands to the total (not the remaining) space occupied by the story in the proportions of about 1:3 in Matthew, 1:4 in Mark, and in Luke disappears—that is, in this gradational order it forms successively $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, and 0 of the whole: figures which it would be absurd to recite except in confirmation of what otherwise appears.

On the other hand, the presentation of the purpose of Jesus at last clears itself, and stands alone, taking on full emphasis, and becoming the one continuous object of attention, insomuch that in Luke *His* sacrificial command, *His* serenity of foresight, form the subjects of the two masses of the story. At the opening, His command appears in a dawn from which all interfering cloud has vanished.

[1] Cp. p. 217.

The study of division showed that the differences between the narratives are not haphazard; the study of gradation begins to show that they lie in a *direction*.

It might at first seem that gradation might be derived from division, by supposing Luke to develop what Matthew omits. But not even all the *progressive* gradations start from a negative position in Matthew. And there would still be the problem of division.

III. GRADATION IN THE SENTENCES.

From our story we go back to the remoter introductions, immediately preceding the story of the Jewish council. We shall there find a very definite cluster of gradations of essentially the same kind, but at this point with regression predominant.

That gradation is here on the whole regressive may easily be tested by observing the amount of information *explicitly* conveyed in each sentence. In Matthew, you are told of an occasion coming in two days, and of the death of Jesus; in Mark of an occasion coming in two days; in Luke, of an occasion coming—an effect, so far, in exact conformity with the others, in point of gradation (as distinguished from the further aspect of separation noticed in the twofold story).

And if we examine the tone—though this may be more precarious—I imagine that anyone with a sense for flavour in expressions must feel that "You know that after two days the passover takes place" is a form of phrase more suggestive of an intimate interest in the occasion than "there was

the passover and the unleavens after two days"; and that "there drew on the feast of the unleavens, which is known as passover" is more suggestive of a distant interest than either.

But let us analyse. The sentences contain three elements—the passover, and the unleavens, and the prospect of the death of Jesus seen across two days. Take them severally.

In Matthew, the prospect of the death of Jesus, seen across two days, is distinctly before our eyes: "You know that after two days the passover takes place, and the Son of Man is delivered over, even to crucifixion." In Mark, it is not distinctly before our eyes, but the point at which it will take place is still definitely indicated: "There was the passover and the unleavens *after two days*." In Luke, even the definite indication of its place has disappeared: "There *drew near* the feast of the unleavens, known as passover."

Allow me still for my purposes to save words by using the language of development, though I suppose the relations to be properly logical. Side by side with this gradual vanishing of the traces of *the distinct outlook towards the death of Jesus after two days*, what happens with the great name of "*the passover*"? It is the sole direct title of the feast (Matthew); it is part of the direct title of the feast (Mark); it is no part of the direct title of the feast (Luke): "the passover," "the passover (*and the unleavens*)" "*the feast of the unleavens*, which is known as passover."

If you wished to speak of the sacred solemnity of the season with the most emphatic and significant force, you would say simply "the passover"; indeed, you could not so much as *pronounce* the word in reciting the titles of "the passover and the unleavens" with the same effect of emphasis.

On the other hand, if you wished to deprive the title of force, you could turn the pronunciation of "the feast of the unleavens, which is *known as* passover," to a repudiating effect quite impossible with "the passover and the unleavens."

And visibly the title is first and sole (Matthew); first but not sole (Mark); neither sole nor first (Luke).

These two elements, then, appear to be in regressive gradation. What of the remaining element, the ceremonial title of "the unleavens"? Do we observe any gradation for that? And if so, of what kind?

We took the terms "passover" and "unleavens" to be employed antithetically. Their division, so like the other regularly antithetic examples of division, sustains this. And understanding this, we can trace lines, as we have found, never infringed, throughout the whole New Testament uses of both terms; we can explain the reserve of the Johannine introductions, and their delicate turn,[1] and solve the critical problem of the "first day of the unleavens," without the aid of external conjecture.[2] Now observe the antithesis even of their *gradational* movement. What we have seen is that while the

[1] Chapter VII. v. [2] Chapter VII. iv.

death of Jesus, associated with the passover, ceases to be before our eyes, and then its place ceases to be marked, "the passover" itself loses emphasis, and then is displaced from its direct position. What we now perceive is that at the same time, "the unleavens," the alternative name for the feast-time, is, quite simply for observation, (i) absent, (ii) *second*, (iii) FIRST, in full position as "the feast of the unleavens." That is, while the spiritually significant title of "the passover" loses position, the title which shows the season on its palpable ceremonial side rises by clear gradational stages (like others) to full establishment. If we follow the line evidenced by all the other gradations we certainly find "the feast of the unleavens" at last in a direct prominence which the other elements have entirely lost.

We have therefore with the first mention of the passover-season of the time of our story a set of clear gradations, of the same type with those in the story, and therefore evidentially re-inforced by them—unless we will still strain that supposition of accidental coincidence far past its almost forgotten breaking-point.

And in the story of the action of Jesus in separation from Jewish authority, the newly dawning spiritual element is in *progressive* gradation, the old passing ceremonial element in regressive gradation. The movement before the story of the Jewish council is exactly complementary to this movement. Here the more spiritual elements are

in *regression*; it is the ceremonial element that is in progressive gradation.

It is possible that in the minds of some readers this detection of a suggestive function in the ways in which the event has found embodiment in permanent expression may be assimilated to the mystically eager interpretation of, say, the relative number of Job's camels and his she-asses. But the assimilations which arise from the neglect to brace ourselves for proper discrimination are the least valuable and most misleading of all assimilations. What is the difference between the fixed persuasion that the cigar-shaped fossil of the *Belemnite* is a "thunderbolt," and the careful interpretation of its comparative functional aptitudes from traces of hook-furnished limb, and sac in which the "ink" is still perceptible? If anyone will ponder the application of the distinction, it may be sufficient; if he will not, even so much is wasted upon him.

As our ultimate conclusions here will be important in significance, let us put the quality of our observations to a close test.

It is surely essentially the occasion of the death of Jesus which is being anticipated across an interval of two days. If it were not for that, is it likely that we should have any anticipation?

If that be so, the features of the sentences as a whole are the passover, the unleavens, and the death of Jesus attracting an outlook across an interval of two days. Sometimes a result of apparent precision can be obtained by judiciously selecting facts. I think it will be found that our examination does not select, but exhausts.

If there be nothing selective about our base of observation, can the results be set down to the account of chance?

Will the reader who thinks that may be possible, first correct or justify the following precise statement, viewing it in the light of the principle that economy of means is evidence of design?

In three renderings of an introductory statement, we have three terms—the passover, the unleavens, and an interval of two days viewed as measuring the distance to the death of Jesus.

These three terms are distributed between the three renderings in such a way that:

(i) Each appears once, and once *only*, relatively in a highest degree of emphasis, prominence or distinctness of reference;

(ii) Each appears directly once, and once *only* in a less degree of emphasis, first prominence, or distinctness of reference;

(iii) Each once, and once *only*, does *not* appear, in *direct* form, at all.

When we find that complete exhibition of each of the three degrees of the three terms is perfectly carried out within the total assemblage, even under conditions which involve *different* degrees of different terms being combined together in one and the same rendering of the introduction, and when we find that a single displacement of position, or a slight variation of relative force here or there in the total assemblage, would be sufficient to break up the existing exact completeness, the maintenance of the effect throughout by chance influences is one of those things which seem more probable the less you think

about them. And you have besides the perfect coincidence with the repeated exactnesses of gradation in the story. Let it be openly known if any individually responsible authority, now reputably at work upon the Gospels, is prepared to state this supposition of chance as a representative example of what he is accustomed to accept as adequate thinking.

By entering into the logical value of series of three or more continuously graded terms, we could more precisely illustrate the exclusion of chance in the distribution of the elements in the three sentences.

Any two points may be joined by a straight line, but a third point may always be out of line with any two. Similarly, a third term or logical position may be out of logically graded line with any other two. A compact series of three-term gradations, therefore, tends to exclude chance even more forcibly than a corresponding two-term series.

(Absences, of course, count as elements in a logical situation, if they are relevant absences, with defined positions in the logical universe.)

On the other hand, if there *be* a functional relation between the statements, the functional economy is of the most perfect imaginable kind. The sentences prove on analysis to be practically built up of elements which fall into three separate strands of conforming gradation, readily distinguishable, and apparently inter-involved, lying so compressed within the small compass of the sentences as to recall the way in which structures are compressed and interwoven in organic development. *Three* degrees (including zeros) of *three* terms (which terms, together with two slight additions of the verb *to be*

and conjunctions, *constitute* the entire Marcan sentence), appear in *three* renderings: *without omission or repetition of any term in any degree.* The opportunities of material and spaces together are exactly used, without overlapping; and no degree of any term is out of relative place required for marking gradation in the order in which we have repeatedly perceived it in the story. And yet the effect is not one of bare uniformity. The gradations are here regressive, there progressive, and exactly in such a way as to suggest a most important significance.

If they be fortuitous causes that are at work here—causes combined merely by chance—they are working in such a way as to make it impossible to produce any examples of their working similarly elsewhere.

Such continuous and unfailing precision through such complexity seems utterly inconceivable as the product of anything short of co-ordinating intent; it would be quixotic to suppose that the writers have combined themselves for such a purpose; vital co-ordination seems to supply us with the only groups of observable facts analogous to the groups of facts observable here.

Moreover, the suggested significance is exactly in accordance with our wider observations of the use of the terms involved; and exactly in accordance with a belief which is not now originated for the purpose of interpreting the facts, but which belonged to their own age:

The Jewish council, of whom we are about to hear in the narratives, will kill Jesus, but will recognise no

significance in his death. Put the significance of that coming death, of which Jesus himself speaks, out of view, and the reality of the passover will fade with it: what will be left will be a ceremonial survival which maintains the eating of unleavened bread, together with speech of "the passover," but retains no spiritual import.

The gradations thus confirm in closely organised form the conclusion about the significance of the terms to which we came from more general observation of the use of the terms in the Gospels. And what severer test than the gradations and their relevance would manifestly pass, would be required to prove co-ordinating intent in other matters—to determine certainly, say, whether notes heard from an instrument were being struck in intentional co-ordination, or in ignorance at random?

IV. THE REMOTER AND THE IMMEDIATE INTRODUCTIONS.

And if we now set these three remoter introductions of the passover-season which was the occasion of the death of Jesus before us in their gradational order, and then the three immediate introductions of the story in the same order, we may observe that in the first remoter three the passover appears as the sun might rise in the morning round, full and sole, only to show its half-disc later twinned with a blot of night in noon, while the atmosphere beneath is touched with desolation, and as at last the dark moon comes full centre, light vanishes, and becomes but a memory and a hope—"the passover," "the

passover *and the unleavens*," the lightless "*feast of the unleavens*, which is known as 'passover.'" And after that point, at which there is left to us in Luke but a "feast of the unleavens, known as passover," the occasion of the Jewish feast-time appears in the Three Gospels as "the passover" no more.[1] All across the story it is, in now unbroken line, "the unleavens," "the unleavens," "the unleavens." But as in the spiritually regressive gradations before the Jewish council we began with a passover associated with the death of Jesus, so in the openings of the story with the spiritually progressive gradations (the story of the new way of Jesus), we find in Luke at last a "passover which must be sacrificed" breaking into view from the eclipse of "the unleavens." Jesus, who will later say, "This is my body," is the personal centre of the new and unquenchable light of absolute reality.

And however hard it may be to receive, there is one correlation to which I feel bound to call attention, though it completes itself beyond the Gospels, and reaches beyond any outlook confined to the history of Jerusalem. Matthew does not touch the subject of the sacrifice. We found that his silence would be quite functional. But there *are* three, and only three passages in the New Testament writings in which the noun τὸ πάσχα, *the passover*, is associated with the

[1] Cp. Edersheim's impression, on another ground, that "while the historical *nexus* with the Paschal Supper is evident, it almost seems as if the Evangelists had intended, by their studied silence in regard to the Jewish Feast, to indicate that with this Celebration and the new Institution the Jewish Passover had for ever ceased" (*Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, Vol. II., p. 510).

verb θύω, *to sacrifice.* Place the three together, and they still form a gradation of exactly the same type as those now before us in the story, and in the remoter introductions. Beginning with the first in the total of three examples—that is, in Mark xiv. 12—we find *no hint of the new sacrifice,* except that something has taken away the interest in the old. Passing to the next, in Luke xxii. 7, we may begin to think we discern the new invested in the at first concealing figure of the old. Then, outside this history of things in Jerusalem, there is yet one more example, one more—and here there is no doubt of the new as the fully revealed centre of interest: "*Christ our Passover* was sacrificed," (1 Cor. v. 7.)

Almost as in division, but now with a shifted centre, and without explicit doubleness, Luke seems, with intentional ambiguity, to have both sacrifices in view; Mark distinctly has the one; Paul distinctly has the other.

Notice how, after "the feast of the unleavens, which is known as passover," we pass on into the darkness of evil purposes (unrelieved with a gleam from Bethany), until there is a liberation of the very horror of blackness —the transitional imperfects which we noticed never rest till they end in the aorist connecting the situation with the Evil One.

It may be observed that Mark's sentence, while it is an immediate introduction to the story of the Jewish council is not quite simply that: it looks at any rate beyond the period of time in which that council is being held, and becomes, we believe, an anticipation of the death of Jesus. In Matthew, the sentence becomes quite a separate narrative of anticipation of the death of

Jesus, and less simply an introduction to the story of the Jewish council. In Luke, on the other hand, it becomes more simply an introduction to the story of the council, for its phrase, "was drawing on," speaks of what was happening in the very time at which the council met; and it ceases to be an anticipation of the precise occasion of the death of Jesus.

We have, in fact, again something like the division between the point of view from which the prospect of Jesus is seen and the Jewish point of view, (but in an order complementary to that of division in the story).

And we have another, and double, gradation: the sentences *regressively* lose the distinctness of the anticipation of the death of Jesus, and coalesce *progressively* with the story of the Jewish council.

Finally, it is noticeable that while "the passover" in the remoter introductions, and "the first" in the immediate introductions, both gradationally lose emphasis by coincidence with a second element in Mark (p. 226), both "the unleavens" and "the day" receive a *setting* of establishment in Luke—"*the feast of* the unleavens"; "*there came* the day" (with nominative).

In concluding this systematic study of differences, we may notice that there is in the history one sentence, and only one, which is the same in all three Gospels. It is the last: "and they made ready the passover" (Matt. xxvi. 19); "and they made ready the passover" (Mark xiv. 16); "and they made ready the passover" (Luke xxii. 13). This sentence gives us no information which we could not have collected from the context; and the Gospels are terse. Its function would therefore appear to be emphasis. And why, in stories which begin with

"the unleavens," "the unleavens," "the unleavens," this closing emphasis on "they made ready *the passover*," "*the passover*," "*the passover*"? We have marked how characteristic of the story is antithesis.

It is curious that just these words:

MATTHEW.	MARK.	LUKE.
On the first of the unleavens	On the first day of the unleavens, when they sacrificed the passover	And there came the day of the unleavens whereon the passover must needs be sacrificed
And they made ready the passover	And they made ready the passover	And they made ready the passover

standing at the beginning and end of each story, may be grouped together as the *only* words which can be regarded as falling outside the division of the masses (though the opening words of "the first day" exhibit an exactly corresponding division of their own). Strictly, Luke's divisional divergence from Mark does not begin with the story, but only *after* the opening dating. And again, at the end, the words, "and they made ready the passover," are subject to no division. These margins at the beginning and end enrich the symmetry. And it is further curious that the *undivided* elements at the beginning and end—"the unleavens" and "the passover"—strike out, vertically, exactly the same antithesis as the division is working out horizontally. And the whole suggests what Luke's opening sentence suggests—that there *is*, after all, to be a

passover coming into view on the day of the unleavens.

It is characteristic of an organism that the whole lives its life in the several parts; and the reader may observe, not only how each Gospel is consistently interpreted by the whole group, but how the life of the whole story needs to be continually revived in our minds in the interpretation of the separate details and configurations.

Chapter IX.

"After-Part."

We have taken the movement to begin after sunset. If anyone were to suppose that this could be quite simply contradicted by pointing to "evening coming on" in Matthew xxvi. 20 and Mark xiv. 17, the supposition would show, I think, either rashness or ignorance, or failure to apply available knowledge. The old Jewish nomenclature of the transition between day-time and night-time offers to the modern mind a bewildering net-work of problems.

I. "*OPSE.*"

Before dealing with our word, translated "evening," ὀψία, *opsia*, it may be well to note the problems connected with the use of its correlate ὀψέ, *opse*, which has been translated "late."

Opse may be used for a time apparently between sunset and midnight: "at *opse*, or at midnight, or at cockcrow, or at morn" (Mark xiii. 35). But if Matt. xxviii. 1, "*opse* of the Sabbath, as it *began to dawn* towards the first day of the week," means what *we* should mean by "dawn," then *opse* could refer to a time so far on the other side of midnight as to be practically indistinguishable from the dawn of the next day-time. It might thus seem to apply to an after-part of the day, beginning near its close, and lingering until the sense of continuous relation with the activities of the past day-time

begins to be lost in the sense of the approach of the next—an after-part perhaps thus looked at more directly in relation to social occupations than to the astronomical changes which were their natural signal. It would in this way be a word to which we have nothing in English to correspond.

It is interesting to see the reference in Moulton and Milligan's *Vocabulary* to oxen coming "late (ὀψέ) yesterday, so as to be ready for work to-day." What is more important is the confirmation which the discussion affords to the impression that ὀψέ tends to indicate an *appendix* to a period of time.

On the other hand, the word used here in Matt. xxviii. 1 for "dawning" is used in Luke xxiii. 54 of the beginning of the Jewish Sabbath with the *sunset.* And from this point has started scholarly discussion involving such a comparison of indeterminate particulars with indeterminate particulars as might sooner accelerate a nervous break-down for the ordinary reader than lead him to any comprehensive conclusion.

To the different suggestions about the "shining forth" of the Sabbath at sunset, I am disposed to hazard an addition. I have wondered whether, since it appears that the Rabbinists held that responsibility for infraction of the Sabbath law deepened with the appearance of each star up to the number of three, the "shining forth" at the beginning of the Sabbath might at first have been that of the warning stars.

My own belief is that the "shining forth" in Matt. xxviii. 1 is the shining forth of dawn in the ordinary sense. If that is so, the contemporary *opse* was capable of being used on the far side of midnight in a

sense of which we of to-day, if we had no example, should have had no dream. Perhaps we should take warning for our thoughts of *opsia* also.

II. "BETWEEN THE TWO EVENINGS."

For our *opsia*, when the known particulars are assembled, seems to offer a problem quite as difficult to reconcile with our modern Western conceptions of usage as the complex problem already sketched.

Matthew, in xiv. 15, makes "*opsia* draw on," and again in xiv. 23 makes "*opsia* draw on"—though it is all one day. And it is not easy, on collecting and comparing the facts, to save the suggestion of a ridiculous blunder on his part from becoming itself ridiculous. I am not now thinking simply that the blunder would be too *unpresentable* for an inhabited world in which the sun set once in a day for everybody to see; so that the egregious error, even if it passed with a stupid or indifferent author, would have too much to escape through before it could get fixed by currency. The difficulty, as we shall see in a moment, is in the *precise placing of the supposed blunder*.

There are, I believe, two places in the whole of well-known literature in which "evening" is presented as coming twice in one day. And it is remarkable that both are in closest relation with the local history of Palestine; and both belong to what may properly be called a Palestinian succession in literature (whether Matthew's Gospel be actually of Jerusalem or of Antioch). One is the Levitical law, where the passover-victim is sacrificed, and other

things happen "between the two evenings" (Exod. xii. 6, xvi. 12, xxix. 39, 41, xxx. 8; Lev. xxiii. 5; Num. ix. 3, 5, 11, xxviii. 4, 8); the other is this Gospel of Matthew. Now for so out-of-the-way a thing as two evenings for one day to recur thus, and with no generally known examples outside, points to some connexion. For such a thing to spring out upon us twice within one literature, and with no connexion, would involve a spontaneity difficult to imagine. And to suppose this natural improbability, and a most violent self-contradiction into the bargain, is to suppose much; without much prospect of reason to support the supposition. This is not all the supposing which would have to be done.

According to John, who has helped us before to a connexion, the occasion on which Matthew sees something happening between two evenings, is an occasion immediately under the shadow of the passover (vi. 4 ff.),[1] and from John's language ("therefore") it might even seem that in the connexion with the passover was seen the very root of what both he and Matthew relate. Moreover, according to John (vi. 26 ff.), Jesus, speaking to the passover-crowd, indicates that this action which Matthew places between two evenings—the feeding of a multitude by his own resource—is typical of his giving them his flesh to eat, apparently as they will now be looking forward to eating the flesh of the passover-victim; (and this agrees, again, with his putting himself in the place of the passover-victim at the

[1] "Now the passover was at hand, the feast of the Jews. Jesus therefore, lifting up his eyes, and seeing a great multitude coming to him, says to Philip, 'Whence shall we buy bread that these may eat?'" (vi. 4, 5).

Last Supper, and saying, "This is my body" as in the three Gospels). Matthew, then, places between two evenings that action of the Master which the Master himself in John interprets as suggestive of his office as the passover-victim. And if you turn to the other appearance of the two evenings, in the Hebrew literature, you find placed between them this very interest of the sacrificing of the passover-victim. Reduce the coincidence as much as you can, by questioning my interpretations of John—though I do not know that they are at all novel, or that one has to go far for them—you are still faced with the connexion of the passover and the two evenings in the Hebrew Scriptures, and the juxtaposition of the passover and the two evenings through association with the same event in John and Matthew.[1] And to suppose that Matthew makes his outrageous blunder —which he will make, of course, once only in his narrative—just at this place of all places, where, *for the once*, it can wear a most striking appearance of appropriateness, and fit into continuously opening and suggestive coincidence, requires for its due setting a world of orderly chaos, organised on lines not generally traceable in this present matter-of-fact member of the solar system, where accidents commonly happen quite accidentally.

Face the matter and its circumstances, and you

[1] Cp. Edersheim (*op. cit.*), Vol. I., p. 677: "The statement of the Fourth Gospel, that the 'Passover was nigh,' is confirmed by the independent notice of St. Mark, that those whom the Lord miraculously fed were ranged 'on the green grass.' In that climate there would have been no 'green grass' soon after the Passover. We must look upon the coincidence of these two notices as one of the undesigned confirmations of this narrative."

may perceïve Matthew (the same Matthew who seems so subtly to develop the felt meaning of the message to the host in its bearing on the passion) dropping into his narrative a hint of the prospect of what should happen in deed and in truth "between the two evenings" when another passover-season was come. He implicitly shows the hour shadowed with the shadow which was so much unfelt at the time, and leaves the hint to remain uninterpreted by those who do not interpret him, nor follow his constant sense for what "was written."

These "two evenings" interpreted through John appear to yield another example of the sense in the Gospels of the relation between the passover and the death of Jesus.

It is not, then, mere error in the use of a word, but an exceedingly well evidenced example of possibility in the use of a word. And it adds to our problems. For it does not appear that the use of "evening" in the old Hebrew sense was still current in Palestine. It is part of the obscurity which seems persistently to attach to the Jewish nomenclature of diurnal transition, that the Rabbinists and the Samaritan doctors were at variance as to the times of the day respectively indicated by the Hebrew "two evenings." (The Rabbinists appear generally to have interpreted the times pretty much as Matthew applies them.) One can only suppose that the word *opsia* must have had some kind of elasticity difficult for us to recover by comparison or psychological conjecture, which enabled it to be used in a sense not exactly current, and yet still

intelligible. Was there some still surviving ceremonial use, based on the Hebrew "two evenings," and did this help Matthew's use? I do not know. The word was perhaps hardly yet a noun, like our "evening"—rather an adjective from classical times now coming into use more in the manner of a noun. Possibly, too, it was colloquial in this use—for Luke does not employ it—and colloquial phrases may share more or less in the pliability of metaphors. If *opse*, the correlative word, surprises and even disconcerts us, *opsia* baffles us. But it is useless to drown our bafflement by sinking into the hopelessly unpsychological and non-explanatory guess of a "blunder."

Mark i. 32 adds to "*opsia* coming on" the further description "when the sun set" as if it might not be quite clear from *opsia* alone what time was meant. Matthew viii. 16 ("*opsia* coming on"), and Luke iv. 40 ("the sun having set"), divide the two elements in the same form with the elements of the story of the passover.

The LXX translation of the "two evenings" is πρὸς ἑσπέραν, except in Ex. xxix. 39, 41, where τὸ δειλινόν balances τό πρωΐ or τὴν πρωϊνήν; in xxx. 8, where ὀψέ is used of the time for lighting lamps; and in Lev. xxiii. 5, where we have the more literal ἀναμέσον τῶν ἑσπερινῶν. The variety suggests that there was no recognised equivalent phrase in current Greek; and possibly both in πρὸς and in the adjectival τῶν ἑσπερινῶν of Lv. xxiii. 5 there is a suggestive vagueness.

III. CAN WE FOLLOW THE JEWISH MIND?

I have wondered whether we can understand the old Semitic conceptions of time without a baptism

into psychological sympathy which a *purely* acquisitive and critical scholarship does little to provide. The tenses of the Hebrew verb, which seem capable of viewing the future as germinally accomplished, and the past as something in which to go forward, suggest a relativity of conception which we do not ask our own English tenses to express. Is it certain that with our labour of conjectural comparison we have got at the very standpoint, or perhaps rather standpoints, from which a crescent or expiring day would quite naturally and easily be viewed in ancient Palestine?

We read, then, a story which to the Western imagination, quite unused in practice to a day which begins with sunset, does not look at all like an evening one, but which appears, the more we examine it, to harmonise the more closely to its innermost fibres with the conception of the evening beginning the 14th of Nisan. Mark might seem to be pressing the continuity of the evening with the day-time of sacrifice upon us—although the day-time would quite ordinarily be "to-morrow," even to a Jew—to bring out how imminent the disciples felt the passover to be, when they asked their question about the supposedly unaccomplished making ready. The writer of a terse story, who would slightly hint the imminence in passing, could hardly have hit upon a more effective opening. After we have read the story, we find "*opsia* having come on." What are we to do? Invest *opsia* with the qualities with which it may be invested by an imagination totally incapable of reconciling them with Matthew's directly preceding narrative uses of

the same term (xiv. 15, 23), and turn tail on our interpretation; or on the great strength of the evidence of what precedes, of the correlations of the Three Gospels, of the parallels in John, of the problems of *opse*, and of the certainly doubled *opsia*, with its passover connexion, admit the presence once again of that recurring problem which modern scholarship has certainly not yet very evidently solved? If the correlative *opse* had a use which is more naturally explained by reference to variations in social activity than by reference to the astronomical changes of which they are a consequence, *opsia*, too (like our "evening"), might have a social as well as an astronomical use. In the months when the sun sets early, our "evening" in the social sense is apt to be later in the night, in its incidence, than "evening" in the physical sense, about sunset; and if our social hours had ended nearer sunset, it seems quite conceivable that we might have had a final "evening" drawing down upon us after the social day was over. And until some one can disprove a socially determined *opsia* (perhaps in general an after-supper *opsia*), falling thus after sunset, and after the resulting quiet has had time to enter into the inner heart of city and village, the stumbling-block to our interpretation will not be obvious. It is difficult to erect an effective stumbling-block out of a liquid that refuses to freeze for the purpose. And the triumphant man who has finally settled the capacity of *opse*, psychologically explained the possibility of speaking of "two evenings" on one day in first-century Palestine, and fully reconciled

his mind to the "dawn" of night—to say nothing of the Hebrew tenses—has yet, I believe, to be met.

The third century reference in Moulton and Milligan, *καθ' ἑκάστης [ἡμέρα]ς κα[ὶ] ὀψας* (l. *ὀψίας*), "every day and evening," suggests a familiar contrast of day-time with something other than the sunset-hour.

IV. THE HOUR OF ASSEMBLY.

Three successive *narrative* uses of *opsia* in Matt. (xiv. 15, xiv. 23, xxvi. 20) would give us an *opsia* before sunset (presumably after the time of the beginning of the sun's more rapid decline, three hours before it set), an *opsia* presumably about the time of sunset, and a consequential *opsia* on the other side of sunset (as *opse* apparently reappears on the other side of midnight). These three narrative uses are all connected with the passover.

I do not understand it to be at all necessary that *opsia* in the last instance should have drawn on *immediately* before the supper. It is enough that it should have developed some time between the beginning of our story and the beginning of the meal. That much less happened between the two times than has been supposed, we have already suggested.[1]

We have now to compare Luke's handling of the progress of the time.

In smoothly ordered development, "*the day*" comes (xxii. 7), and then "*the hour*" draws on (xxii. 14)—he evidently means an appointed hour. And the deliberate "*when* the hour was drawn on"

[1] P. 38.

(contrasted with the participial construction "*opsia* having drawn on," to which we shall turn in a moment) suggests an hour awaited by someone. It is the fit sequel to a story in which we have just been following the expression of the serene foresight of Jesus; (and it is in perfect quiet harmony with the subsequent expression of desire fulfilled.)

And as Luke, in "the passover" which "must needs be sacrificed," may seem with double-edged subtlety to glance at the ordinary sacrifice only to indicate one appointed by law not less real, but more profound and vital, so in "the hour" he may seem with double-edged subtlety to remind us of the hour for the regular passover-feast, and by showing us Jesus reclining with the commissioned "Apostles" in their places with him, to indicate a feast of no less order in its appointment, and no less dignity in its authority.

On the other hand, the participial construction, "*opsia* having drawn on," is fitted to suggest the sweeping of occasion upon men in the inevitable course of time. At the previous note of time the disciples were seen seeking to evade the crisis. Now time is moving inevitably on; and after a very brief account of the supper, in which we do but hear of the imminent betrayal, and see the prophecy, soon to become a memorial, of the body broken, and the blood poured out, we pass on to the Mount of Olives, where the disciples are to be parted from their Master.

Into the structural characteristics of the verses I shall not here enter.

Chapter X.

Whence ?

John Constable, who could search sympathetically into the meaning of Ruysdael, and be touched to tears by Gainsborough, and whose biographer did not remember ever to have stood with him before a fine picture without his directing attention to some unnoted excellence in it,[1] was perhaps too extremely English to be understood at once so near at home as England, when he said that the first thing he tried to do in sketching from nature was to forget that he had ever seen a picture.[2] He wished to retain the power to see those vital blendings of form which might, though directly present, remain strangely invisible to minds preoccupied with those selections from nature which formed the base of scholastic elaborations. I am not clear that we are even strongly wishing for any such power in England to-day as we approach the manifold wealths of the Gospels. Our enquiring intellect seems in danger not of using method, but of allowing an imported method to use it. My limited knowledge does not enable me to distinguish in this land of John Locke that even where information is copious and speculation active we are anywhere evincing any

[1] See C. R. Leslie, R.A.'s *Memoirs*, (Second Edition 1845), pp. 350, 354, 311.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 307.

very fundamental capacity for progressively discovering method for ourselves under the direct and ever-fresh influence of the facts. For merely to react into the freedoms of imagination where we decline the limitations of mechanism—to exchange the wooden for the woolly, as a friend of mine expresses it—is not to use method. I do not know how clumsy an attempt this now offered may be. But while it owes much to the counsel of others, and I hope owes some part of the debt which a work of research should owe to the accumulated research which has preceded it, I do not feel that it has to acknowledge any disproportionate debt to that perpetually shifting but radically unchanged tradition of arbitrariness which has prevailed ever since the days of the selective attempt to force the New Testament writings into becoming an illustration of the Hegelian philosophy. "My pictures," said Constable, "will never be popular, for they have no *handling*."[1]

Our method has not been to base conclusions upon selections of facts cited as illustrative of tendencies, but to examine the facts within a given area as far as may be exhaustively. And the reader may go through the narratives, if he will, and observe minutely to see how much has been left unweighed. We have held it to be our reasonable and bounden duty, with the facts directly available before us, to see whether they display any natural coherence of their own, before we reconstructively accommodate them to any expectations worked out in theory.

[1] *Ibid.*

Owing to the comparative form which begins to become evident in them even on superficial inspection, and which does not cease to be evident on closer investigation, we have thought it right not to shrink from carrying investigation to any degree of attainable intensity at which it would still yield coherent results. I know of no other scientific rule for the limitation of the process of comparison. It appears, indeed, to be so fully assumed that there is no intimate arrangement to investigate, that I have learned more than once of scholars being able to express views upon the present enquiry before it had come into their hands. But I do not see how any permanent conclusion about the latent nature of objects can be drawn from the fact that a particular form of investigation has not hitherto been tried upon them.

The correlations revealed by examination, while very clear and orderly, seem not only too difficult in structure, but too latent in manifestation, to be the result of any every-day and easily fathomable purpose. Indeed, to say that they appear insignificant, while yet they have somehow been wrought out in all their insignificance, is but to say that their presence is not to be explained by any ordinary literary motive.

The few who know the work of the late William Medley of Rawdon, will not be wrong in supposing that it is the remembrance of his intuition which has helped to interpret my observations.

If someone should ask how it is possible to reconcile the presence of a vitally regulative factor with

that play of individual literary motive which appears to be present (though it is certainly not sufficient to explain what else is present), he will be quite under an illusion if he supposes that he is thereby disposing of the problem of the correlations.[1] He is only stating a phase of it. But if he has neither on the one hand closely examined the given facts nor on the other deeply pondered the essential character of vital operation he may not know what phase. He who has considered how, in life's hierarchy, organism can control material, and mind can direct organism, may realise how purpose can live within purposes—purposes aflame yet not consumed.

To state a position which, so far as it is true, requires reconciliation with the facts, is not to get rid of the facts, and it is certainly not to solve their problem. The question is, can you get rid of the configurations? If not, does your theory explain them? And again if not, is it sufficient to explain the present dispositions of the material?

We have seen that the configurations of the facts are not only such as to force upon us a critical problem; they are of a kind to suggest significance.

There are two main directions of significance to which I desire to call attention at the close.

(I) By what authority did Jesus, at the end of his earthly days, step in and change the order of the passover, which was understood to be a centre of vital privilege which separated between life and

[1] See p. 26 ff.

death for its participants, and gather its ancient meaning and future promise about a living Personal centre?

Was it authority which showed all that it was upon the face of its action, and went no deeper? Then the incident was a curious one in religious history.

Was it a living and unfathomable authority? If so, it becomes possible that that rare passover was a turning-point in the religious history of the world. There may be something in it which has an interest as perennial and as modern from out of its antiquity as the mystery of life itself.

Now who tells us to-day that he stepped in and made the change? I cannot see who does so, though I cannot rid myself of the evidence that we are told.

Mark does not tell us. Had we his story alone, if we could reflect upon it constantly for a year together, I do not suppose we should trace the change There would be points unexplained, like that with which we dealt in our opening pages. But in the course of centuries they might never come into focus; and if they did, we should not think of any such large explanation.

What of Matthew? He has a turn in his story, we saw,[1] which his story does not explain—but that is as much as to say that *he* does not tell us of the change.

Luke differs from the others[2]; but his own story might seem to run perfectly straight: much too straight to reveal any change.

[1] See p. 212. [2] Cp. pp. 158, 159.

Once more, with John alone, we should not know that we had touched the passover—though he has one verse, noted on our way,[1] which so far as I know never has been explained, and which I believe never can be explained apart from his sense of the passover-value of the supper.

No one tells us. Yet the records taken together have not now for the first time suggested the belief of the change. And when we examine with an unremitting scientific closeness, the stories as a whole are bound up into a unity of functional distinctness, and mingle their forces in a marvel of coherent complexity, to which the change seems everywhere to be the clue. One principle unifies John's differing account of the time of the Jewish passover with the Three, and Luke's differing account of the opening with the other two. And out of detail organised as clearly, and for all we can see, as unfathomably, as the structures that witness to life, stands forth everywhere what no one has told us—the change made at the bidding of human lips, and under the sanction of a human presence.

Is it, then, a defect of narrative that no one tells us? If someone told us, in what way could his telling set before us to-day the almost palpable likeness of an act of unfathomable authority? If no one tells us, and yet the telling comes from beyond those who give the details of the history, then the act must be sanctioned from beyond. Whence? At present I say no more than that the acknowledgment of the change appears to come from beyond the writers of the Gospels, and from some agency

[1] See p. 84.

that is able to produce a likeness to a higher order of vital combination in the world.

(II) Behind the story, at the first appearance of the passover-season, and ramifying into the story, and connecting with lines of consistency, I think, far beyond the limits of the story, we found a complex, but definite coherence, which is a strange phenomenon indeed if it be not significant, and which seems susceptible, so far as I perceive, of only one supremely reasonable interpretation: the passover is the passover when associated with the death of Jesus, otherwise it is the passover no more. A brief *résumé* of the correlations might not fairly represent them. The reader who is in earnest may not wish that I should save him the tension of collecting and keeping the facts before his mind. But I do not see how, upon the observation of the facts, and the definite correlations of the facts, as we trace them from Gospel to Gospel, and upon the very movement of the facts, if our minds follow the movement, we are to escape the impression that we have here, in a form which is either vital, or wonderfully simulates vitally governed co-ordination, a testimony to the sacrificial import of the death of Jesus, such as has never yet been shown to have been given to any fact outside the history of Jesus.

No man gives it. No men would conspire to give it in a form requiring something like a biological closeness of comparison to trace its definiteness, But can you dissolve the correlations, expose the unreality of the division, confound the measures of the gradations while yet discriminating the degrees

in order, or show how absence of motive would produce continuity which does not fail amid all its complex latency?

A deeper problem remains. Though we may conclude on evidence inescapably definite, and redundant within the space examined, that there has been a co-ordinating of the actions of living individuals into something not logically distinguishable from coherent testimony, and that the co-ordination lies outside the scope of recognised human dispositions, yet it is not upon the ground even of such transcendent unifying that we must rest the assurance of Divine testimony in the Gospels. It is not the mere presence of a higher co-ordinative principle which can guarantee to us the highest form of spiritual manifestation. We already recognise the presence of a co-ordinative principle at various levels in the world—in physical organisation, in mental coherence, and in the higher unity of our own self-conscious and responsible being; and when we have proved the presence of co-ordination more or less controlling the highest of these (as among these also the higher may control the lower), we have not thereby evidenced Divine authority. Any convincing revelation of that must lie in the quickening issues of what is conveyed rather than even in the most manifestly vital arrangement of its conveyance. Arrangement may be produced by life, but out of arrangement you cannot get quickening; and without quickening there is no fundamental illumination, as surely as without life there is no mind.

It does not follow, however, that form has no reaction upon life. Suppose it possible for a moment that a too mechanically self-satisfying explanation of the history of the death of Jesus would hinder the perception of quickening possibilities hidden for us in his sacrifice. Suppose when such an explanation had been given, there appeared characteristics even in the very outward form of the conveyance of the history which, when examined with an accurate naturalism, were found after all to be beyond the scope of naturalism to explain. Surely the effect should be *suspensory*. If our naturalism proves inadequate to explain even so much as the measureable features of the mode of conveyance, why assume it to be peculiarly capable of finally enlightening us on the real measurement of what is conveyed?

Now we saw at the outset that the suspending of activities which could not in their own quality be regarded as vital might be an essential condition of bringing them ultimately into a vital co-ordination.[1] In the suspension of our own unquickened conclusions through the intervention of mystery quite superficially evident, yet irremovable by any contrivance, the living wisdom of a Spirit that does not infringe our individuality might conceivably find its opportunity to bring our minds into that ordered mingling of quiet and activity which would prelude a larger apprehension. The new apprehension might transcend all that a limited naturalism had ever intended to be found thinking, yet within its scope might freely spring a quickened reflection,

[1] P. 27.

an impassioned impulse, an answering gratitude, all ours more deeply than anything we had reckoned as ourselves before. Then in that higher co-ordination of thought which had become possible where there was vital realisation, we might leave behind the poor hope of ever completely rationalising the sacrificial death of Jesus according to any measure of rationality more limited than the eternal thought of God; and under that same guidance which gave the records the shape which we only mistook when we thought we had measured it, we might gladly welcome, through a sacrifice transcending all limits of law, emancipation not only from our own past limits of interpretation, but from our own past burden of ourselves.

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